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1  Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Introductory Comments 
 
 
I had the chance to spend one year as an Erasmus student in Lithuania in 2006/2007, where I 
studied at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the University of 
Vilnius and I had the opportunity to witness how Lithuania is becoming more and more a part 
of Europe again. 
In this year I also realized how essential it is for Lithuania to be part of Europe; that the 
European countries see Lithuania no longer as a former state of the Soviet Union, but as a 
member state of the European Union and NATO.   
Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO in 2004, both memberships were important 
milestones for the country, but for different reasons. The joining of the European Union was 
merely for economic reasons and to be realized as an integrative part of the “European 
family”. In my thesis paper I want to dwell on analyzing the reasons for Lithuania’s NATO 
membership. For one reason because I discovered that this is a very interesting topic, although 
a very emotional one for Lithuanians and for the other that there is a lot of literature on 
NATO’s second round of enlargement including Lithuania in 2004, but very few on why 
Lithuania felt the need to join this global security alliance.  
Therefore this concentrates on the question why Lithuania chose to join NATO and if there 
were other security scenarios possible for the country which were not chosen and for what 
reasons. Which factors played a role? On the other hand why was NATO interested in the 
membership of the Baltic States, three former Soviet Union countries, although it clearly 
imperiled its relations with the Russian Federation? And of course the resultant question why 






1.2 Guiding Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 
To assess the reasons for Lithuanians NATO membership on both sides, from the point of 
view from Lithuania as well as from NATO, the following questions will guide the analysis of 
this matter: 
 
 Why did Lithuania want to join NATO? 
 Is there another possibility for an emerging small state than to join an international 
security organisation? 
 Why didn’t Lithuania want to be neutral? 
 Why was Baltic Co-operation not an option that was taken into further consideration 
concerning military security? 
 Was NATO the best choice for Lithuania? 
 Why did NATO want Lithuania as a member state? 
 Why was Russia against Lithuania’s joining of NATO? 
 What is Lithuania’s public view of its military? 
 
 
Through these questions five hypotheses are to be tested. 
 
1. If Lithuania still believes that Russia is a threat to their nation then Russia is one of the 
main reasons Lithuania joined NATO. Lithuania saw Russia as a threat throughout 
history and was often proven right and therefore they wanted joined a defence 
alliance. 
 
2. If the Lithuanian identity and history played also an important role in their decision to 
join NATO then Lithuania wanted to set a clear signal for the Western countries that 
they want to belong to them and are not anymore a satellite of the Russian Federation. 
 
3. If the military power of their threats is as big as the one of the Russian Federation then 
the Lithuanian armed forces would neither have the quantity nor the quality – no 





4. If Lithuania could not find another alliance or institution that would guarantee their 
hard security concerns then their only choice was NATO. 
 
5. If Lithuania has NATO membership Lithuania then they believe to assure that the 
Western countries and especially the United States would be their allies in times of 
emergencies.  
 
6. If the parties of Lithuania would not have agreed completely upon NATO membership 




                                                
1.3  Theory and Definitions 
 
 
In this part I want to develop or adopt some definitions or theories in order to explain what 
opportunities small states, and in particular Lithuania, have for ensuring their security.  
 
Firstly I will point out some descriptions that are essential for understanding the topic. What 
is a small state and what did this mean in history and nowadays? And what does this mean 
especially for Lithuania? All in all the whole paper concentrates on security and what did 
Lithuania do to ensure it for its nation, so I wanted to define the term security. Not only what 
does security mean for Lithuania, but also how much security means defence for this country 
Did the challenge for a country to be secure changed since 9/11 and does this effect 
Lithuania? Lithuania chose NATO-membership, the membership of a security alliance; 
therefore I will define what is an alliance and what it differs from other forms of bonds. 
 
Secondly I will look on theoretical concepts. What “solutions” does political theory have for 
small states and their security policy and are they practical for Lithuania? Does a theory 
explain why this small country joined NATO? By the virtue of security policy I chose 
Realism and Liberalism. On the one hand because the two theoretical schools differ from each 
other very much and have varying options how to solve a security dilemma, but on the other 
they both explain in way why Lithuania is now a member of NATO. But as Erich Reiter put it 
very accurate in one of his articles,  
 
 The question whether small states should join alliances or not is both sustainable and 
unsustainable in theory. 
 The question whether a specific small state should be a member of an alliance, cannot 
be answered, however, by theory, but can only be answered on the basis of concrete 
circumstances, in particular, its objective comprehensible interests in the specific 





1 Erich Reiter, Introductory Comments on the Objective of the Small States and Alliances Workshop, in: E. 




                                                
1.3.1  Some Definitions 
 
 
1.3.1.1  Small states 
 
The heydays of small state theory were in the ‘70s of the last century and it has been criticised 
and questioned a lot since then. It had two trends: First the powerful states and the realist 
school of thought researched the small state “phenomenon” and after that, quasi as a respond, 
the small states analyzed themselves.2 
You could argue that small state theory is no longer relevant as a political theory but it is very 
usable for Lithuania. On the one hand Lithuania sees itself as a small state and on the other 
the common perception is that of the Baltic states and not as Lithuania as such. Furthermore 
the recognition of small states is still crucial when it comes security matters3 and international 




To define what a small state is and what states are small states, the literature does not quite 
agree and in most articles the definition is left out with the reference that this is a complicated 
topic. 
That is why I decided to choose different types of definition in which it will be coherent that 
there is no doubt that Lithuania, the state of my thesis, is a small state. 
 
1. Quantitative Definition 
Small states are states with a population under 15 million people.4 
For a quantitative definition it has proven to be suited to use the population of a country. 
In this way countries with a comparatively large territory but with a small population, for 
example Canada or the Scandinavian countries, can also be seen as small states. 
Lithuania has a population of 3.349.8725, so using this definition it is clearly a small state. 
 
2 Cf. Felix Koßdorff, Die Republik Irland – Ein Europäischer Kleinstaat und seine Aussenpolitischen Strategien 
als Mitglied der EU, Dissertation, University of Vienna, 2000, Vienna, p. 20-25 
3 Cf. Felix Koßdorff, Die Republik Irland – Ein Europäischer Kleinstaat und seine Aussenpolitischen Strategien 
als Mitglied der EU, Dissertation, University of Vienna, 2000, Vienna, 41-46 
4 Cf. Helmut Kramer, The concepts of Small States, Paper presented at the Workshop „Small States and 




                                                                                                                                                        
 
2. Definition by Power 
In international politics states are often referred to as powers, bearing realist theory in 
mind that international politics is always a struggle for life. You could emanate from this 
that small states and minor powers point to the same conclusion. 
“[M]inor powers can be defined as states whose diplomatic and material resources are so 
limited that their leaders focus mostly on the protection of their territorial integrity rather 
than the pursuit of more far-reaching global objectives.”6 
Lithuania proofed in their choice of joining NATO that they are mostly concerned with 
assuring their security and according to this they are a minor power.  
 
3. Comparative Definition 
“Small states are defined by what they are not.”7 Neumann and Gstöhl wrote that every 
state that is not a great power and is not insisting to be a middle power is a small state. 
According to this definition states compare themselves to others and if they are a small 




In history small states were mostly seen as weak states, because they had not the ability to 
build up armed forces with enough military power. Thus they were vulnerable to the 
expansionary policy of their larger neighbour states and hence small states often became the 
victims of larger powers interests. One of the crucial examples for Lithuania was the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when the foreign ministers of Russia and the German Reich decided 
how to split the region between Germany and Russia. In this secret document the larger 
powers under Hitler and Stalin regarded Poland and the three Baltic States just as interstations 
to their dominance in Europe. 
5 Lithuanian Population 2009 in: http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/pages/view/?id=371 26th October 2009 
6 Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns, 
in: Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p. 16 
7 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? In: Christine Ingebritsen 
(Ed.), Small States in International Relations, University of Washington und University of Iceland Presses, 2006, 




                                                
But on the other hand small states had some positive recognition too; they were seen as 
“politisch übersichtlich und für demokratische Strukturen besonders geeignet”8, but 
unfortunately this fact didn’t matter that much when they were constantly threatened by 
militarily more potent states. 
   
In the 20th century there were two major historic incidents that shaped Europe and its state 
world as it is today. Those two had the most influence on Europe’s “Mutation […] zum 
Kleinstaaten Kontinent”9. 
 
1. The First World War 
After the break up of the “Habsburger Reich” the emerging of numerous small states 
was evident. What was before one state became Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Yugoslavia.10 Before, most of the world powers were European empires 
but after the 1st World War the time of big empires was over and the time of the 
nation state arose and as said earlier some of them were newly built. “Gab es im Jahre 
1914 lediglich acht Kleinstaaten”11 thus in 1919 the number of small states had nearly 
doubled. 
 
2. The Fall of the Iron Curtain 
After the cold war was over and Soviet Union broke up another large number of states 
emerged, of course not all of them were small states with the population under 15 
Mio. But nevertheless the following incidents, after this major historic event, like the 
peaceful splitting up of Czechoslovakia, or the martial dissolution of former 
Yugoslavia let the number of small states in Europe increase to 38 in 2004.12 
 
 
8 Laurent Goetschel, Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik von Kleinstaaten: Indiz für die Entwicklung der 
internationalen Beziehungen?, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen, 
2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, p. 223 
9 Romain Kirt, Der Kleinstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in 
den internationalen Beziehungen, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, 
p.155 
10 Karl Vocelka, Östereichische Geschichte, 2007, C.H. Beck, Munich, p.96 
11 Romain Kirt, Der Kleinstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in 
den internationalen Beziehungen, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, 
p.156  
12 cf.  Romain Kirt, Der Kleinstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur 
in den internationalen Beziehungen, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, 




                                                
As the Belgian Prime Minister Theo Lefèvre put it already in 1960: “All countries in Europe 
are getting small. There are those which know it already and those which don’t know it yet.”13 
 
 
1.3.1.2  Security 
 
Even in the classic English Dictionaries like the Oxford English dictionary and the 
Thesaurus the understanding of security is quite different. In the Thesaurus14 defence 
and protection are listed first, when in The Compact Oxford English Dictionary15 
defence and protection is not even mentioned. What is also interesting is that The 
Compact Oxford English Dictionary sees terrorism and espionage as criminal activities 
and not as military threats. 
 
 
In political science Heinz Gärtner found several different definitions of security:16 
 
1. Security is the absence of a threat. 
2. Security is the absence of a threat or the power to defend oneself against a threat. 
3. Security is “the ability states and societies to maintain their independent identity and 
their functional integrity”17. 
4. Security is the inner freedom to make decision even under the pressure of an external 
aggressor. 
 
Especially the 4th definition is crucially important for Lithuania so they can withstand the 
pressure of the Russian Federation. 
 
Security policy was and sometimes still is the major topic in the foreign policy of small states. 
Of course in the 19th and early 20th century it was far more important for a small state to be 
 
13 Cited after Romain Kirt, Der Kleinstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als 
Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, 
Vaduz, p.157 
14 Roget’s II: The New Thesaurus, Third Edition, 1995 
15 Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English, 2009 
16 Heinz Gärtner, Internationale Sicherheit, Definitionen von A-Z, Wiener Schriften zur Internationalen Politik – 
Band 9 OIIP, 2005, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p. 125 
17 Buzan cited after Heinz Gärtner, Internationale Sicherheit, Definitionen von A-Z, Wiener Schriften zur 




                                                
able to secure their country against all threats because the military superiority of the large 
empires in Europe was evident.  
The level of threat has changed dramatically in the last one hundred years; symmetric 
conflicts are no longer state-of-the-art instead new forms of asymmetric conflicts appear.18 
Since 9/11 especially, terrorism is a new threat, but terrorism is a threat for all states, the size 
doesn’t matter, “[g]egenüber dem Terrorismus sind alle Staaten klein”19. I would even say 
that the chance of an international terrorist attack is higher for great powers because the 
attracted attention is much higher if you attack the United States than for example Lithuania. 
But not only size matters, military power is no safeguard either and not even the largest 
intelligent agency of the world, the CIA, could foresee the terrorist attacks in September 2001. 
 
 
1.3.1.3  Alliances 
 
According to Krause and Singer, the major disadvantage of the existing literature on alliances 
is that there is “no overall consistent theoretical framework on alliances”20. As Singer and 
Ward note, a key impediment to theory building in alliance research is the absence of clarity 
about what constitutes an alliance. One way to come to a definition is to point out how 
alliances are distinct from alternative forms of international co-operation as alignments and 
coalitions. That is why I will briefly differentiate among alignments, coalitions and alliances 
involving sovereign states.21 
 
 “An alignment is usually understood as any general commitment to co-operation or 
collaboration.”22 This is a rather vague co-operation with a broad task field, including 
military, economy, politics and culture. 
 “A coalition is a group of states avowing a common purpose, but which may leave the 
specific obligations it entails open and indeed subject for negotiations when the 
contingency to which the common purpose applies arises.”23 
 
18 cf. Irene Etzersdorfer, Krieg, 2007, Böhlau Verlag, Wien-Köln-Weimar, p. 115-136 
19 Laurent Goetschel, Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik von Kleinstaaten: Indiz für die Entwicklung der 
internationalen Beziehungen?, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen, 
2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, p. 226 
20 Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary 
Patterns, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.16 
21 Cf. Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary 
Patterns, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg 
22 Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary 




                                                                                                                                                        
 “An alliance is based on a written, mostly voluntary, formal agreement, treaty or 
convention among states pledging to coordinate their behaviour and policies in the 
contingency of military conflict. The more aggressive an external enemy, or the more 
serious a military threat, the more cohesive a formal alliance is.”24 Alliances are 
furthermore primarily concerned with military and security issues. “The predominant 
goal of alliances is to guarantee each signatory’s integrity and security on the bases of 
collective military defence.”25 
 
You could further distinct between three basic types of formal military alliances: 26 
 the defence pact, for example NATO  
 the non-aggressions/neutrality treaty, for example Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 
and  
 the entente, for example British-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 
 
 
1.3.2  Theoretical Background 
 
 
1.3.2.1  Security Concepts for small states 
 
1.3.2.1.1  The Realist Model  
 
In Realist Theory everything centers on power. A state has to have power either economically 
or militarily, because otherwise it has no chance to survive in the world of Realists. Hans J. 
Morgenthau, one of the main representatives of realist thought, said that the world is in 
“einem Zustand der Anarchie”27 and international politics is “wie alle Politik ein Kampf um 
die Macht. Wo immer die letzten Ziele der internationalen Politik liegen mögen, das 
23 Henry Kissinger, cited after William Safire, ON LANGUAGE; The Way We Live Now, The New York 
Times, 27th January 2002 in: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/27/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-1-27-02-on-
language-needing-to.html?scp=8&sq=on%20language%20january%202002&st=cse 26th October 2009 
24 Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary 
Patterns, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.157 
25 Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary 
Patterns, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.157 
26 Cf. Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary 
Patterns, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.158 




                                                
unmittelbare Ziel ist stets die Macht.”28 From this it follows that the highest interest of a state 
must be to ensure and maximise its own power, so it is able to guarantee the security of the 
state. The followers of the Realsitic school of thought have a very pessimistic idea of man; 
everybody is eager for their own interests and doesn’t think of any others. Which means that, 
in this scenario continuing peace is nearly impossible. 
 
So what does this all mean for a small state? As Andreas Kley points it out in his article “Der 
Kleinstaat in suprastaatlichen Einigungen” the „politische Realismus ist einigermaßen 
Kleinstaaten unfreundlich“, because it sees small states under an everlasting threat of greater 
powers and their selfish interests. In Lithuania’s point of view history prooves this assumption 
is not that wrong. Lithuania was always in danger of being overrun by another state; the 
Poles, the Germans and the Russians did it a couple of times in the past centuries, although 
Russia still insists that the last occupation in 1940 was not existent.  
 
Is there actually a way for small states to be secure of their larger enemies? There are two 
possibilities for small states in Realistic theory; either they ally with a great power or they join 
an alliance of great powers. But for now I want to concentrate on the second option, the 
alliance in order to explain Lithuania’s choice for NATO membership. 
 
 
Alliances in the Realist Model 
 
For the Realist school of thought alliances are based on one of their main concepts, the 
concept of “balance of power”. For Hans J. Morgenthau alliances are the “most important 
manifestation of the balance of power”29. Stephen Walt developed Morgenthau’s balance 
concept further; for him alliances are the result of a “balance of threat”30. Kenneth Waltz on 
the other hand is more interested in the motivation of states to join an alliance. He states that 
members of alliances have only negative common interests: the fear of other states. In a 
nutshell you could say that in the Realist Model, the connection between alliances and a 
potential threat are inseparable. This explains that this model resulted from bipolarity and the 
Cold War.  
 
28 Christiane Lemke, Internationale Beziehungen, 2008, Oldenburg, München/Wien, p. 15 
29 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among nations, 1985, 6th Edition, New York, p.205-206  





                                                
But can you still rely on this model after the cold war is over and the Soviet Union as a 
sufficient threat for NATO is gone? Kenneth Waltz concluded on this matter: “NATO’s days 
are not numbered but its years are.”31 Nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War NATO 
shows no sign of dissolution. The thing that is different now is that the threats have changed. 
The threat is no longer one single country, but an international terrorist organisation for 
example. 
If you see this topic through the eyes of Lithuania, the threat has not changed that radically. 
The possibility of a terrorist attack in Lithuania in not very high, but an attack from the 
Russian Federation is still feared and Lithuania saw this proven in summer 2008, when Russia 




1.3.2.1.2  The Liberalist Model  
 
In contrast to the realistic model which concentrates mainly on power and national 
sovereignty, the liberalist model is more concerned with individual protagonists and their 
interdependence. It is their interaction that is the field of study. Especially for small states 
interaction in communities or institutions is very important, because it defines their role and 
importance in international relations.32 I concentrated now mainly on Pluralistic Security 
Communities and Institutionalism to point out what is relevant in the liberalist model for 
Lithuania and its decision-making. On the one hand it points out the options for a small state 
in the means of security policy and on the other what led to Lithuania’s conclusion that 
joining NATO would be the best of these options. 
 
 
Pluralistic Security Communities 
 
Karl Deutsch and his colleagues work on the concept of “security community” from the late 
1950ies has proven very influential and had been further developed in recent years. According 
to Deutsch: 
 
31 Kenneth Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, in: International Security, 18, no.2 1993, 
p.75-76   




                                                
“A security community is a group of people that has become “integrated.” By integration we 
mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and institutions and practices 
strong and widespread enough to assure […] dependable expectations of “peaceful change” 
among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief […] that common social 
problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change [that is, the] assurance that 
members will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”33 
 
There are three major conditions concerning security communities: 
1. compatible values for the member states 
2. states must be relevant to each other and mutually responsive (criteria can be assessed 
by the level of communication, consultation and transaction) 
3. shared identity34 
These conditions should provide enough assurance for states not to fight each other according 
to Gärtner. Institutional structure should be added, but need not have formal inter-
governmental machinery and political differences among the member states.  
 
“Rightly understood, the self-interest of the West-centric states and peoples advises them to 
cope with conflict beyond their immediate borders if for no other reason then their long-term 
security, material welfare, and open, democratic ways of life depend on the progressive 
development of a global security community.”35 
 
Is this really an option for Lithuania? Lithuania was reintegrated into the European 
community step by step and they do have the compatible values, but I think that Lithuania 
doesn’t want just to have confidence that especially the Russian Federation has the same 
beliefs. So this whole concept can’t be functional, if one of the suspected enemies turns out 
not to be part of the community. It doesn’t help Lithuania if they commit to the pluralistic 
security community and Russia won’t. Their potential enemy will be very unlikely part of the 
European Union, so in a way Lithuania is already in a pluralistic security community, but it 
won’t erase all their possible threats. After the Cold War Lithuania felt the need to assure their 
security by all possible means, therefore to rely on only a security community would have 
been not the “safest” option, especially since the European Union haven’t decided yet on a 
joint conclusive security policy. 
 
 
33 Karl Deutsch (et al.), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 1957, Princeton, p.5 
34 Heinz Gärtner, Small States and Alliances Part I, OIIP Arbeitspapier 30, 2000, Vienna, p.11  




                                                
Institutionalism 
 
The international system especially in the Western countries at the end of the Cold War was 
highly institutionalized: state behaviour was to a considerable high extent governed by rules, 
which meant that states had agreed on following certain rules of international institutions for 
example the Charter of the United Nations or the North Atlantic treaty.   
Institutions fulfil specific functions: 
 facilitate communication 
 provide information 
 develop common principles, norms and rules 
 constrain aggressive behaviour 
 provide a bases for joint actions, conflict prevention, management and resolution36 
 
According to the liberalist school international institutions promote co-operation among 
members and they also pull the strings in international relations. 
The common values and beliefs of a community are now transformed into rules of an 
institution and make the members depend on each other and their abiding by the rules. There 
are a lot of similarities between pluralistic security communities and international institutions 
but institutionalism developed the concept further by the means that they defined the shared 
values and interests into a mutual agreement, which can be a charter, treaty, pact, or similar 
and is signed by the members of the institution. 
 
In the eyes of Lithuania this model of the liberalist school is much more trustworthy than the 
pluralistic security community – model, because the members of the institutions are bound to 
their joint agreement. Of course it depends on the form of institution how much they are 
bound to the rules, for example the difference between the United Nations and NATO. 
Concerning security issues NATO was thought to be the institution with the “strongest” rules. 
The most important passage in the North Atlantic Treaty by this means is article 5, which 
states that the “Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all”37. 
 
36 Heinz Gärtner, Small States and Alliances Part I, OIIP Arbeitspapier 30, 2000, Vienna, p.10 




1.4 Methodological Approach 
 
 
The method of qualitative analysis of primary and secondary documents was central in my 
research process for the thesis.  
Primary sources include NATO documents and documents from various Lithuanian, Latvian 
and Estonian ministries. Press releases from several institution or ministries were also taken 
into the survey. Since the primary sources concerning the topic are few, the research was 
based merely on secondary sources. Studies on the issue of NATO enlargement, in particular 
the second round of NATO enlargement, as well as commentaries on the security issues of the 
Baltic States were taken as secondary sources.  
 
Since the particular topic of the thesis has rarely been the topic of academic research as such 
and primary and secondary sources were not always conclusive, I took interviews or had e-
mail correspondence with several experts. These experts were chosen from different 
backgrounds, namely an official representative, a journalist and a writer and interpreter, so it 
was possible to examine the topic from different angles. Unfortunately it was only possible to 




1.5 Outline of the Analyses 
 
 
The first chapter of the thesis portrays NATO as an institution in general and presents a 
timeline to Lithuania’s NATO membership, where as the second chapter concentrates on 
Lithuania and its identity. The preceding chapter is about Lithuania’s view of their security 
and their military. The alternatives to NATO are also shown and why they did not succeed. 
That Russia was an important factor is the next topic of analyses and why NATO wanted the 
Baltics as member states. According to these issues the question on why did Lithuania join 
NATO will be assessed. According to these issues the question on why did Lithuania want to 




                                                






NATO was founded on the 4th of April in 1949 in Washington D.C. by the twelve founder 
members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal and the United States of America), when they signed the North Atlantic 
Treaty. 
This Treaty consists of 14 articles and its introduction says that: 
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all 
governments.  
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of 
their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.  
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of 
peace and security.38 
A very important passage in article 5 states that the “Parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 





NATO is a global security alliance which has now 28 member states (the founding members 
as mentioned above plus Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey) 
and its headquarters are in Brussels. The delegations of each permanent member form the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC), but there are also meeting with the NAC and the heads of 
Government or State and the Foreign and Defence Ministers. NATO summits form another 
 
38 North Atlantic Treaty, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (03/26/09) 




                                                
venue for major decisions, such as enlargement. Since 2004 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (the 
Netherlands) is Secretary General and since 2008 Giampaolo Di Paola (Italy) is Chairman of 





At first NATO was more a political association than a military alliance, which changed 
quickly with the Korean War and the resulting beginning of the Cold War. The famous 
statement of the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, that the organization's goal was 
“to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”41 underlines the 
direction NATO was heading. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 NATO’s attention 
turned to the Balkans and the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, former 
Warsaw Pact countries or even former Soviet Union countries. Since the terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 and the increasing lost of traditional wars with 
one country vs. the other, NATO tries to refocus its goals and prepare for new challenges. 
 
You can find the appropriate timeline to NATO-membership in the appendix. 
 
40 Source: NATO, www.nato.int (03/26/09) 
41 David Reynolds, The origins of the Cold War in Europe, International perspectives, 1994, Yale University 




                                                
3  Lithuanian Identity and Values 
 
 
After 150 years of foreign domination by Russia and Poland and with little intermission for  
another 40 years as part of a Soviet State, “it was necessary to face the daunting task of 
rediscovering and redeveloping the roots of [Lithuania’s] national identity”42. Lithuania is a 
small country and its independence was endangered throughout history, so it was and still is 
very crucial for Lithuania to find its identity. 
Lithuania has always had difficulties to be seen as an independent state for itself, and it had to 
always to distinguish itself from others. 
“For the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it has become important to stress 
their difference both from Russia and from other parts of the previous Soviet Union, and – 
perhaps increasingly - from each other.”43 
 
Not only is Lithuania a small country with a difficult history, its major problem is that it is 
mostly seen as part of the Baltic States by Western countries, including EU countries. Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia are steadily seen as a conglomerate of countries that belong together. 
They have the terrifying time of the Soviet era in common. But there the resemblance ends. 
 
“It’s time that we recognize that we are dealing with three very different countries in the Baltic 
area, with completely different affinities. There is no Baltic identity with a common culture, 
language group, religious tradition. For almost four years now, Lithuania has been correctly 
pointing out that it is a Central European country. Its Catholicism, architecture, history all link it 
to Poland and the other Vishegrad [sic!] countries.”44 
 
 
It was very hard for Lithuania to find its place in Europe and to stress that it is a Central 
European Country, not just a former Soviet Union country, and that it doesn’t have the same 
interesst as the other Baltic countries, such as Estonia, who wanted to be part of the 
Scandinavian countries. 
 
42 George F. McLean, Introduction, in: Aida Savicka (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian 
Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, 
V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., p.1   
43 Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association, Vol. 38/1, 2003, Sage Publications, p. 53 
44 Toomas H. Ilves cited in: Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in: Co-operation and Conflict: 




                                                
I think that this search for an identity and the convincing of other states of the very same is a 
very important aspect in understanding Lithuania, its security and foreign policy and also why 
it joined the North Atlantic Alliance. 
 
 
3.1 Construction of Identity 
 
 
Since you can see a relation between Lithuania’s identity and values and its decision to join 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this chapter should explain what identity means and 
how and by whom identity can be constructed.  
 
The content of identities is made of “relatively stable organization of feelings, values, 
imaginations, experiences and future projects related to oneself”45 states Malewska-Peyre. By 
identity this author means personal identity how an individual sees itself in society. For this 
paper, however it is more important how individuals see their country and where they would 
place their country in the world and other contexts. Therefore, the distinction between 
personal identity and national identity, as A.D. Smith46 calls it, is crucial and the focus in this 
thesis should lay on the second one, the national identity. 
 
Essential features of national identity according to A.D. Smith are: 
1. A historic territory or homeland 
2. Common myths and historical memories 
3. A common, mass public culture 
4. Common legal rights and duties for all members 
5. A common economy with territorial mobility for members47 
 
As you can already see at the first point, “a historic territory and homeland”, it is not that easy 
to tell for Lithuania. The country was split several times and most of its time it was under 
foreign rule. That is also why the two times when Lithuania was a state of its own, during the 
 
45 Hanna Malewska-Peyre, Identity and Cultural Conflict, Research Problems, Psychological Studies, Vol.20 
No.1, 1981, Poland,  p. 27 
46 Cf. Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, University of Nevada Press, 1991 




                                                
Grand Duchy and interwar period, are often glorified. Lithuania was always under great 
influence from other nations and had to eke out their capital Vilnius from Poland several 
times, the last time after the Second World War 
The second feature, “common myths and historical memories”, is very distinctive in 
Lithuania. The Grand Duchy, the late Christianisation, Lithuania as a nation in the 1920s, the 
Lithuanian partisans known as the Forest Brothers who were against the Soviets, are all very 
important historic events for Lithuania which are also mystified. Balcytiene even states that 
the public discourse in the early nineties “was based on the myths created in the glory of 
previously independent Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of much earlier 
centuries”48. She named this early phase of the independent Lithuania the “mythological 
stage” of political culture, which “can be described as a lack of rational thinking […] as 
showing increased trust in authorities and accepting illusionary myths rather than reality”49. 
Concerning the third point, “a common, mass public culture”, Smith does not fully describe 
what he means by that. If he is referring to common values and the influence of mass media 
and political parties on the country, then yes, Lithuania has “a common mass public culture”. 
Especially in the early stages of Lithuanian democratisation, there was pressure to have 
common national and moral values, which was even encouraged by the media and politics.50 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, a return to religiosity and religious moral values took 
place in Lithuania.51 
Points four and five, “common legal rights and duties for all members” and “a common 
economy with territorial mobility for members”, are all true for Lithuania. Lithuania is also 
part of the Schengen states and Lithuanians have to obey not only Lithuanian law, but also 
European law. 
 
Manuel Castells also finds three distinctions of identity. 
1. Legitimizing identity52: used by the dominant institutions to legitimize their power and 
authority 
 
48 Aukse Balcytiene, Changing Role of Media in Post-Communist Lithuania, Working Papers in International 
Journalism, No.2, 2002, Projekt Verlag, Bochum, p. 14 
49 Balcytiene Aukse, Changing Role of Media in Post-Communist Lithuania, Working Papers in International 
Journalism, No.2, 2002, Projekt Verlag, Bochum, p. 15 
50 Cf. idem, p. 14-17 
51 Cf. Stanislovas Juknevičius, Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians in the Europeans Context, in: 
Savicka Aida (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and 
Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values 
and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., p. 101-104 
52 Cf. Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, The information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. II, 




                                                
2. Resistance identity53: used by the opponents of the dominant institutions to justify 
their principles which differ from legitimizing identity 
3. Project identity54: social actors redefine their identity by the transformation of social 
structures. Castells gives feminism as an example, which was first a branch of 
resistance against patriarchalism and became institutionalised in society. 
 
Lithuania has a multi-party system with 37 registered parties55 in 2008. Like most post-
communist countries, it has a high fluctuation of governing parties and Lithuanians lean more 
towards individual-related parties than to party platform oriented ones.56 
Therefore it is not easy to say what the Legitimizing identity or the Resistance identity is in 
Lithuania. The people are still divided in ex-communists and anti-communists57, so you could 
say that the Legitimizing identity or the Resistance identity is to be against or in favour of 
communism. However, since the former communist party managed its transformation into a 
left-wing social party58, the distinction is not as evident anymore. The clear tendency that can 
be seen in Lithuania, like in most post-communist democracies is the turning towards 
nationalism and populism in most of the parties.  
You could say that Legitimizing identity as well as Resistance identity is strongly related to 
individuals and less to principles a party or institution represents, which you can also see in 
the levels of trust in 2004 of the parliament (16%), of political parties (10%) and of the 
president (66%)59. 
As Project identity you could see the transformation from a Lithuania within the Soviet Union 
to an independent Lithuanian nation. The long fight for status is now reality and the world 
recognized it as such.  
 
But the question now is: what is Lithuanian? Previously we discussed how A.D. Smith 
defined national identity and how it can be applied to Lithuania. Now I want to discuss the 
 
53 Cf. idem, p.8 
54 Cf. idem, p.8 
55 http://www.lrytas.lt/-12117988511210019906-p1-Lietuvos-diena-Partij%C5%B3-derliaus-metais-
u%C5%BEder%C4%97jo-ir-profs%C4%85jung%C5%B3-partija.htm 3rd March 2010 
56 Cf. Benjamin Ewert, Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur, Interdisziplinäre Europa Studien, Gornig et al. (Ed.), Band 4, 2007, 
Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main, p. 70-72 
57 Cf. Verena Fritz, State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, 2007, 
Central University Press, Budapest, p.253 
58 Cf. Verena Fritz, State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, 2007, 
Central University Press, Budapest, p.244/245 
59 Cf. Benjamin Ewert, Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur, Interdisziplinäre Europa Studien, Gornig et al. (Ed.), Band 4, 2007, 




                                                
aspects that are essential in my eyes for Lithuania’s identity. In my opinion, Smith ignored 
some crucial aspects, like the common language or its relation to the nations that influenced it 
and still do. 
 
 
3.2 Political Culture 
 
 
The construction of a civic society, in the sense of Almon/Verba60, is not yet finished in 
Lithuania, like in most other former Soviet Union member states. Lithuanians have a deep 
rooted skepticism towards lobbying groups or any associations that originated from Soviet 
rule.61 They don’t trust these institutions. On the other hand, Lithuanians’ trust in specific 
institutions is rater high, such as the military, the church and the president.62 
In 2004, only 69% of Lithuanians thought that democracy is the best form of governance.63 
However, these numbers are a result of the disenchantment with politics, which is a noticeable 
phenomenon in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe. This specific disenchantment is also 
reflected in the decline of voter turnout in the elections since 2000.64 In the ‘90s, it was more 
or less a sense of duty to participate in elections, but later the strict reforms and political 
reality caught up with Lithuanians. Seimas, the Lithuanian parliament, was praised 
prematurely, and lost its trust after diverse corruption scandals, such as the impeachment of 
Rolandas Paksas leading to disillusionment.65 As a result, Lithuanians have a tendency to 
technocracy. 
 
Only 2-4% of Lithuanians are members of a party, which is not only a result of the distrust 
from Soviet times, but it also exacerbates the political participation of Lithuanians.66 The trust 
 
60 Almond, Gabriel/Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture, 1963, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,  p. 14 et 
seq. 
61 Benjamin Ewert, Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur, p. 68 and  
Cf. Joachim Tauber, Das politische System Litauens in: Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, W. Ismayr (Ed.), 
2004, 2nd Edition, UTB, Wiesbaden, p. 180 
62 Benjamin Ewert, Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur, p. 145 
63 idem, p. 70 
64 Cf. Joachim Tauber, Das politische System Litauens in: Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, W. Ismayr (Ed.), 
2004, 2nd Edition, UTB, Wiesbaden, p. 176 
65 Cf. idem, p. 180 




                                                
in parties or the parliament is alarmingly low. 14% of Lithuanians have trust in the Seimas 
and only 7% trust in the political parties67, which is also a result of disillusionment .  
Therefore, it is not a surprise that a subjective political culture, which judges the political 
system by its results but without any idea about the decision making and without seeing itself 
as part of the political process, is predominant (68%) in Lithuania.68 
 
 
3.3  Language 
 
 
Lithuanian is a Baltic language, closely related to Latvian, although they are not mutually 
intelligible. The Lithuanian language has its roots in the Indo-European language and “[i]t is 
[even] the most archaic Indo-European language still spoken.”69 
Lithuanian is the official Language since 1918 and one of the key elements of Lithuanian 
identity. It is also one of the things that separate Lithuania and Latvia from the third Baltic 
country, Estonia. Estonian is a Uralic language which is closely related to Finnish, which also 
explains its close ties to Finland. 
 
The language is also one of the keys to Lithuanian identity, thinks Cornelius Hell.70 
Lithuanian language and Lithuanian literature have a long history of suppression. They both 
survived the polonization, the russification and the Latin domination of the Catholic Church. 
Only during the interwar period had literature in Lithuanian language its heyday. Between 
1940 and shortly before its independence, a free literary scene was only possible in exile71 
and those books had to be smuggled into the country. Although in our region not commonly 
known, lyric has had a long tradition in Lithuania and was even prohibited in Soviet times, 
because it was often used to criticize the establishment. Prose, on the other hand, hadn’t 
become an outrider until the last 25 years.72 
 
 
67 Cf. idem, p. 181 
68 Cf. idem, p. 180 
69 Lithuanian Language in: Encyclopaedia Britannica in: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/343881/Lithuanian-language 12th September 2009 
70 Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15th September 2009, Vienna 
71 Cf. Cornelius Hell, Litauen: Große Literatur aus einem kleinen Land in: Die Rampe, Litauen lesen, Hefte für 
Literatur 2/09, Trauner Verlag, 2009, Linz, p.9-11 
72 Cf. Cornelius Hell, Litauen: Große Literatur aus einem kleinen Land in: Die Rampe, Litauen lesen, Hefte für 




                                                
The Lithuanian language and literature had and will always play a strong role in the 
Lithuanian culture, because it was an expression of resistance for centuries and one of the 
most precious forms of identification not only in Lithuania, but also in exile. The Lithuanians 
are proud of their ancient language and their unique literature. 
 
 
3.4  History 
 
 
Lithuanians have a very ambivalent relation to their history. They are very proud of their 
history when it comes to the things Lithuania has achieved, but on the other hand they tend to 
“forget” historical facts when they cast a negative light on Lithuania, or at least they think it 
would.73 For example, they are very fond of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the 13th 
century and they refer to it very often to show that Lithuania was already independent then 
and even bigger than today. On the other hand, they often suppress the fact that Vilnius was a 
Polish city for a long time, even during the interwar period and the second independence of 
Lithuania.  
Nevertheless, they are Lithuanians and hence very proud of their history, especially when it 
comes to singularities, like the fact that they were very hard to Christianize. But you also have 
to bear in mind that their fears are also closely related to their history. History proved them 
right in that they are a small and defenceless country that needs strong allies.  
Even with recent history such the interwar period or the Soviet Regime, Lithuaninas tend to 
see their history in extremes. Especially the interwar period tends to be glorified;74 yes, it was 
the second awakening of Lithuania as a nation, but it was a corporate state with Antanas 
Smetona as a de facto dictator.75 
 
There is a strong tendency to ignore the historic events in-between the Grand Duchy and the 
first rising of a Lithuanian state; the centuries when Lithuania was occupied and influenced by 
Poland, Prussia/Germany and Russia. Perhaps this protection mechanism is crucial for a state 
that still has trouble to find its roots. 
 
 
73 Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15th September 2009, Vienna 
74 Cf. Ralph Tuchtenhagen, Zwischen Klasse und Rasse, Der europäische Nordosten beim Ertasten der 
Staatlichkeit 1918-1940, in: Ostsee700-2000, Komlosy (Ed.), 2008, Promedia, Vienna, p. 218 




                                                
3.5  Religion 
 
 
Catholicism came to Lithuania with the Teutonic Order, that wanted to convert the 
Lithuanians to Christianity and failed at first.76 The Lithuanians are very proud of their 
heathenism and call themselves the last pagans of Europe.77 This is one of the things that 
distinguishes Lithuania from other countries and some pagan rituals even survived until today. 
 
However, Catholic religion became very important to Lithuanians. It served as a barrier 
against the Russians and their Orthodoxy on one side, but on the other Catholicism was also a 
form of resistance against the regime, both the Czarist and the Soviet. 
The Catholic Church was always a backup for Lithuanians and they didn’t forget that a lot of 
priests helped them during Nazi and Soviet times.78 The Church not only survived the Soviet 
regime, but also had a tremendous reputation in Lithuania; it was the only constant they had 
and that’s why it meant that much. 
That is why the church had a remarkable inflow after gaining independence and religious 
beliefs still have strong influence in Lithuania. For example, in 2001 41% of the Lithuanian 
population thought that it “would be better for our country if more people with religious 
beliefs held public service positions”79, which was the highest rate from all questioned states 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland). Another interesting survey also from 2001 
points out that 24% of the questioned Lithuanians think that “[p]oliticians who do not believe 
in God [sic!] are unfit for public office”, which was also by far the highest rate of the same 
questioned states. 
 
The importance of being an active Catholic has diminished, but the Church still represents 




76 Cf. Stanislovas Juknevičius, Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians in the Europeans Context, in: 
Savicka Aida (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and 
Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values 
and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., p. 101-104 
77 Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15th September 2009, Vienna 
78 Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15th September 2009, Vienna 
79 Cf. Stanislovas Juknevičius, Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians in the Europeans Context, in: 
Savicka Aida (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and 
Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values 




                                                
 
3.6  Poland 
 
 
The Poles and the Lithuanians have a long history together. There was a Polish-Lithuanian 
State (also known as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) between 1569 – 179580 and even 
before the Grand Duch of Lithuania was married to a Polish princess. Vilnius was long a 
Polish city and even during the interwar period it was Polish territory while Kaunas had to be 
the capital of Lithuania. The Poles and the Lithuanians do not have a conflict-free history. For 
example, they both tend to ignore each other’s presence in their commonwealth, but 
nevertheless they managed to put their disputes behind and developed strong bilateral 
relations. They even built up a strategic partnership with the LITPOLBAT as its figurehead. 
(For further information see chapter Lithuanian-Polish Co-operation) 
 
Related to their common history is also their common religion, Catholicism, which Cornelius 
Hell not only sees as a tie, but also as a borderline to other religions of the region, especially 
to the Russian orthodoxy.81 
 
In Lithuania, the Polish minority is the biggest with 6,74%82 of the population and it is mostly 
located in the Vilnius region, where you have a significant polish community. 
 
(For further information see chapter Comparison to Poland.) 
 
 
3.7  Russian Federation 
 
 
The Russian minority is, comparable to the other Baltic countries, small with 6,31%83 of the 
Lithuanian population. Nevertheless, Lithuanians still have very strong feelings towards the 
Russian Federation. 
 
80 Cf. History of Lithuania in: Encyclopaedia Britannica in: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/343803/Lithuania 19th September 2009 
81 Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15th September 2009, Vienna 





                                                                                                                                                        
For all the Baltic countries, Russia is still the enemy. They cannot forget the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact and the 50 years of forced Soviet regime. On the other hand, they are, like 
nearly every country in Europe, dependent on Russia’s energy resources. Russia knows how 
to stress this fact and it also has some difficulties to seeing Lithuania as an equal opponent. 
You get the feeling that Russia likes to treat Lithuania as its little, unimportant brother and 
Lithuania is very used to react as such. 
 
(For further information see chapter The Role of the Russian Federation.) 
 
 
3.8  USA 
 
 
The US plays an important role for Lithuania in many aspects.  
First, since the first waves of emigration in the 18th century, the US is traditionally the country 
where most Lithuanians migrate. Most Lithuanians settled down in the city of Chicago, which 
has a big Lithuanian community and even had a Lithuanian opera house.84 
Second, Lithuania sees the US as its most important ally and through NATO membership the 
US is even bound to help the country, if attacked. 
 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, many of migrated Lithuanians came back from the 
US and many of them engaged in politics, Foreign Service or international relations in 
Lithuania. The most obvious example is Valdas Adamkus. His family fled in 1944 from 
Kaunas, Lithuania to Munich, Germany and later in 1949 emigrated to the US. The family 
also settled down in Chicago, where Adamkus studied civil engineering and later joined the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where he was even awarded for his 
achievements by President Reagan. But after Lithuania regained its independence he returned 
to Lithuania and ran for the presidency in 1998, winning for the first time. Adamkus served 
for two presidencies from 1998 to 2003 and from 2004 to 2009. 
Adamkus played an essential role for Lithuania in its relationship to the US during his 
presidency. You could even say that Adamkus was good for Lithuania’s self-esteem. He had a 
83 Statistics Lithuania, Population by Ethnicity, 2005 in: http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/pages/view/?id=1731 11th 
September 2009 





                                                
gentlemanly appearance and was not a “nobody” from a small former Soviet Union country, 
but instead a man who had a steep career in the US and was taken seriously on internal stage.  
 
You get the feeling that nearly every family had some relatives in the US and therefore this 
country had a special meaning for Lithuanians. It is the land where everything is possible, but 




3.9  Migration 
 
 
Migration plays a strong role for such a small country, especially when the emigration is 
higher than the immigration. In 2006, the percentage of immigrants was 7,7 and the 
percentage of emigrants was 27,8; hence there was a difference of 20,1%, whereas in 2005 the 
difference was even 41,3%.85 For a country with a little over 3 million inhabitants, losing that 
many people every year is enormous. Although the numbers are not as high anymore, 
emigration is still an important topic. 
 
Lithuania had and still has traditionally a high rate of emigrants, but the type of emigration 
changed over the decades. In the 18th century, migration occurred due to bad conditions of 
living and famines. In the 1930s and 1940s, it was more of an escape than emigration; on the 
one hand, a lot of Jewish Lithuanians fled because of the Nazis, but on the other hand, a few 
years later the people fled because of the Soviets. The next wave of migration was after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, because the Lithuanians were free to go where they wanted 
for the first time in fifty years. Today, the migration changed into a “working migration”86, 
where 70% of the migrants go to an EU-country, especially Ireland and Great Britain (50%), 
because they were the first ones to open their labour markets.87 The difference between this 
type of migration and the others is that the migrants hope to return when they have earned 
enough money for themselves and their families. This also affects the families, especially the 
 
85 Cf. Migration in Lithuania in: http://www.stat.gov.lt/lt/news/view/?id=6719 22nd September 2009 
86 Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15th September 2009, Vienna 
87 Cf. Ekaterina Ryabykh, Migration als Soziale Innovation, Untersuchung im Rahmen des wissenschaftlichen 
Forschungsprojekts (RGNF) "Migration als soziokulturelle Realität" in: TRANS. Internet-Zeitschrift für 




                                                
children, because most of the time the migrants leave their families back home in Lithuania. A 
lot of parents are working in another country, while the children grow up at the grandparents’ 
home. 
 
You get the feeling that migration is a mixed blessing for Lithuania. They profit from 
emigrants who send their money back home or support their families, but the “Brain-Drain” is 
becoming a problem. Especially young educated workers leave the country, because the 
chances for a career and better salaries are higher elsewhere.  
Furthermore the sheer number of migrants during the last 150 years is an enormous challenge 
for such a small country. 
 
 
3.10  Self-perception 
 
 
It is always difficult for a small country to have a positive self-perception, but in the case of 
Lithuania it is especially hard. 
Lithuania is used to decades of suppression and can only look back to two times as an 
independent state (Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the interwar period). Considering this, the 
problems of Lithuania’s identity are easily understood. 
Bearing this in mind, it is not at all surprising that Lithuanians identify themselves firstly with 
their settlement and secondly with Lithuania; Europe and the world are only in fourth and 
fifth position, even in 2004.88 
Antanas Andrijauskas even called one of his articles “Searching for Lithuanian Identity 
Between East and West”89 which reflects the insecurity if Lithuania and where it sees itself. 
 
In my perception, Lithuania sees itself as a beautiful country with a unique language and 
culture, with warm and brave people who can play basketball very well. Yes, these are all 
clichés, but the feeling occurs that even that is hard for Lithuanians to describe. Lithuania tries 
 
88 A.V. Matulionis, Self-Identification: Sociological Research Data, in: Savicka Aida (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity 
and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, 
Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., 
p. 85 
89 Antanas Andrijauskas, Searching for Lithuanian Identity Between East and West, in: A.V. Matulionis, Self-
Identification: Sociological Research Data, in: Savicka Aida (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian 
Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, 




very hard to point out its uniqueness and find its way in Europe, but it does not succeed every 
time. 
 
It is shocking how many people still don’t even know which one of the Baltic States Lithuania 
is. Lithuanians are used to being seen as one of the three Baltic States, but it is not beneficial 
to their positive self-perception. That is also the reason why they are very keen on pointing 
out their differences to their neighbouring countries. 
 
Lithuania tries to point out its achievements and singularities rather than its failures, which is 
also understandable and it will take time before it can look at its identity critically, because it 









                                                
4  Security of Lithuania 
 
 
In this chapter I want to explain what security means for Lithuania. For this purpose I looked 
at the current structure and also the history of the armed forces in Lithuania and what does 
this military means for the Lithuanian public. What are the relations between society and 
military and have they changed since the break-up of the Soviet Union? Why are the armed 
forces so crucial for an emerging state and especially for the small state Lithuania? What are 
the security threats for this country and what role does the Russian Federation and NATO 
play in this context? 
 
 
4.1 Armed Forces of Lithuania 
 
 
The number of servicemen and cadets serving in the National Defence System in 2006 was 
18.250. In September 2008 the general conscription was rescinded and now Lithuanian 
military is a professional army with the strength of 15.525 men in 2009. 
 
The main focuses of Lithuanian defence policy are determined by the military missions, 
which are: 
1. “Protection of Lithuania’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”90 
2. “Contributing to regional and global stability”91 
3. “Contributing to the peace and welfare in the country”92 
 
 
4.1.1  Structure of the Lithuanian Armed Forces  
 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces and chair of the State Defence Council is the 
President of the Republic of Lithuania. The State Defence Council is concerned with 
discussion and coordination of the significant issues of national defence. The Parliament 
 
90 Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188824 (03/25/09) 
91 Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188824 (03/25/09) 




                                                
implements the parliamentary control of the national defence system and it has to approve 
major military decisions. The Government has to “protect the inviolability of the territory of 
the Republic of Lithuania and ensure State security and public order”93. It also appoints the 
Minister of National Defence, who is supported by a Vice-Minister, a State Secretary and 
three Undersecretaries. The Ministry of National Defence (MoND) is responsible for the 
development and implementation of the defence policy of the Republic and it is also 
responsible for its Military resources.  
 
The Defence Staff is subordinated to the Commander of Armed Forces and he exercises the 
command authority over the Armed Forces. Furthermore he advises the President and the 
Minister of National Defence and he is responsible for the requirements planning of the 
Military. 
 
The Armed Forces consists of three main groups, such as:  
 Land Forces 
 Air Forces and  
 Naval Forces.  
In addition to these three main forces there are:  
 the National Defence Volunteer Forces,  
 the Special Forces,  
 the Logistic and Training Command and  
 the Military Police.94 
 
 
4.1.2  National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) 
 
The NDVF is the reserve of Lithuania and could be compared to the National Guards in the 
United States of America. Its tasks are widespread: one part of the NDVF is trained for 
“participating in international crisis response operations”95. But the NDVF is also responsible 
for the provision of “protection of national strategic objects”96, assisting “civil authorities and 
 
93 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Chapter 7, Article 94 
94 Source: Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, www.kam.lt (03/25/09) 
NATO, www.nato.int/invitees2004/lithuania/defence.htm (03/25/09) 
95 Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/38174/ (03/26/09) 




                                                




4.1.3  History 
 
Lithuania has a “deeply rooted, many layered national military tradition”99, at least Lithuania 
sees it like that as Andrius Krivas describes it in one of his articles. Fact is that Lithuania had 
its first armed forces during the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the medieval times, when they 
had to fight against intruders like the Teutonic order, the Golden Horde or the Russians. After 
the Union with Poland, Lithuania had no national army until after the 1st World War; in the 
period between 1918 and 1940, when Lithuania was independent for the first time since the 
Middle Ages. During their Independence Lithuanian armed forces played a strong role against 
the Red Army and the Polish and German troops. But at the time of incorporation into the 
Soviet Union the army was not deployed as defence which was merely caused by the 
indecisiveness of politicians on how to react to the situation. During the 2nd World War the 
Local Force (LF) was established; a compromise between the Lithuanian army and the 
German troops, which meant that it was still a Lithuanian Force but under the command of the 
Wehrmacht. But the LF fell apart when it was ordered to fight outside of Lithuanian territory.  
 
After the 2nd World War the Lithuanian military fought as a guerilla like resistance against the 
Soviet occupation. These partisan battles lasted until 1956. In the time when Lithuania was 
part of the Soviet Union the national influence of the army was barely existent. Lithuania 
established its new national armed forces only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Since then the Lithuanian Armed Forces have undergone multiple changes to pass the 




97 Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/38174/ (03/26/09) 
98 Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/38174/ (03/26/09) 
99 Andrius Krivas, Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania, in: A. Forster, et al., Soldiers and Societies in 




                                                
4.2  Military and Society in Lithuania 
 
 
The Military has throughout history played an important role for the country as I’ve shown in 
the preceeding chapter. “The image of the Lithuanian warrior is both mythologised and 
idealised in today’s public perceptions.”100 This perception developed for a reason. It was 
essential for Lithuania after the break-up of the Soviet regime that they established their own 
armed forces, not only in terms of security, but also in terms of identity. This country 
struggled ever since for their independence and role in Europe. It was very difficult to 
differentiate itself to the neighboring countries and one of the reasons was that Lithuania had 
no army.  
 
So one of the first agendas after regaining independence, was the establishment of the 
Lithuanian armed forces.  
First it had merely a symbolic role since the Russian army stayed in the country until 1993. 
The Military was a symbol of national unity and a visible attribute of sovereignty. You could 
almost say it had nation building functions. Andrius Krivas sees even an “embodiment of 
Lithuanian national traditions”101 in its military. One is for certain the Lithuanian military 
played an important role in the country’s way to the West; Since 1994 Lithuania’s armed 
forces participated in peace supporting operations (PSOs) for example under NATO 
command. 
The Lithuanian armed forces managed to gain the trust of the public. In 1996 46% and already 
in 2004 63% of the population trusted its military, only the president (66%) and the church 




100 Andrius Krivas, Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania, in: A. Forster, et al., Soldiers and Societies in 
Postcommunist Europe, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 117 
101 Andrius Krivas, Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania, in: A. Forster, et al., Soldiers and Societies in 
Postcommunist Europe, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p.113 
102 Benjamin Ewert, Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur, Interdisziplinäre Europa Studien, Gornig et al. (Ed.), Band 4, 2007, 
Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main, p.71/145 
103 Cf. Verena Fritz, State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, 2007, 




4.2.1  During Soviet Times 
 
 
When Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union, it had practically no national army, not even a 
notional branch of the Soviet Army. The Soviet military doctrine was the only source of 
expertise also for the military in Lithuania.  
That was why the military had no positive public perception during that time. It was seen as 
yet another imposition of the Soviet regime and not as a national institution. Military issues 
were associated with this widely despised regime. And first Lithuania didn’t even want or feel 
the need for its own military branch, because of anti-militarism and pacifism.  
Therefore the Lithuanian military had a very bad public perception at first, but over the years 
Lithuania realized how important a national army is.  
The Lithuanian military had to assure the population of their concern for the nation, by the 
means of independence and sovereignty. 
 
 
4.2.2  Legitimacy after the Soviet Regime 
 
Because the military was so crucial for the country the population was willing to spend a 
significant amount on the military budget. But the military also had to gain its legitimacy. 
First, it has to be recognised by the public, and the Western countries and institutions, 
especially NATO, for its efforts and progress in defence reform and development of the 
armed forces. After that the trust of the population in the military grew. 
Second, the military had to have, unlike in Soviet times, a democratic and civilian control. 
The public had the right to co-decide what happened with and in the military. 
Third, Lithuania’s armed forces gained their capabilities and professionalism through 
international aid, military advice and military training.  
Fourth, Domestic Military Assistance became more and more important. The military now 
was also capable of helping in states of emergency, for example natural disasters like 
flooding. 
Fifth, there was a public debate about defence spending and the relevance of universal 




                                                
Finally, the Ministry of Defence had a public information campaign about the military and its 
development and established a public relations department. In this way the population not 




4.2.3  The Role of the Military before NATO Membership 
 
 
Initially the Military had two main reasons assuring independence and defence against threats, 
especially by the Russian Federation, but it also had to acquaint to other task fields such as: 
 
 The role of a nation builder and builder of national identity and the establishment of a 
multi-ethnic military in a multi-ethnic country. 
 Lithuania’s wider security culture, which includes international peacekeeping 
missions. 
 The domestic military assistance role in medical emergencies, police operations and 
states of emergency. 
 
Lithuania’s military had to manage its way to a western-style military force with all its 
requirements and adapt to its new challenges; most notably after 9/11, when the “classic” 
threat was disused.  
 
Especially important in the trends in relation of military and society was the opportunity of 
the integration of western security institutions, first and foremost NATO, if the development 
of Lithuanian armed forces was to be successful. Although the new challenges of the military, 
like domestic military assistance and soft security issues gave positive conception in public, 
the most crucial achievement was the interoperability of NATO and the so accomplished 
accession to NATO. NATO membership is a widely approved goal of the country and it “also 
adds significantly to society’s willingness to pay for the development and the strengthening of 
the country’s national defence capabilities”105. But the acceptance to pay also for large peace 
 
104 C. f. Andrius Krivas, Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania, in: A. Forster, et al., Soldiers and Societies in 
Postcommunist Europe, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 112-115  
105 Andrius Krivas, Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania, in: A. Forster, et al., Soldiers and Societies in 





                                                
keeping units, which are included in NATO membership, could not really prevail. It was far 
more important for Lithuanians to assure their own security with the help of NATO, than 
wider security issues including peacekeeping all over the world. 
 
One severe test was the establishment of laws concerning the military, like Law on 
Fundamentals of National Security (1996), the Law on the Organization of the National 
Defence System and Military Service (1998) and the National Military Defence Strategy. In 
all these documents the democratic civilian control of the army is the key point. These control 
arrangements focus on two issues.  
First, the Military leadership is subordinated to the democratic civilian authorities. 
Second, the political activities of the armed forces and its personnel are limited strictly. These 
restrictions go as far as public criticism of decisions of the political authorities even 
concerning military is not allowed. Bearing in mind the Soviet past of the country and its 
military these laws do make sense, although they are not that strictly enforced anymore. This  
led for instance to the debate in 2002 over a Commander of the Armed Forces who took part 
in a conference organized by the US Lithuanian community while he was on leave. He had 
criticized practices of social and economic management in Lithuania. He was called for 
account before the President and the Speaker of the Parliament, while the right wing 
opposition argued that he had only expressed his view as a citizen.106  
 These laws reflect the deeply rooted distrust since the Soviet era against military and state 
personnel in general, but these issues are getting better the more the armed forces appear in 
public and are included into NATO. 
 
Another heatedly discussed issue concerning military was the general conscription, which was 
rescinded in 2008. Adrius Krivas saw it as “one of the most important factors in military-
society relations in Lithuania”107. It was the link between the armed forces and the 
population; it was not an elitist group of society, but every male over 18 knew the military 
because he served. Now the armed forces are getting more and more specialized and better 




106 Cf. Andrius Krivas, Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania, in: A. Forster, et al., Soldiers and Societies in 
Postcommunist Europe, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
107 Andrius Krivas, Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania, in: A. Forster, et al., Soldiers and Societies in 




orces with international 
haracter in NATO, assuring in this way the security of the country.  
what Lithuanians want is to feel safe, 
specially when it comes to the Russian Federation. 
alize that they have paid a high price to 
e in NATO and yet their security is not guaranteed. 
 
                                                
 
All in all you can say that the view of the armed forces in Lithuania has changed dramatically 
in the last 20 years. From a totally distrusted part of the Soviet apparatus to one of the must 
trusted institutions of the country.108 It was now hope of a new emerged state as a nation-
builder, gate to international institutions and finally to specialized f
c
 
But not only were the relations between society and military shaken up, the armed forces 
literarily reinvented themselves. They had to start from scratch with all its advantages and 
disadvantages and a lot of support from Western countries. In addition to that it had to change 
from a purely on defence construed forces to forces that concentrate on international 
peacekeeping and domestic military assistance. It had to transform itself from a military based 
on hard security to one based on soft security issues. This is precisely what could strain the 
society-military relations, because the first thing 
e
 
Ironically Lithuania wanted to join the “old” North Atlantic Alliances, not the new one, which 
sees Russia not as the main enemy anymore, but is more concerned about asymmetrical 




108 Cf. Verena Fritz, State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, 2007, 




                                                
4.3  Security Threats 
 
 
When you talk about security threats and Lithuania, one thing is obvious; the Russian 
Federation is seen as the main problem.  
“Though there are few people who would say Russia presents a military threat to the Baltics 
today, it is nevertheless the only possible source of threat to the Baltic security. The enormous 
power asymmetry between the three small Baltic countries and Russia predetermines the need 
for the Baltic integration into Transatlantic and European institutions.”109 I definitely agree 
with Atis Lejins in the point that Russia is seen as the one and only threat in Lithuania.  
 
Especially the war in Georgia in summer 2008 alienated all the three Baltic countries and old 
fears came up again. Die Presse, an Austrian newspaper, had then as a headline “Die Urangst 
der Litauer vor den Russen”110, which in a way is true. If you look at the history of small 
Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours you can understand that fear.  
 
Russia made it very clear that Lithuania and the Baltic States are still in the sphere of interest 
for them.111 Crisis in the relations between Russia are immanent, which is if nothing else due 
to the inability of Russia to treat its weaker neighbours as equals. Everything Russia did or 
does towards Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania sounds like sabre-rattling to these countries.  
Especially audacias was the offer of security guarantees to the Baltic States by the Russian 
Federation in October 1997, which reminded them of the one during 2nd World War, where 
the Red Army freed the Baltics from the German enemy just to absorb these states itself. Of 
course this offer was rejected and seen as pure derision. 
 
But still in 2004 Janusz Bugajski describes in his book “Cold Peace: Russia’s New 
Imperalism” that Russia wants to reassert its influence of the security policies of the countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe.112 
 
109 Atis Lejins, The “Twin Enlargements” and Baltic Security: Prospects of the 21st Century in: Paul Luif (Ed.), 
Security in Central and Eastern Europe, Problems, Perceptions, Policies, The Laxenburg Papers No.12, 2001, 
Braumüller, Vienna, p. 201 
110 Hannes Gamillscheg, Die Urangst der Litauer vor den Russen in: Die Presse, 30th September 2008 in: 
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/418860 2nd October 2008 
111 Cf. William Safire, ON LANGUAGE; The Near Abroad, The New York Times, 22nd May 1994 in: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html 1st August 2009 
112 Cf. Richard Krickus, Iron Troikas: The New Threat From Russia in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 




                                                
Richard Krickus sees the treat from Russia changed and describes the “Iron Troikas”113 a new 
way of the Kremlin to achieve influence over other states. The “Iron Troikas” consists of: 
 
1. The Siloviki, the “men of power”, are mostly former members of the military or the 
secret service, like Vladimir Putin. Under Putins presidency the number of these in 
important positions grew rapidly. They now pull the strings not only in state affairs, 
but also in the economy, preferably in the energy sector. 
2. The economic warlords are the “new” oligarchs that have close ties to the Kremlin and 
the Siloviki. Putin tried very successfully to re-nationalise Russia’s important branches 
of trade, primarily exploiting natural resources. This has the advantage that Russia can 
put a lot of states under pressure, which depend on energy from the Federation. 
3. Political and business groups that are under Russian influence in the former Soviet 
Union and Socialist states.114 
The best example for this in Lithuania would be “Paksagate”. In 2004 the president of 
Lithuania, Rolandas Paksas was impeached, because Yuri Borisov, a Russian citizen 
and President of an aviation company, Avia Baltika, who had financed Paksas' 
political campaign was given Lithuanian citizenship by Paksas decree. Furthermore 
Paksas was accused of warning Borisov of secret investigations concerning corruption. 
 
The Russian threat has changed, it is no longer a military threat, but if you define security 
after Gärtner as “the inner freedom to make decision even under the pressure of an external 
aggressor”115 the Rsussian Federation is clearly still a security threat for Lithuania. 
 
Lithuania has seen itself always as powerless against this major power and that is the way it 
was certain that it had to find a security solution were the defence against the Russian 
Federation was guaranteed. But if NATO was really the best solution remains uncertain. For 
example the recurrent threat of Russia to station Iskender Missiles, nuclear capable missiles, 
wouldn’t be so severe if the Baltics were not members of NATO. With NATO membership 
Lithuania not only assured its security, it also became part of the Western security strategies, 
which sometimes provoke Russia more than the Baltics would like. 
 
113 Richard Krickus, Iron Troikas: The New Threat From Russia in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 
15/16, 2005, p.98 
114 Cf. Richard Krickus, Iron Troikas: The New Threat From Russia in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 
15/16, 2005,  
115 Heinz Gärtner, Internationale Sicherheit, Definitionen von A-Z, Wiener Schriften zur Internationalen Politik – 




                                                
 
Another threat that could occur because Lithuania thought being an ally of the United Sates 
would be the best option against the Russian harassment is its support of the US in its war 
against terror. Not only is Lithuania part of NATO operation in Afghanistan, it also had sent a 
small troop to Iraq.  
Furthermore Lithuania is now in headlines because it supposedly provided the CIA with a 
building outside Vilnius for interrogation purposes and as a secret prison for terror 
suspects.116 On the one hand Lithuania helped the CIA and the US government to commit 
crimes against Human Rights and on the other it made itself a target for terrorist attacks.  
Lithuania should be more concerned about measuring on the one hand pleasing his most 
important ally, in his eyes, or on the other becoming a butt for an unknown threat. Luckily for 
Lithuania it is small and not that important as a state, but it is considered to be part of “new” 
Europe and was a supporter of US foreign policy under President Bush therefore an enemy of 
Al Qaida. Lithuania is so focused on having the US as a partner; it doesn’t realize that this can 
be dangerous too. 
 
After the break-down of the Soviet regime every Western state was eager that the Baltic 
region and the former Socialist countries are granted to be stable. Central and Eastern Europe 
was the hotspot, the feared tinderbox in Europe, but these states have proven to be stable and 
democratic countries, which are almost all now integrated into Western institutions. The 
concerns of Western states and NATO have shifted. Now the Caucasus is considered to be the 
trouble spot in Eurasia and perhaps Romania and Bulgaria are becoming much more 
important NATO members and allies of the US than the Baltic countries or Poland. 117  
 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have the feeling that they were and are forgotten 
by their most important ally and that’s why they addressed altogether an open letter in a 
Polish newspaper to the Obama administration in the hope to get attention for their concerns.  
“Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however, we see that Central and Eastern 
European countries are no longer at the heart of American foreign policy. […]Despite the 
efforts and significant contribution of the new members, NATO today seems weaker than when 
we joined. In many of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant - and we feel it. 
 
116 Cf. Teresa Schaur-Wünsch, CIA-Geheimgefängnis auch in Litauen? In: Die Presse, 22nd August 2009, 
Vienna, p.6 
117 Cf. Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal 




                                                
Although we are full members, people question whether NATO would be willing and able to 
come to our defence in some future crises.”118 
 
After some years of easing the tension between the Russian Federation and the Central and 
Eastern European countries, Russia is back with its reputation as a serious threat. If nothing 
else because the Western security institution they all joined is not what it was during cold war 
and it’s not certain anymore if the US will join in defending CEE states if necessary. 




118 Cf. An open letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe with the signatures of 
Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan 
Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, 
Alexander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, Janos Martonyi. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Rotfeld, Vaira 







                                                
5  Alternatives  
 
 
5.1 Regional Co-operation 
 
 
5.1.1  Nordic Co-operation 
 
After about fifty years being part of the Soviet Union, Lithuania and the other two Baltic 
States were not quite sure where to belong. Since the prestige and the allegiance of the 
Scandinavian states are very high in Lithuania119, why not become a part of the Nordic 
community? The Nordic countries are recognized for their diplomatic behaviour and their 
welfare state, which you could compare in a way to the social benefits of the Soviet times; all 
very desirable goals for emerging states. 
But could the Nordic Co-operation assure the so much wanted security for these nations? And 
is the Nordic Co-operation willing to affiliate the Baltic States? Could this co-operation help 
Lithuania on its way to the West? 
 
 
5.1.1.1  What is the Nordic Co-operation (Norden)? 
 
In the interwar period Scandinavia considered forming one Scandinavian State120, but this 
concept failed and instead a formal and informal co-operation network, especially between 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, was formed.  
This co-operation manifested in the foundation of the Nordic Council in 1952, the Helsinki 
Treaty in 1962 and the Nordic Council of  Ministers in 1971. The Nordic countries also co-
ordinate their policies in various international organisations (UN, OECD, GATT). 
The Areas of co-operation vary, which is also a sign of the different paths of international 
relations these countries struck. Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO, Sweden and 
 
119 Study of 150 Lithuanians and their heterostereotypes of other Nations. Scandinavians (in this Study Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden) were ascribed the most positive attributes of all investigated nations. In:  
Sonata Neumüller, Das Selbstbildnis der Litauer und die Abgrenzung gegenüber Nachbarn, 2006, Vienna, p. 50 
 
120 Cf. Tom Schumacher, The Emergence of the New Nordic Co-operation, DUPI Working Paper 2000/6, 




Finland (since the dissociation of the soviet sphere of influence) stayed neutral. In addition to 
that Denmark, Sweden and Finland are part of the EU, Iceland is now considering to join and 
Norway still refuses. 
 
 
Table 1: Areas of Co-operation of the Nordic Co-operation 
 
 
Culture, Leisure and Media 
 Creative Industries 
 Language 
 Information Technology 
 Music, Literature 
 Etc. 
 
Education and Research 






Legislation and Justice 
 Freedom of Movement 
 Justice Co-operation 
 Moving Commuting 
 Etc. 
 
Economy, Business and Working Life 
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries 
 Regional Policy 




Environment and Nature 
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries 
 Environment (Nature, Culture) 
 Sustainable Development 
 The Arctic 
 Etc. 
 
Welfare and Gender Equality 
 Health, The Nordic Welfare Model 





Source: Norden, Official Co-operation in the Nordic Region, in: 
http://www.norden.org/en/areas-of-co-operation, 24th July 2009 
 
 
Tom Schumacher sees four motives, why the Nordic Co-operation still functions: 
First, the common historical and cultural traditions of these countries paired with their closely 
related languages (although I would argue the language point, since Finnish is clearly not 
related to the other Scandinavian languages). He sees an “overall feeling of belonging 
together”121, which results in a certain pressure for Nordic politicians to co-operate. 
Second, the achieved advantages like the division of labour, which bear great chances for 
these small states with limited chances to complete each other. 
Third, the Nordic countries were eager to balance their relations with their neighbouring 
major powers, like Germany and France. They could increase their power by co-operating. 
                                                 
121 Tom Schumacher, The Emergence of the New Nordic Co-operation, DUPI Working Paper 2000/6, Danish 




                                                
Fourth, the Nordic nations represented and still represent the “Third Way”, which Olof Palme, 
former Prime Minister of Sweden, described as Democratic Socialism. Especially during the 
Cold War period this was an important motive, because this was an alternative to the 
bipolarity of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But the Nordic Welfare Model is still an essential, 
if not the most essential, factor in Nordic policy.122 
 
 
5.1.1.2  Are the Baltic States Nordic States? 
 
In the interwar period there was even the idea of Estonian politicians to form a “Balto-
Scandian” federal state, which would include the three Baltic States and the Scandinavian 
states. After the break-up of the iron curtain this concept was seized again especially by 
Estonians, but in another contexts; the Baltic countries wanted to become a part of the Nordic 
community and the Nordic Co-operation. 
“Scandinavism implied staking out a boundary line towards Russia on the one side and 
Germany on the other.”123  Just the idea that being Nordic would mean to have a boundary 
line towards the Russian Federation, and be essential for all three states.  
Since Finland is part of Norden and sometimes also considered to be Baltic124, why not all the 
Baltic States too? “Much if not most is determined by what others believe”125 about states as 
the former Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves stated in one of his speeches. He 
refers to the successful self-redefinition of Finland from a Baltic country before the 2nd World 
War to a Nordic country in the 1950ies.  
 
 
But what defines the Nordic countries? Lars-Folke Langrén, Professor at the University of 
Helsinki, determined eight key elements of Nordic Identity and Mikko Lagerspetz,  Professor 
at the University of Tallin, compared these elements with the cultural, social, political and 
economic landscapes of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to see if these countries would fit in the 
Nordic Community. 
 
122 Cf. Tom Schumacher, The Emergence of the New Nordic Co-operation, DUPI Working Paper 2000/6, 
Danish Institute of International Affairs, Denmark 
123 Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association, Vol. 38/1, 2003, Sage Publications, p. 51 
124 Cf. Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence, 1994, 
Second Edition, Yale University Press, New Haven (et al.) 
125 Toomas H. Ilves cited in: Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in: Co-operation and Conflict: 




Table 2: Bases of Nordic Identity after Landgrén 
 
 
1. Geographical Location 
2. Historical ties 
3. Linguistic affinity 
4. Lutheran faith 
5. Social Development 
(the Nordic Model) 
6. Nordic co-operative organs 
7. Legal & administrative 
tradition (municipal self-
determination, the rule of law) 






































Source: Lars-Folke Landgrén cited in: Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in:  
Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 38/1, 
2003, Sage Publications 
Note:  The “+” indicates the presence of an element of Nordic Identity. The “(+)” indicates the 
relative presence. The “−” indicates the absence and the “?” shows that the relation is 
uncertain. 
 
As you can see on Table 2 Lagerspetz couldn’t find common elements in all three states in the 
points of  Social Development and Gender Equality. The Nordic Model is one of the most 
important characteristics of the Scandinavian States and neither one of the Baltic countries 
fulfilled it’s criterias. Estonia has some linguistic affinities at least with Finland, but the other 
two lack to have similarities concerning any Scandinavian language. Protestantism is rampant 
in Estonia, already less in Latvia and Lithuania is a catholic country with 80% Catholics.126 
 
Estonia has the most common ground with the Nordic countries comparing to Latvia and 
especially Lithuania. The Baltic countries fail to be part of the Nordic community at the 
compliance of its requirements. Lithuania has not much in common with the Nordic countries 
and even if it would make efforts to adapt, it would unlikely succeed. Mainly the Nordic 
Social Model, the key element, is none of the three countries willing to adopt fully because 
their economic policies are closer to the neo-liberal model than the Nordic. 
 
                                                 






5.1.1.3  Nordic Co-operation as a Goal 
 
It is important for all the three Baltic States to stress their difference from their past, thus the 
Russian Federation and the other former Soviet Union states and the Nordic Co-operation 
represented an alternative. 
But viewed realistically, Lithuania has no common ground with the Scandinavian countries, 
neither cultural (Protestantism vs. Catholicism, no language affinity, or historical ties) nor 
social (gender equality). Not to speak of the economic model. 
Member states of the Nordic Co-operation have no interest in an overthrow of their long-
lasting and well established institution. On the one hand the Co-operation would have had to 
change dramatically to adapt to their new members and on the other it is not even sure if they 
could have provided what the Baltic States were expecting. 
 
As you can see in Table 1 the areas of Nordic Co-operation do not include any security issues. 
You could use the co-operation to distance oneself from the Soviet past and the Russian 
Federation symbolically, but not in the area of security against possible threats, which exclude 
soft security threats. The Nordic countries all go their different ways when it comes to “hard” 
security policy. As I mentioned before, Denmark, Iceland and Norway are member states of 
NATO, while Sweden and Finland are neutral. Norden excludes security issues deliberately in 
order to function as a co-operation in its own way. 
 
Nevertheless the Nordic countries realised how important their impact and influence is for the 
Baltic States on their way to the West. It is not only in their interest that Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania are stable democracies and independent states, but it is one of their characteristics to 
act as a mouthpiece for other countries interests.  
According to this the Nordic Co-operation not only helped them to join NATO and EU, but 
also established a larger Co-operation – the Council of Baltic Sea States. There they enabled  
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a regional forum for their interests and needs.  
 
The Nordic Co-operation found a way to keep the Baltic States out, but even so integrated 
them to the West and Europe. It “is not to argue that the Nordic countries [...] did not play a 





                                                
concerning the Baltic States [...] [they] indeed contributed significantly to the process of 
political – economic – social change”.127 
 
 
5.1.2  Baltic Sea Region 
 
“The Baltic Sea Region has throughout history been characterized more by cultural and 
political diversity than by any form of unity.”128 Nevertheless Helmut Hubel ascertained a 
„development of a certain „regional“-awareness around the Baltic Sea“129 after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the 1990ies. The emerging of a region which never used to function as 
one is difficult, especially if some parts regard the others as villains or does not see them as 
equal partners. The big problem in this region is that they have no common ground to build 
on. Some of the states have historical ties, but have no cultural or social affinities.  
 
For the Baltic Sea Region it could be useful to draw on the definitions concerning regions of 
David Lake. He states that regions, especially in terms of security relations, are being shaped 
by specific “externalities”.130 For the Baltic Sea Region these “externalities” were the 
pressure of  the EU and Norden to put the Baltic States, Poland and Russia into a regional 
context, were they have to work together to stabilize their relations. These “externatilities” are 
not developed from inside the region, they are set mostly from outsid
 
Is it nevertheless possible to develop a regional co-operation in a region that is newly 
constructed? Could this regional co-operation function as a security co-operation? Would it 
have been another alternative for Lithuania and the other two Baltic States to decrease their 






127 Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of 
the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 285 
128 Lars F. Stöcker, The History of the Baltic Sea Region in the Cold War Era, in: Sooman, Donecker (Eds.), The 
“Baltic Frontier” Revisited,  2009, Vienna, p.153  
129 Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of 
the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 283 
130 David A. Lake cited in: Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation 




5.1.2.1  Council of Baltic Sea States 
 
The CBSS sees itself as an “overall political forum for regional inter-governmental co-
operation”131 with the eleven states of the Baltic Sea Region (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden) and the European 
Commission as members. The CBSS was established by the Foreign Ministers of the member 
states in 1992. 
 
Table 3: Areas of Co-operation of the CBSS 
 
Environment  
 Baltic 21, etc. 
 
Energy  
 Meeting of Energy Ministers, etc. 
 
Civil Security & the Human Dimension 




 Baltic Sea Labour Network Project, 
etc. 
 
Education & Culture 
 Ars Baltica, Euro Faculty Pskov, etc. 
  
 
Source: Council of the Baltic Sea States in: http://www.cbss.org/main  
 
As you can see in Table 3, CBSS is not a security co-operation; it deals mostly with soft 
security, social and cultural issues. As Helmut Hubel puts it, CBSS acknowledged “that other 
institutions in post-Cold war Europe are far more relevant in terms of high politics, i.e. 
economic and military integration.”132 CBSS had never the intention to inherit functions of 
EU or NATO. 
 
Besides the member states of CBSS have deliberately restricted the competences of the 
council, perhaps also bearing in mind the conflict situations it would create especially 
between the Russian Federation and the Baltic States or Poland. The CBSS should be a forum 
of discussion were Russia should be a part of, in that way Russia was not left outside and little 
damage could be done.  
 
                                                 
131 Council of Baltic Sea States in: http://www.cbss.org/main 
132 Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of 




                                                
Unlike Browning and Joenniemi133, I wouldn’t say that security is the essence of the Baltic 
Sea Region and its co-operation. CBSS is clearly concentrated on soft security issues and 
social topics which in my opinion is the key point why this could have never been an 
alternative to NATO membership.  
 
On the one hand the creation of CBSS was a positive initiative, but on the other it was just a 
drop in a bucket, because it was a compromise solution. The Nordic countries didn’t and 
couldn’t admit the three Baltic States into their co-operation, though the Western countries 
believed that establishing regionalism, where the former Social and Soviet sates are part of, is 
essential for restoring democracy and assuring peace in Europe. They wanted to set a 
symbolic act, which you can also see at the membership of the European Commission in the 
council.  
 
It would be illusive to think that the CBSS, the way it was established, could serve as an 
alternative to NATO. No one should be left out, that’s why the council has eleven member 
states and the European Commission, and this is the reason why CBSS has little influence. 
The members don’t have common aims and for example the Russian Federation doesn’t see 
itself as part of the Baltic Sea Region. It is too diverse to be a section of a region and therefore 
has little interest in it; especially when it likes to see certain members still in their sphere of 
influence. 
An institution like the CBSS could never assure Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania its 
independence and security. 
 
 
5.1.3  Baltic Co-operation 
 
„Unfortunately most if not all people outside Estonia [Latvia and Lithuania] talk about “The 
Baltics”. This is an interesting concept, since what the three Baltic States have in common 
derives almost entirely from shared unhappy experiences imposed upon them from outside: 
occupations, deportations, annexation, sovietization, collectivization, russification. What these 
countries do not share is a common identity.”134 
 
 
133 Cf. Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, Regionality beyond Security? The Baltic Sea Region after 
Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 
No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 233-234 
134 Toomas H. Ilves cited in: Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in: Co-operation and Conflict: 




                                                
Thoomas H. Ilves, the former Foreign Minister of Estonia, points out what a lot of Estonians, 
Latvians and Lithuanians think and the “West” fails to realize. In the aftermath of the break-
up of the Soviet Union the Baltic States were seen as a geopolitical union and not as three 
different emerging states. Nevertheless Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania managed to establish, 
with the help and pressure of the “Western” countries, a regional co-operation especially 
concerning security issues. A regional co-operation that is very remarkable, because it is 
unique in Europe and serves often as a good example for other states. 
 
 
5.1.3.1  Reasons for a Baltic Co-operation in Terms of Security 
 
Since all three States had not inherited armed forces from the Soviet period, they had on the 
one hand to build up new armed forces and on the other to professionalise the little they 
already had. Thus the Baltic States had to develop their defence structures from scratch. 
Hence, they had very similar tasks to manage in a very short period of time. 
 
All three states were parts of the Soviet Union before and had therefore Russian troops 
stationed until 1993/4. These troops and the constant violations of their airspace by the 
Russian Federation, posed a threat for the emerging states and their reclaimed independence. 
In addition to that, Russia still saw and sees the Baltic States as their “near abroad”, which is 
“the claim by Russia of political interest and influence in states adjacent to it that were once 
part of the Soviet Union”135 and still leaves a bitter aftertaste in these countries. That’s why 
the Baltics felt the urge to establish armed forces as quick as possible. 
 
Another reason was that the three states were eager in their efforts to anchor their security 
within the EU and especially NATO. Therefore they were keen on reaching the standards for 







135 William Safire, ON LANGUAGE; The Near Abroad, The New York Times, 22nd May 1994 in: 




                                                
5.1.3.2  BALTBAT 
 
BALTBAT was established in 1994 as the showcase of co-operation of the Baltic States, as 
former Soviet states, NATO and Western not-NATO states and it was embedded in the 
NATO PfP program. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed a tri-national agreement on 
building a joint peacekeeping unit and the Baltic States, four Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden) and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding. Denmark agreed on taking the patronage of BALTBAT and later other 
Western states (including the United States and Germany) also joined the MOU. 
 
As I said before the three countries had to develop their armed forces from scratch and 
BALTBAT was a good opportunity to enlist assistance in terms of resources, training and 
money . For the supporting countries on the other hand it was much easier to justify their 
intense engagement to BALTBAT, a PfP project, rather than giving it to a former Soviet 
Republic to build up their new armed forces and in that way “produce” a new threat in the 
region.136  
 
BALTBAT was in no way without controversy. The three states were more or less forced into 
this co-operation and their national armies saw BALTBAT as a rival, who costs an immense 
amount of money, which they could use for themselves. But instead it was put into an “elite” 
troop, with soldiers that earn remarkable high bonusses and with skills that were irrelevant to 
the needs of national defence of the respective countries.137 
 
The organisation of BALTBAT was co-ordinated on the one hand by the BALTBAT Steering 
Group, which was responsible for political decisions and the co-ordination of support and on 
the other hand the BALTBAT Military Working Group, which was responsible for the 
military aspects related to the realisation of the project.138 
 
BALTBAT was first deployed in1998 as part of the Danish Battalion (DANBAT) in the 
SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
136 Cf. Robertas Sapronas, BALTBAT and development of Baltic Defence Forces, in: Baltic Defence Review 
2/1999, Baltic Defence College, Tartu 
137 Cf. Vitalijus Vaiksnoras, The Role of Baltic Defence Co-operation fort he Security of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, NATO Individual Fellowship Report, 2000-2002, Vilnius, in: http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-
01/Vaisknoro.pdf 31st July 2009 





Just in 2002 Vitalijus Vaiskornas wrote in a NATO Fellowship Report about the future of 
BALTBAT, its opportunities as a joined peacekeeping unit and becoming part of NATO 
North Eastern Army Corpus.139 Nevertheless in September 2003 BALTBAT was disbanded, 
oddly because it “successfully completed its goals”140. 
 
Table 4: Achievements of BALTBAT 
 
 The creation of the Peace Keeping Operations Centres 
 The creation of a national quick reaction force Scouts Battalion 
 The ability to send peacekeeping forces to various crisis locations (a good current example is 
the forces participating in the international operation in Afghanistan) 
 Acquiring trilateral and international co-operation experience 
 Drew up common English procedures for the development of co-operation 
 Skilled and experienced units and officers 
 
 
Source: Estonian Embassy in Tokyo, Estonia and NATO, Baltic Co-operation Projects, in: 
http://www.estemb.or.jp/lang_4/rub_1906/rubviide_157 3rd August 2009 
 
 
After the Baltic States realized that the EU, NATO and the Western countries are taken with 
the tri-national BALTBAT project, they initialised other joint forces and hoped to attain the 
same assistance as for BALTBAT. The plan came together.   
 
 
5.1.3.3  BALTNET 
 
BALTNET is the Baltic Air Surveillance Network, in which development started in 1994 and 
was launched in 2000. Norway took the chairmanship of the project and the Baltic States also 
gained other supporting nations, like the US. 
 
                                                 
139 Cf. ibid., p.32 
140 Cf. Estonian Embassy in Tokyo, Estonia and NATO, Baltic Co-operation Projects, in: 




A Regional Airspace Surveillance Co-ordination Centre (RASCC) was built in Kaunas, 
Lithuania. This enables Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to view, identify and monitor air traffic 
across the entire Baltic region, a fact that rose hackles with the Russian Federation.141 
 
BALTNET is now integrated into NATO operations. 
 
 
5.1.3.4  BALTRON 
 
BALTRON is the Baltic Naval Squadron and was established in 1997 under the patronage of 
Germany.  
Its main mission was the establishment of a tri-national squadron of MCM vessels. A unit for 
search and rescue operations and a training center were added. 
 
BALTRON is now also integrated into NATO units and has its headquarters in Estonia.  
 
 
5.1.3.5  Baltic Defence College - BALTDEFCOL 
 
BALTDEFCOL is the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia with the mission to educate 
full-fledged military personnel for the Baltic States. 
 
Table 5: Education at BALTDEFCOL 
 
 
The mandate of BALTDEFCOL is to educate: 
 
 Staff Officers - Army Intermediate Command and Staff Course (AICSC) 
 General Staff Officers - Joint Command and General Staff Course (JCGSC) 
 Leaders of Transformation - Higher Command Studies Course (HCSC) 
 Senior Civil Servants - Civil Servants Course (CSC) 
 Short-term tailored courses according to the request from the Baltic States 
 
Source: Baltic Defence College in: http://www.bdcol.ee/ 8th August 2009 
 
                                                 
141 Cf. James Geary, Yes, We Have No Army, Time Magazine, Nov 2002, in: 




                                                
In the last years more and more military personnel from other states than the Baltics graduate 




Maybe the Baltic Co-operation could have been the alternative to NATO membership, but the 
co-operation was coerced by the Western states and not a grown co-operation like the Nordic. 
Not even the biggest project BALTBAT, which was thought as a joint peacekeeping mission 
for NATO operations, lasted. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not willing to adapt their 
security issues on each other. They see each other as totally different countries with totally 
different goals; Estonia sees itself more as a Nordic country with close ties to Finland, 
Lithuania on the other hand sees itself as a Central European country with close ties to Poland 
and Latvia is somewhere in the middle. They don’t want to give up their newly achieved 




5.1.4  Lithuanian-Polish Co-operation 
 
„Since neutrality or co-operation with the Nordic or with the Baltic countries cannot lead to 
security guarantees, the optimal geopolitical code version could be the orientation towards 
Poland and the strengthening of the strategic links with the country”142 state Tomas 
Janekiunas and Kristina Baubinaite.  
 
Is Poland really the best strategic partner in the region? What role plays the US in this 
partnership? Could it have been an alternative to NATO? 
 
Poland and Lithuania have undoubtedly some common ground. You could see two cultural 
ties; on the one hand both countries share some history together, i.e. the Polish-Lithuanian 
Union from the 14th to the 16th century. On the other hand Lithuania and Poland both have 
significant national minorities in the respective country. Poles are the biggest minority in 
Lithuania with around 7% of the population. 
 
142 Tomas Janekiunas and Kristina Baubinaite, In Search for the Optimal Regional Alliance: Strategic 
Partnership between Lithuania and Poland in: Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, 2006, Lithuanian 




                                                
 
Polish influence on Lithuania is far more evident than the other way round, but Lithuania is a 
good strategic partner for Poland in the means of supporting it in international structures. 
Poland and Lithuania both represent the new Central Europe with similar aims. With this 
partnership Lithuania hopes to gain influence on an international level, also on the ground that 
Poland has become a not to underestimated ally of the US in Europe (War on Terror – 
Afghanistan and Iraq, US - Missile Defence Shield).  
 
Poland became a NATO member in NATO extension round before Lithuania in 1999. In this 
way they could provide support and essential information about NATO accession and its 
procedures. Lithuania also achieved easier access to NATO operation force “Northeast” and 
the establishment of BALTSEA (Baltic Security Assistance Management Group) through the 
help of Poland.143 
Poland was throughout history Lithuania’s gate to the West and when Lithuania saw its 
opportunity to be part of the West again, it relied on the support of Poland again. Lithuania 
sees Poland as its role model, both in economic and military aspects especially since it is an 
ally of the United States. Lithuania thought that with a military partnership with Poland it 
collateralizes its hard security issues in two ways; First, Poland is one of the largest 
confederate states in the Central and Eastern European Region and second, Lithuania gains 
more importance, especially regarding US military and NATO support. 
 
“The presumptions of strategic partnership between Poland and Lithuania on the global level 
[…] are mostly connected with the identical geo-strategic aim of two countries – to gain hard 
and soft security.”144 The two countries have a similar threat – Russia. They both want to 
escape Russia’s sphere of influence and Lithuania is less vulnerable with Polish backup. 
Above all it is very useful if Lithuania and Poland pull together concerning Kaliningrad - 
Oblast and so build up a stronger opposition against the Russian Federation. 
 
As Andrius Krivas put it in an article, expressed a bit oddly but still correct: “Military co-
operation with Poland, a large friendly neighboring country, is a form of bilateral relations in 
 
143 Cf. Andrius Krivas, Lithuanian-Polish Military Co-operation in: Lithuanian foreign Policy Review, No. 2 
Vol. 7 2001, in: http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2001-7/Krivas.pdf 
144 Tomas Janekiunas and Kristina Baubinaite, In Search for the Optimal Regional Alliance: Strategic 
Partnership between Lithuania and Poland in: Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, 2006, Lithuanian 




                                                
the sphere of such a vital importance.”145 The main military co-operation of these two 
countries is the LITPOLBAT, the Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion. 
 
 
5.1.4.1  LITPOLBAT 
 
The foundation of military co-operation between Lithuania and Poland lies in the agreement 
signed on June 15, 1993 in Vilnius between the Ministries of National Defence of the 
respective countries concerning the establishment of mutual military co-operation. 
 
The Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion is designed for maintenance and restoration of 
international peace and security as well as participation in peace-keeping missions, 
humanitarian and rescue actions undertaken by the UN, EU and NATO. Nearly 800 soldiers 
serve in the battalion (435 Polish and 351 Lithuanian) and the key staff positions are be taken 
up by rotation. The joint LITPOLBAT headquarters are located in Orzysz, Poland.146 
 
It was also designed as a support and training project for Lithuania’s joining of NATO in a 
way alike BALTBAT. Poland demonstrated how to achieve NATO operability and Lithuania 
benefited from Polish NATO experiences. 
 
 
The Lithuanian-Polish military co-operation helped and helps Lithuania in many ways, but it 
was never thought as an alternative for NATO membership, more a gateway to it. Lithuania 
realizes how important the Polish support is in strategic aspects, however it would not rely 
only on that. Besides it was very clear that Poland’s goal was also from the beginning to join 
NATO in that way it could only be of real help if Lithuania also is a member of the North 
Atlantic alliance.  
LIPOLTBAT was established with the joining of NATO in the back of both countries heads 
and Lithuania clearly profited from it. It was similar to the idea of the BALTBAT project, 
only with the difference that it was not forced upon Lithuania by the Western countries. This 
co-operation was far more logic and “natural” in the eyes of Lithuania. 
 
145Andrius Krivas, Lithuanian-Polish Military Co-operation in: Lithuanian foreign Policy Review, No. 2 Vol. 7 
2001, in: http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2001-7/Krivas.pdf 
146 Cf. Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion, Ministry of National Defence of Poland in: 




                                                
5.2  Neutrality 
 
 
Since I live in a small country that is more or less voluntarily neutral since the end of World 
War 2nd, I thought of neutrality as an option for Lithuania too, but reading literature it seemed 
that I was the only one. 
Neutrality if at all was only mentioned in one or two sentences, describing that it never was an 
aspired goal for the country. A fact that the three Baltic States share. 
Even the “Law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania [which was established 1996] 
stipulates that the national defence system of Lithuania is developed as a part of the common 
European security and transatlantic defence systems”147 
 
When it works for small European countries like Austria or Switzerland and even for another 
country with the Russian threat at its borders like Finland, why was it never thought of for 
Lithuania?  Could neutrality have been the answer? 
 
 
5.2.1  Why not? 
 
There are several reasons why neutrality was never thought of as an option for Lithuania after 
the break up of the Soviet Union. 
 
The most obvious one is certainly the fear of a Russian aggression. Lithuania and also the 
other Baltic States were overrun throughout history by different major powers. According to 
that to sit on the fence didn’t help them either the last time during World War 2nd when they 
were bargained in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. 
 
There was another problem after independence, as I mentioned in the chapter about the armed 
forces of Lithuania and also the Baltic co-operation, Lithuania had no military at all at this 
time. Building up armed forces that could ensure independence and security for Lithuania, if 
 
147 Agreement between the parliamentary parties of Lithuania on the defence policy in: 




                                                
it is neutral, would have been a long-term assignment and the country wanted the quickest 
possible version. 
You could argue that Lithuania’s armed forces had to start from scratch anyway; why not 
build up military that would suit neutrality instead of NATO? 
Most of all because the establishment of armed forces was only possible with the help and 
support of several Western countries, who were willing to spend money and effort, because 
Lithuania was part of NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program. They definitely wouldn’t 
have been willing to do that, if Lithuania’s “security future” would have been uncertain. They 
would have feared a change of mind of Lithuania concerning neutrality and through that 
endanger the stability of the region. 
 
Furthermore history taught Lithuania that neutrality is not a safe option. “Dass Litauen eine 
solche Verankerung [a NATO membership] anstrebte, hat auch mit der schlechten 
historischen Erfahrung zu tun, die man in der Zwischenkriegszeit mit der Neutralität gemacht 
hat. Sie bot keinen Schutz, sondern machte Litauen im Gegenteil anfälliger dafür, zum 
Spielball anderer Mächte zu werden.”148 
 
Lithuania not only wanted to ensure their security, but also to show the Russian Federation 
what side they are now on and what powerful allies they have. The small country feared that 
being neutral Russia could see as a concession and an invitation to see it once more as its 
“Near Abroad”. They wanted to send a signal that they are now not only an independent 
country but also independent from Russia’s sphere of influence with the help of NATO. 
“Lithuania’s primary security and foreign policy objective is full integration in the North 
Atlantic Alliance. Vilnius explicitly rejected all other security options as unrealistic and 
destabilizing, including membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), states 
neutrality, and non-alignment. All these options generated ambiguity and could have potentially 




148 E-mail correspondence with Reinhard Veser, October 2009 
149 Raimundas Lopata, et al., Lithuania’s Security and Foreign Policy Strategy in: Lithuanian Political Science 




5.3  OSCE 
 
 
Another alternative could have been the tight ensnarement with the OSCE; since Lithuania is 
a member since 1991 right after their independence and all the states of the region are 
members as well. 
“Several political actors (including the late Soviet Union’s and thereafter Russia’s 
leaderships) had hoped that in post-Cold War Europe the CSCS, since 1995 the OSCE, would 
develop into the key institution for safeguarding peace and co-operation in the continent.”150 
 
 
5.3.1  What is the OSCE? 
 
With 56 States drawn from Europe, Central Asia and America, the OSCE is the world's 
“largest regional security organisation”151, which was founded in 1975 when 35 countries 
signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The 
OSCE headquarter is based in Vienna, Austria. It has now grown to 56 member states152. 
 
The OSCE divides its members into the regions of South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe 
(including the three Baltic States), South Caucasus, Central Asia and Western Europe and 
America for their missions, field operations and activities. 
Its activities in the various regions are separated into three so-called “security dimensions”, 
which are the politico-military dimension, the economic and environmental dimension and the 
human dimension. 
 















Environmental Activities  
 






                                                 
150 Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of 
the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 288 
151 OSCE in: http://www.osce.org/ 27th August 2009 















Source: Activities of the OSCE in: http://www.osce.org/activities/ 27th August 2009 
 
As you can see on Table 6 the security understanding of the OSCE has a wide range which 
stretches across the politico-military dimension to the economic and environmental dimension 
and the human dimension. The politico-military dimension concentrates more or less on hard 
security issues, but the others are centred on soft security issues like media freedom, minority 
rights or environment.  
 




5.3.2  Why not? 
 
As I quoted above, the OSCE sees itself as the “largest regional security organisation”153 and 
has not the aim to be a global security organisation. I don’t quite understand why the OSCE 
calls itself a regional security organisation when it has 56 member states stretched across 3 
continents, but it seems that this is one of the key elements of it. This alliance is geared to 
operate in its five regions and concentrates on specific activities in specific regions. In this 
way it can respond better to the particular needs of each region on the one hand, but on the 
other it anticipates to act as a global security player. 
 
The biggest drawback of the OSCE concerning Lithuania is certainly that it is no defence 
pact.  
“The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner 
as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice. […] For this purpose they will 
use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement 
                                                 




                                                
or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement agreed to in advance to the 
disputes to which they are parties.”154 
The OSCE is construed to solve issues with diplomatic means and not with military 
intervention in any way. 
“[S]everal “new democracies” in Europe’s former East (especially Poland and the Baltic 
States) were not willing to forego US “hard” military guarantees for OSCE’s “soft 
mechanism” to maintain stability.” 
 
The OSCE does a good job on preventing conflicts and in this way ensuring the stability in its 
distinct regions, but it will never be a security organisation like NATO, not even the “new” 
NATO, because it is no defence pact and it has not the support of the United States in means 
of military. It had the chance of becoming a global security alliance but without the backing 
of the US it was doomed to fail. 
 
To put it a nutshell the OSCE could not ensure security as Lithuania has aimed for, because it 





154 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, p. 5 in: 




                                                
6  Comparison to Poland 
 
 
Comparing Lithuania to Poland is almost natural, even more natural than setting in relation to 
the other two Baltic countries, Latvia and Estonia. The demarcation of the countries in this 
region was and is still more or less arbitrary.155 Lithuania and Poland formed a 
commonwealth in the 16th century and since at least that time the Polish influence in 
Lithuania has been obvious. 
However, they not only shared a commonwealth, but they also share the same history of 
foreign rule. The Prussians/Germans, the Habsburgs and the Czars/Russia/Soviets dominated 
the region in different stages and far too often Lithuania and Poland were a pawn in the hands 
of the powerful. 
It cannot be denied that the Polish ties and influences especially concerning the Vilnius and 
Kaunas region have been very strong due to this region being always densely populated by 
Poles. It was also repeatedly part of Polish territory. Above all, Vilnius has been the apple of 
discord between the two countries for quite some time, the last time being in 1938, when 
Poland occupied the city and its surroundings causing a diplomatic discord.156 
 
Poland and Lithuania were nations in transformation after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact 
and the Soviet Union. They chose similar ways to force the communist party to react and to 
gain back their freedom through peaceful means (Solidarność and Sąjūdis). In addition, both 
countries stroke related new paths to European democracies with the same foreign policy 
goals, such as memberships to the EU and NATO. They both became members of the EU and 
NATO for the same reasons and trusted NATO safeguarding their security. 
 
Sometimes the feeling is evoked that Poland sees Lithuania as its “little brother”, as one of the 
countries in the region it has to look after and needs to provide a guiding hand.157 On the 
 
155 Cf. Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der 
Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen 
Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 21 
156 Cf. Idem, p.30 et seq. 
157 Cf. Mieczysław Jackiewicz, Litauen und Polen aus polnischer Sicht in: : Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. 





                                                
other hand, Lithuania sees Poland as its most important ally in the region, who offers the most 
in return, like good relations to the US.1
 
The intention of this chapter is to compare the political systems of Poland and Lithuania, 
because it would go beyond the scope of this paper, but to point out the similarities and 
connections between both countries in some areas. Therefore it focuses on their history, their 
transformation and their foreign policy over the last few years. Hence, on the one hand, it is a 
diachronic comparison and on the other hand it is a policy comparison with the emphasis on 





Poland and Lithuania has had close contact even before they formed a commonwealth in the 
16th century during Christianization of the region, which was “promoted” by the Teutonic 
Order.159 In 1569, Lithuania signed the Union of Lublin in which Poland and Lithuania 
created a single state: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This union was strongly in 
favour of Poland, which had the chance to push Lithuania into this treaty because it feared the 
fast advancing Russians. The Union of Lublin made clear who had the political predominance 
in this commonwealth, namely Poland. Afterwards the Polish influence in the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania grew stronger and stronger as Poland initiated its language as a vehicle of culture 
and religion.160 
In 1791, Lithuania suffered the loss of its autonomous state and became a part of  the Polish 
state. Shortly afterwards, in 1795, during the third partition of Poland, the whole nation 
declined and the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, and Habsburg Austria divided up 
the lands of the former commonwealth among themselves. From then on, the forced 
Russification process began in large parts of the two countries.161 By then the Lithuanians 
 
158 Tomas Janekiunas and Kristina Baubinaite, In Search for the Optimal Regional Alliance: Strategic 
Partnership between Lithuania and Poland in: Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, 2006, Lithuanian 
Military Academy, Vilnius, p.75-91 
159 Cf. Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der 
Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen 
Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 25 
160 Cf. Idem, p. 26 
161 Cf. Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht in: Litauen Nachbar im 




                                                
were seen as different speaking Poles, thus the Polish influence couldn’t be denied any longer. 
In the following years a process of alienation occurred between the two nations.162 
 
After World War I, the relations grew particularly tense since Lithuania proclaimed 
independence and the Vilnius region became the problem case between the two countries. 
This region was always densely populated by Poles and was also part of Poland from time to 
time. On the other hand, it was Lithuania’s largest city, with a significant economically 
importance to the new state. Furthermore, Germany engaged itself in this conflict and was 
eager to limit Polish influence in the region.163 
Nevertheless, in October 1920 Polish armed forces occupied Vilnius and the eastern part of 
Lithuania, which caused the state of war for several years between the two countries.164 
Interestingly, in most historic outlines of Lithuania, Lithuanian scientists are coy about the 
fact that during the interwar period Vilnius was not part of the independent Lithuania the 
entire time. 
In 1939/1940, both Lithuania and Poland became once again a pawn in the hands of the 
powerful when Hitler and Stalin agreed on the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany 
and the Soviet Union, better known as the Molotow - Ribbentrop Pact, which included the 
division of Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. Since 
then Poland and Lithuania were under the changing rule of Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Another topic between Lithuania and Poland that is willingly kept under wraps is the “Armia 
Krajowa”, and if this topic is discussed, the Poles and Lithuanians do not have the same 
position.165 “Armia Krajowa” was a Polish partisan movement that fought for the 
independence of the eastern part of Lithuania from the Germans, the Soviets and more or less 
the Lithuanians. 
For both countries the Soviet Communist dominance began after 1945. Lithuania became part 




162 Cf. Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht, p. 86 
163 Cf. Marianne Bienhold, Die Entstehung des Litauischen Staates in den Jahren 1918-1919 im Spiegel 
Deutscher Akten, 1976, Brockmeyer, Bochum, p. 115 et seq. 
164 Cf. Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht, p. 86 
165 Cf. the articles of Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht, p. 87 and 
Mieczysław Jackiewicz, Litauen und Polen aus polnischer Sicht, p.104 both in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. 




To put it in a nutshell, Poland and Lithuania shared a common history for centuries, which 
was often dictated by foreign rule. Thus, they share the same inveterate fear of being overrun 





The transformation process into consolidated democracies of Poland and Lithuania share 
some similarities, but first I want to shed some light on the two movements which initiated the 
transformation in the first place: Solidarność and Sąjūdis 
Though the two movements arose from totally different backgrounds, their characteristics are 
related. Solidarność was a labour union, which promoted the betterment and rights of workers 
and was not directed at the government at first. Sąjūdis, on the other hand, arose from a 
movement that supported Glasnost in Lithuania and which was political from the beginning, 
but foremost not against the Communist Party. Due to their different backgrounds, they chose 
different instruments of protest, strikes and demonstrations. Nevertheless, they both had 
similar claims like eventual independence and achieved the enforcement of free elections 
through peaceful means. New parties derived from Solidarność and Sąjūdis166, which lost 
influence over time, but were essential in the process of transformation. 
Both movements shaped the Polish and Lithuanian states and gave them state systems with a 
similar character.167 
 
Table 7: Characteristics of Solidarność and Sąjūdis 
Solidarność Sąjūdis 
 The founding-activity emanated from the 
people 
 The movement was not political at first 
 
 The instrument of protest was going on 
strike 
 The movement emanated from the 
people 
 The movement was political from the 
beginning 
 The instrument of protest was 
demonstrations 
                                                 
166 Cf. Joachim Tauber, Das politische System Litauens in: Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, W. Ismayr 
(Ed.), 2004, 2nd Edition, UTB, Wiesbaden, p. 171 
167 Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der 
Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen 




 The movement questioned the leading 
role of the (communist) party 
 The movement enforced free elections 
 New parties derived from Solidarność  
 The movement questioned the leading 
role of the (communist) party 
 The movement enforced free elections 
 New parties derived from Sąjūdis  
 
Source: Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende 
Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der 
polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 40 and 48/49 
 
The revivification of the Polish-Lithuanian relations began in the ‘80s on behalf of the 
Catholic church and the Pope.168 The Catholic Church always had a great influence in both 
countries since the Christianization in the 15th century and played an important role in the 
transformation process.169 The church enjoys a high reputation in both states (for Lithuania 
see Chapter 3.4.) and both states have a very high rate of Catholics (Lithuania 79% in 
2001170, Poland 89% in 2002171). The Church influenced the values under which the 
transformation took place. 
                                                
 
Poland and Lithuania both had to find their place in global relations and from the beginning it 
was clear to both of them that they wanted to belong to Europe and not be related to the 
Russian Federation or to the CIS.172 The Russian Federation as such is a highly emotional 
topic for both countries as they relate everything Russian to the Soviet Union. Gregor Ryssel 
even speaks of “hatred”173 towards the Russian Federation because of the forced ward of the 
Soviet Government. Furthermore the Russian troops that were stationed in both countries until 
1993 tightened their relationship to the Russian Federation even more. 
 
168 Cf. Mieczysław Jackiewicz, Litauen und Polen aus polnischer Sicht, p. 106 
169 Cf. Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der 
Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen 
Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 39 
170 Lithuanian Catholic Network, The Percentage of Lithuanian Catholics 1990-2001 in: 
http://www.lcn.lt/en/bl/istorija/5/ 27th July 2009 
171 CIA – The World Factbook, Poland in: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/pl.html 18th of June 2010 
172 Laure Paquette, NATO and Eastern Europe after 2000, Strategic Interactions with Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, 2001, Nova Science Publ., Huntington, NY, p. 37/38 
172 Cf. Rokas Bernotas, Der Aktuelle Stand der litauischen Außenpolitik in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. 
Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 81/82  
173 Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der 
Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen 




                                                
Both countries see themselves as a bridge between the East and the West and like the idea of 
the leadership in the region.174 
 
 
6.3 Foreign Policy 
 
At first glance it doesn’t seem self-evident that Poland, a country with over thirty-eight 
million inhabitants, and Lithuania, with not even four million people, have very similar 
foreign policies. However, looking deeper into the matter this becomes obvious. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Poland and Lithuania had the 
same fears and the same enemy. It was crucial for both countries to restore their independence 
and their international recognition.175 This was more difficult for Lithuania, because it was 
part of the Soviet Union and not a nation of its own. Nevertheless, they both feared that 
Russia would dictate its terms, or even more frighteningly, that Russia would use military 
force to restore the old system after gaining back its strength, particularly since both countries 
had Russian troops stationed in Poland176 and Lithuania177 until their phased withdrawal was 
completed in the summer of 1993. Furthermore, a total breakdown of the Russian Federation 
was another suspected scenario, which would have toppled the transformation to consolidated 
democracies in the whole region.178 
Foreign policy as such was a blank page to both states since it was dictated by the Soviet 
Union for decades. Poland had at least some diplomatic relations to and embassies in other 
countries, whereas Lithuania had not even those. Nevertheless, Lithuania had the most 
diplomatic ties compared to the other Baltic states.179 
 
 
174 Cf. Aleksander Smolar, Introduction in: Poland’s Foreign Policy: Continuation or Brake with the Past?, 2004, 
Discussion, Stefan Bartory Foundation, Warsaw, p. 8 
Cf. President Artūras Paulauskas, Lithuania’s New Foreign Policy in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 
13/14, 2004, p. 11 et seq. 
175 Cf. Rokas Bernotas, Der Aktuelle Stand der litauischen Außenpolitik in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. 
Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 80 
176 Cf. Jacek Cichocki / Wojciech Konończuk, Polen und seine östlichen Nachbarn Das Verhältnis seit 1989 in: 
http://www.bpb.de/themen/LG5ZIY,0,0,Polen_und_seine_%F6stlichen_Nachbarn.html 15th June 2010  
177 Cf. Romuald Misiunas, National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic states in: The Legacy of History in 
Russia and the New States of Eurasia, F. Starr, The international Politics of Eurasia I, 1994, Sharpe, Armonte, 
NY, p.108/109 
178 Cf. Romuald Misiunas, National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic states, p.103 




As you can see in table 8, Poland and Lithuania agreed on almost the same foreign policy 
strategy in the ‘90s. In both countries the political parties agreed on the aspiration of a 
membership to the EU and NATO.180 Like most states in transformation, assuring their 
security was one of their major concerns and both trusted NATO the most to safeguard their 
nation.181 EU membership, on the other hand, was important for a different reason. Economic 
reasons were a determining factor, combined with the desired alignment with Western 
Europe. Poland and Lithuania wanted to state clearly their commitment to Europe and to 
distinguish themselves from the Russian Federation as much as possible. Furthermore, the 
friendly relations between the Bonn/Berlin - Moskow axis were feared because they brought 
back some negative memories of the Molotow-Ribbentrop pact182 and being part of the 
European community provided additional security. 
 
Table 8: Foreign policy goals of Poland and Lithuania in the ‘90s: 
Poland183 Lithuania184 
 consolidation of  state security and 
national independence 
 national sovereignty and national 
security 
 economic and social development of the 
country 
 economic growth and social development
 development of a suitable position for 
Poland in the world 
 prevention of smuggling and illegal 
immigration 
 
Needless to say, after the accession of the EU and NATO the foreign policy of both states 
changed, but nevertheless the similarities remained. Naturally now they concentrate now 
naturally more on European policy and global relations: especially their relations to the US 
are crucial for Poland and Lithuania likewise. Also remarkable is their emphasis on relations 
to other countries in their region, in which they both want to act as a mediator. Interestingly, 
                                                 
180 Cf. Aukse Balcytiene, Changing Role of Media in Post-Communist Lithuania, Working Papers in 
International Journalism, No.2, 2002, Projekt Verlag, Bochum, p.16 and 
Cf. Poland’s road to NATO in: The Warsaw Voice , November 2008, 
http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/19144/article 15th June 2010 
181 Cf. Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht in: in: Litauen Nachbar 
im Osten, J. Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 89 
182 Cf. Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der 
Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen 
Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 68 
183 Laure Paquette, NATO and Eastern Europe after 2000, Strategic Interactions with Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, 2001, Nova Science Publ., Huntington, NY, p. 38 
184 Rokas Bernotas, Der Aktuelle Stand der litauischen Außenpolitik in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. Hackmann 




Poland as well as Lithuania stated aspirations of leadership in the region, which is obviously 
more realistic from Poland’s point of view than from Lithuania’s.185 
 
Table 9: Foreign policy goals of Poland and Lithuania after 2004: 
Poland186 Lithuania187 
 relations with the countries in its region  relations with countries in the region, 
bridge the East and the West 
 European policy  European policy 
 transatlantic or global relations (esp. 
NATO and the US) 
 strengthening Euro-Atlantic Alliance, 
EU-Russia relations and EU-US relations 
 
Another characteristic that both foreign policies share is that they are strongly connected to 
the history of both states and are therefore often highly emotional. And as Aleksander Smolar 
states, the “combination of emotions and foreign policy is hazardous”. Especially any item 
concerning the Russian Federation Poland and Lithuania tend not to be objective, but instead 
they hear an assault on their countries.188  
 
The fact that the fear for their security and the fear to be overrun is still alive, even after 2004 
and their memberships in the EU and NATO, is shown by the following citations. 
“For the first time in several hundred years no external threat hangs over Poland. Poland’s 
security, to many previous generations of poles an unattainable dream calls for constant 
vigilance.”189 “We [Lithuanians] should defend our national interests and […] avoid a 
situation where we are made an item of trade or other states pursue their interests at our 
expense”190 
                                                 
185 Cf. Aleksander Smolar, Introduction in: Poland’s Foreign Policy: Continuation or Brake with the Past?, 2004, 
Discussion, Stefan Bartory Foundation, Warsaw, p. 8 
186 Aleksander Smolar, Introduction in: Poland’s Foreign Policy: Continuation or Brake with the Past?, 2004, 
Discussion, Stefan Bartory Foundation, Warsaw, p. 14 
187 President Artūras Paulauskas, Lithuania’s New Foreign Policy in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 
13/14, 2004, p. 11 et seq. 
188 Cf. Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der 
Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen 
Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 70/71 
189 Laure Paquette, NATO and Eastern Europe after 2000, Strategic Interactions with Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, 2001, Nova Science Publ., Huntington, NY, p. 42 
190 President Artūras Paulauskas, Lithuania’s New Foreign Policy in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 




                                                
7  Russia as an Important Factor 
 
 
“It is said that Russia is the biggest obstacle to NATO expansion to the Baltic states. The 
Baltic states certainly think so […]”191. According to that it is necessary to look at the Russian 
NATO relations and the Russian Baltic relations concerning NATO enlargement. It shall be 
explained why Lithuania’s NATO membership did cause the Russian Federation headaches 
and why did Russia decide nonetheless not to block the expansion. For this reason the chapter 
largely bases on NATO-Russian relations because “Russia’s attitude towards NATO 




7.1  Historic Aversion 
 
 
Moscow’s extremely negative reaction towards the first and especially the second wave of 
NATO enlargement is closely connected with the image the Soviet Union established of 
NATO during the Cold War. 
 
Even Gorbachev’s Perestroika, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following so called 
“honeymoon with the West”193 at the beginning of Yeltsin era didn’t change the original 
image Russia had of this transatlantic security organization essentially. It is a quite paradox 
phenomenon, because former enemies, such as United States or Germany, were no longer 
regarded as hostile countries. NATO was still viewed as a potentially anti-Russian coalition 
and it was more or less seen as a collective enemy. The fact that NATO is a powerful alliance 
with, back then, 16 highly developed Western states, with mechanisms that linked the United 
 
191 Daniel Austin, NATO Expansion and the Baltic States, Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst, 1999, Surrey, p. 1 
192 Vladimir Baranovsky, NATO Enlargement: Russia’s Attitudes, speech for IISS/CEPS European Security 
Forum, July 2001, Brussels 
193 Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, 




                                                
States to their allies in Europe, made it more ominous and threatening than any single 
Western state, even the before mentioned United States or Germany.194 
 
Of course strong Russia’s attitude was merely inherited from history. The creation of the 
Warsaw Pact in May 1955 was portrayed as a security response to NATO, which was 
established seven years earlier. And even until the early 1990s the Soviet political literature 
described NATO as “a military bloc of capitalist countries under American leadership, 
directed against USSR and other peaceful countries”195.  The Hungarian reformers 1956 and 
the initiators of Pragues Spring 1968-69 were accused of having intended to leave the Warsaw 
Pact and join NATO instead and destroy the social commonwealth. 
 
More than three generations of Russians and especially political people – including diplomats, 
journalists, military officers, government and party officials – were brought up to strongly 
believe in this paradigm. Although fewer and fewer Soviet citizens believed that NATO 
would launch a military attack against Soviet Union or any of the member-states of the 
Warsaw Pact, the negative attitude changed woefully little.  
One of the reasons why the image of NATO was barely possible to destroy was the Leninist 
concept of two camps inside the world’s bourgeoisie196: one militarist, aggressive camp and 
one pacifist camp. This idea was brought to new life under the Khrushchev era and they 
divided the West into the “realistic and moderate forces” and the “aggressive and militaristic 
circles”. Naturally and automatically NATO fell into the second category and NATO was by 




194 Cf. Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, 
NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C. 
195 Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, 
NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C., p. 124 
196 Cf. Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, 




                                                




During the first two years of Yeltsin’s rule, the more or less liberal political establishment of 
Russia did not consider NATO as a serious problem. The general approach towards the West 
and adjustment of Russia’s foreign policy especially concerning the Western countries was 
seen as much more significant and necessary.197 
 
It was hard enough to change the purely communistic foreign policy, which was full of anti-
Western heritage, radically into a more moderate form and get rid of the remnants of the 
communist system. It was a remarkable change to a distinct pro western policy promoted 
especially by Yeltsin, Kozyrev and the members of “Democratic Russia”. They also sought a 
way to start integration into international economic and financial institutions with regard to 
the national debt.198 
Russia even joined North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and started to increase and 
intensify their ties with NATO.  
But relating to NATO it is essential to say that Russia believed very much that NATO would 
change after the end of Cold War, because it has lost its main threat.199 That its main focus 
would be on disarmament and it would concentrate on the remaining threats outside of Europe 
(e.g. the Middle East). Russia didn’t think that NATO would still maintain their priorities in 
Europe. 
 
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev labeled this era as a “romantic period”200 in 
Russian foreign policy and set high hopes on Western assistance. 
 
But this so called “honeymoon” with the West was soon over, to be precise at the end of 
1992, when the West made it clear that it had no mind to see Russia as a close ally, after such 
a short time after emerging from 70 years of communism. 
 
197 Cf. Margot Light, Foreign Policy Thinking in: N. Malcolm (Ed.), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1996, Oxford, p.33 
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So as the West was not willing to grant Russia a place in their own arms markets the opposite 
happened, Washington insisted that Moscow would drop some of its intended deals, for 
example China. 
When the situation between the Western countries and Russia grew tense, the support for 
Kozyrev’s foreign policy nearly disappeared and the conservatives and communists in the 
Supreme Soviet criticized him sharply.201 
 
Debates began, especially in the US, concerning NATO’s future and by the summer of 1993 
the governments of Central and Eastern Europe started to prepare the ground for joining 
NATO. This idea was widely accepted and supported meanwhile in the West as they saw a 
need to enlarge towards Eastern Europe to ensure stability in Europe. On the contrary Russia 
was kept out of their considerations. 
On August 26th 1993 President Yeltsin said his famous statement in Warsaw that Eastern 
European countries are free to join any alliance they consider necessary and changed the 
pretext of NATO enlargement from theoretical to practical. Moscow tried immediately and 
desperately to relativize Yeltsin’s saying.202 
 
 
7.3  Russia’s Fears and Threats in General towards the Enlargement 
 
 
 Isolation and Exclusion: 
Russia felt betrayed by the West and NATO, because they were treated differently from other 
Eastern European countries.203 NATO even considered Ukraine, not only a former socialist 
state, but also a former USSR state, to become a member of the alliance, but Russia was not 
part of the European or Western community still. 
Russia was deeply concerned and it feared that the Western countries were trying to profit 
from its weakness because it was no longer a world power. The conservatives criticized that 
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Russia was leaning too much towards the West and they get the paycheck as NATO would 
still remain a militaristic, aggressive alliance.204 
The liberal pro-Western democrats were not so much concerned about NATO as a threat to 
Russia but they felt eliminated by the “civilized world”. They were more or less hurt by the 
fact that Russia tried to move decisively to the West and in return the West turned away from 
it. The western countries decided to not embrace Russia, but to strengthen NATO. 
The enlargement would change the geopolitical configuration of Europe in an unfavorable 
way for Russia. 
 
 Moving NATO Troops Closer to Russia: 
Not only would a part of the former Soviet Union come under Western influence, but the 
threat that NATO would gain new allies right beside Russian borders was strong.205 NATO 
would be able to post their troops at strategic points near Russia. If NATO wished they could 
overrun Russia easily, as they would have military bases along the whole western border of 
the Russian Federation. Russia just managed to gain a more or less trustworthy relationship 
with its former enemies, but how would that be possible if Russia would be surrounded by 
NATO? 
 
 Loosing Influence: 
Russia had a very hard time (and still has) to realize that it is not a world power anymore and 
that the world is no longer bipolar even if they still preferred it to be. Extremely hurting was 
to see that they also lost influence in their former Soviet Union member states and that the 
power of the Western alliance will be unavoidable. The Russian Federation wanted to have at 
least ensured the possibility of co-decision in Europe, but would this be possible if a couple of 
former socialist and USSR countries would have seats and even veto-rights in NATO? Russia 
would have liked that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) act as a 
“counterbalance” in the East under the patronage of Russia. Russia still felt it would be the 
“big brother”. 206 
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Every one of that issues bothered the Russian Federation, but “when they are all considered 
together, this creates a critical mass of negative attitudes making Russia feel particular 
depressed. Such political and even psychological frustrations represent the source of Russia’s 
vigorous (although not always coherent) opposition [to NATO]”207. 
 
Regarding Russia’s fears it also thought of a couple of “counter measure” reactions to NATO 
expansion towards the East:208 
 Building a CIS military based counter-alliance 
 Re-deploying armed forces in the western areas of Russia 
 Targeting East Central Europe with nuclear weapons 
 Developing strategic partnership with anti-Western regimes 
Luckily none of them was realized as such, because the pressure of the international 
community would have been too heavy and Russia would have destroyed his foreign relations 




Political Scientists found at least five factors which prevent the Russian Federation from 
setting out on this path. These were true especially in the 90s:209 
 Its economic weakness 
 Its dependence on Western financial sources and investments 
 The necessity to integrate in to the world economy by becoming part of  international 
economic and financial institutions 
 The desire to be part of global decision making (G-7) 
 The weakness of its military and the absence of belligerent attitudes in society 
Of course all these mentioned factors changed a lot during the 90s and for example energy 
issues became one of the factors which are clearly favorable for Russia. Through this they can 
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7.4 Further Development in Russian – NATO Relations 
 
Right after the shock of the announcement of the willing to expand NATO to the East of 
Europe, leaving out Russia, the talks and debates about joining the Partnership for Peace 
(PFP) were very tense. 
But nevertheless NATO and the Russian Federation officially signed the PFP declaration in 
January 1994. Foreign Minister Kozyrev made nearly every effort during the negotiations 
with NATO to make clear that Russia wanted at least a postponing of the enlargement. So it is 
very obvious how pleased Kozyrev was when NATO decided to adopt a slow approach to the 
expansion.210 The Russian federation also joined the North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
(NACC). 
The earlier tension grew visible again during the war in former Yugoslavia and with NATO 
intervention. The Russian public opinion opposed the planned NATO attacks to stop the Serbs 
as Russian diplomats tried hard to reach a more diplomatic and “peaceful” solution with the 
Serbs. 
NATO on the contrary was flying air strikes against the Serbs without even informing 
Moscow and Yeltsin was hurt, not so much as the defender of the Serbs, but more as the 
leader of a great power who had not been notified of a major international action on which 
Moscow had uttered serious doubts and concerns. But after the initial frustration Russia even 
supported the air strikes, although the feeling of uneasiness concerning the Expansion of 
NATO grew stronger. 
When the first war in Chechnya was shocking the international community the tension grew 
intense once again. 
At the end of 1996, NATO – Russian dialogue entered a new stage, measured both by the 
intensity of mutual contacts and new proposals on mutual relations. On May 27th 1997 in 
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Paris the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and security between NATO and 
the Russian Federation” was signed.211 
Although at the end of 1997, when the new NATO candidate countries signed the agreement 
for their admission to NATO, negative feelings towards the enlargement still remained very 
obvious. 
“Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov […] reiterated his country's opposition to NATO 
expansion but said, it would not "keep harping on" it. Speaking on arrival in Brussels, where 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic earlier signed protocols clearing the way for their 
admission to NATO, Primakov said, "We continue to take a negative view of the expansion of 
NATO and we do not want to see this. At the same time, we are not going to keep harping on 
about these issues. So we are going to have a serious discussion. As for the interests of those 
countries which are joining NATO or are signing up, we'll just have to wait and see, as they 
say." His remarks were broadcasted by Russian NTV television.” 212 
 
 
7.5  Why not the Baltic States? 
 
 
 Former Soviet Union member states: 
 
The Baltic States were not “independent” socialist countries, like Czech Republic, Poland or 
Hungary, on the contrary they were part of the former Soviet Union – they belonged to the 
core countries of Russia. So it was even more hurting when the Russian federation had to 
realize that they would loose one of the “little brothers” – their “near abroad”. 
Russia wanted to see the Baltic States as a part of the CIS family, but they refused. Instead 
they “deserted” to the Western enemies and NATO. Russia would sustain the loss of  its 
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 “Buffer zone” against NATO: 
 
This was more a problem concerning military security, because Russia saw the Baltic States 
as a buffer zone against NATO, but now NATO would be able to post military bases right in 
front of the western borders of the Russian Federation. 
 
 Russian Minorities:214 
 
The tremendous Russian speaking minorities bared a lot of problems even before. Russia used 
them before as a counter argument on why they are not willing to withdraw all their troops in 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Especially in Estonia and Latvia the Russian minorities were 
up to 30% of the population and Russia insisted that they have an obligation to protect them. 
The public opinion of the Russian speaking minorities was divided. A lot of them were not in 
favor of the enlargement and would have preferred stronger ties with Russia instead of the 
new alliance with the West, but the supporters of the Expansion were not that small either. 
They saw themselves not as Russian but felt like citizens of Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. 
 
 Border issues: 
 
The border issues concerning Lithuania are very much linked to Kaliningrad Oblast, but 
Estonia and Latvia had some problems of their own.215 
There are tensions between Latvia and Russia over border issues. The two countries have yet 
to sign a treaty formally delineating the border because they haven’t agreed on every term. 
Actually the Estonians and Russian had already agreed on the borders, but as you can see in 
the following Russia is not really reliable on that. In 2005 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov announced during a visit to Helsinki that the Russian Federation had decided to 
revoke its signature from the border agreements it signed with the Estonian government in 
Moscow. The move came just one week after the Estonian Riigikogu ratified the border 
document which slightly amends the border that has been used since Estonia regained its 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. 
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“The problem with this half-forgotten enclave of Russia is that for historical reasons it is 
diplomatically highly sensitive. The break-up of the Soviet Union left Kaliningrad, home to 
950,000 Russians, as an isolated outpost with its road and rail connections to Russia passing 
through Lithuanian territory.”216 Kaliningrad is still of great strategic importance to Moscow. 
It houses the Russian Baltic Fleet at the port of Baltiysk and is the country's only European 
ice-free port. 
Nevertheless Russia and Lithuania managed to agree on the borders of Kaliningrad with the 
help of the European Union in 2003. They also agreed on Visa issues and the transit of 
civilians and military personnel.217 
 
 
7.7 The Enlargement still Happened 
 
It was significant that before NATO and EU took their decisions in 2002, they were eager to 
manage to develop further their “partnership relations” with the Russian Federation.  
NATO and Russia had their co-operation in the Project for Peace on the one hand and on the 
other even more important they signed a formal partnership agreement during the Rome 
Summit of May 2002 – an agreement, which would involve Russia in all of NATO’s decision 
making, except the core of collective defence, which are enshrined in Article V. This was the 
Establishment of NATO Russian Council.218 This NATO Russia Council was a milestone in 
the relations between NATO and the Russian Federation. The US and Russia were willing to 
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Realist School of thought: 
If you bear in mind the realistic model219 Russia agreed not because of the power of 
institutions like NATO as such, it was more likely that it just couldn’t suppress the realisation 
of the US as a “hyper power”.  We have also to consider that the US made it clear a couple 
times that they would support the expansion either way. America took the tough position the 
enlargement would take place in spite of Moscow’s veto so the Russian Federation tried to 
realize as many advantages as they could, but not kick over the traces with its demand to 
consent to the expansion. 
Liberal School of thought: 
Following the Liberal Model220 you could argue that Russian decision makers are 
increasingly following the “logic of interdependence”, especially in terms of economic and 
political means in the increasingly globalised world of today. They depend on the European 
and Western markets for trade and they would have risked heavy loses in their fi
Both schools have its plausible explanations and they do not exclude each other. On the 
contrary the truth is lying somewhere in the middle. R
But the relations between Russia and NATO were still on rocky ground and from time to time 
Russia has outbursts to push through their demands. We can the see it on the 
“The Duma's tough resolution was supported by 305 deputies, with only 41 voting against and 
also two abstentions. The document said NATO's move eastwards contradicted a pledge to 
enhance the alliance's co-operation with Russia in counterterrorism, peacekeeping and other 
areas contained in an agreement signed in 2002. It also warned that Russia may revise a promise 
to limit troop numbers in its Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, and the north-western Pskov region 
near Estonia, if NATO tried to change the military-political balance in the whole region. 
"Common responses to modern global challenges don't require a build-up of weapons on the 
 
219 Cf. Christiane Lemke, Internationale Beziehungen, 2008, Oldenburg, München/Wien, p. 15 
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territories of Russia's neighbours," the resolution said. The Duma said it would also recommend 
the government to strengthen Russia's nuclear deterrent and consider the deployment of 
additional troops on the country's western borders. Earlier the same week, the US ambassador to 
NATO, Nick Burns, said there was no sense of a crisis in relations with Russia over the 
expansion.  Mr Burns also
 
Another possible answer is that Russia doesn’t see NATO and the membership of the Baltic 
States as threat anymore, because the whole institution
States no longer join the hard security alliance anymore. 
NATO isn’t the “old” NATO anymore; at the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, 
the war on terrorism and the wide expansion to the East of Europe, NATO had to change its 
perspectives and find new challenges. They are no longer that much focused on co
d
 
The Russian leadership was not so frightening anymore especially in a military point of view 







The attitude towards the eastward expansion of NA
with Moscow’s attitude in general towards NATO. 
It was not easy for Russia to overcome historic aversion concerning NATO and the Western 
countries and it was even harder to except that the bipolar world setting with Russia as one of 
the super powers has come to an end. Russia lost its influence in a region, which w
especially painful, because it was a former Soviet Union state and Russia’s “near abroad”. 
Russia had to except that it depends on the on hand on the United States and on the other on 
institutions like NATO and the EU. Russia is able to put pressure on the Western
w
 




t is not the 
ard security alliance it was fifteen years ago and less a threat to Russian security. 
 “Near 
broad” once again made Putin and Medwedew so popular in the Russian Federation. 
 
 
When the Russian leaders saw that the expansion was unavoidable, they tried to gain as much 
favor as possible; in NATO and the NATO Russian Council with some concessions even of 
the United States. Of course NATO as an organization as such has changed and i
h
 
In order to have good relations both with NATO and the Baltic States the desecuritisation of 
Russian foreign politics would be essential, but it is arguable if this will really happen, since 
having imperialistic goals is popular under Russian leaders more than ever. In addition to that 





                                                
 
8  Why did NATO want Lithuania as a Member State? 
 
 
The main focus of my analyses is why Lithuania wanted to join NATO, but in this chapter I 
want to discuss shortly on why NATO wanted Lithuania as a member state. I think it is 
essential to shed light on the perspective from NATO and also from NATO’s super power, the 
United States. 
What were the advantages of the Treaty Organisation and why it was seen as a high risk at 
first and why did NATO take it either way. 
 
 
8.1  Stability 
 
 
In the early 90ies the discussion about an enlargement of NATO concerning former Socialist 
states and even former Soviet Union states was heated and feared. As Magenheimer wrote 
scholars were sceptical where these states and the Russian Federation were heading, they even 
feared a renaissance of Marxism and Leninism.222 
Furthermore the war in former Yugoslavia had just broken out and similar scenarios were 
feared to take place in the other Eastern states. There were also battles in the Caucasus Region 
between Russia and Georgia and it was not clear if some of the Russian constituent republics 
would want to leave the Russian Federation.223 
 
The integration of the Eastern European states is a track record, but it should not be forgotten 
that the future seemed unpredictable for these countries in the early 90ies. 
Not only was the West uncertain how these states would develop, but also Lithuania was not 
sure were it should head. Russia offered all the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, a membership in the CIS, as well as it offering security guarantees to the Baltic 
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States even in 1997.224 In 1997 it was clear that Lithuania would resolutely reject the offers, 
as a few years early it would have caused public debates. 
 
For NATO and the Western countries in general it was soon evidently that promising NATO 
membership would stabilize these countries on one hand and on the other pave their way to 
the West and not back to Russia. 
„That move [,the acceptance of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia,] would, in one stroke, increase stability from the Baltics to the Balkans.“225 
Veser stated also that „die Bereitschaft von EU und - anfangs mit Einschränkungen - Nato, 
diese Länder aufzunehmen, waren meines Erachtens ein Faktor, wenn nicht sogar der 
entscheidende Grund dafür, dass die Entwicklung dort stabil und demokratisch verlaufen 
ist.“226 
 
But not only assured NATO membership the stability of the region by integrating the former 
Soviet states into the West, but also NATO now had control as far as the Russian border. As 
Schwarzinger put it very strikingly, “die Kontrolle und Abdeckung des baltischen Luftraumes 
der NATO macht absolut Sinn. Weil das natürlich die russische Luftbewegung enorm 
einschränkt. So würden sie über die ganze Ostsee hin und her fliegen und die Küsten 
Schwedens und Dänemarks davor abschippern, und so drehen sie schon über baltischen 
Boden um. Das ist schon ein großer Unterschied.”227 
 
 
8.2  Coalition Partner 
 
 
The other most evident advantage for NATO and especially for the United States is that they 
have now one more ally country in „New-Europe”.  
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They have now one more state that is easily convinced in joining the US in their opinion and 
intentions. “Old” Europe is not always delighted of the fidelity the CEE states show to the 
US, from the point of view of Lithuania and the other CEE states it is rather obvious. They 
see their most important ally in the US, so they will support them in every possible way.  
 
Another important factor is that NATO now has a far larger contingent of soldiers they can 
send on missions. “[S]ie [steuern] da Man-Power bei und politischen Support. Und dann 
macht auch die Mitgliedschaft von so heterogenen Partnerländern absolut einen Sinn.“ 
 
In retrospect NATO gained a lot with the acceptance of several Eastern European countries, 






9  Conclusion 
 
 
9.1  Hypotheses 
 
The outcomes of the study allowed testing the following five hypotheses: 
 
 
1. If Lithuania still believes that Russia is a threat to their nation then Russia is one of the 
main reasons Lithuania joined NATO. Lithuania saw Russia as a threat throughout 
history and was often proven right and therefore they wanted joined a defence 
alliance. 
  
The first hypotheses can be verified. The Russian Federation is still believed to be the biggest 
threat in the eyes of Lithuanians. Lithuania has the feeling that Russia changed their way on 
influencing their “Near Abroad”, but the intention stayed the same.  
 
Russia still has a very aggressive foreign policy where they only see a few states as equal 
powers and Lithuania is clearly not one of them. Unfortunately Lithuania remained dependent 
on Russia in certain sectors, like energy resources, and in this way Russia is able to put 
pressure on Lithuania.   
 
Furthermore the risk of Russia threatening Lithuania was reduced drastically with its 
membership in NATO and the EU. 
 
 
2. If the Lithuanian identity and history played also an important role in their decision to 
join NATO then Lithuania wanted to set a clear signal for the Western countries that 
they want to belong to them and are not anymore a satellite of the Russian Federation. 
 
This hypotheses can also be verified.  
Lithuania tends to relate everything to their history which you can easily see when you read 
some articles. A lot of Lithuanian scholars like to point at their history in every aspect of 




suppression. They are proud that they are now a part of Europe and the West which was 
sealed with their NATO and EU membership. 
Another important aspect in choosing the West instead of Russia were the large number of 
Lithuanians that lived in exile in the United States. They played a crucial role in Lithuania 
especially after the break-down of the Soviet Union. You can see this for example in the 
presidency of Valdas Adamkus, who came back from the US after Lithuanians independence. 
 
 
3. If the military power of their threats is as big as the one of the Russian Federation then 
the Lithuanian armed forces would neither have the quantity nor the quality – no 
matter if they stand alone nor co-operate with the other Baltic States – to protect their 
nation. 
 
This hypothesis can be partly verified. Lithuania is a small sate with fewer than 4 m people, 
so it would be impossible to build up armed forces that would withstand military attacks of a 
major power, like Russia, their main threat. Furthermore Lithuania’s military had to be built 
from scratch, so the expenses were enormous in any way. Lithuania simply would not be able 
to afford the quality of military equipment to defend their country. 
 
The only way I could see that would have worked was the development of joined armed 
forces of the three Baltic States, although Schwarzinger and Veser think that these armed 
forces still would be too small. Together Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have approximately 7 
m people, you could compare to Switzerland. Besides, one united military would have been 
more affordable than three of its own. I would not have been the most conflict-free possibility, 
bearing in mind the different interest of these states, but in my opinion the only real 
alternative to NATO. 
 
 
4. If Lithuania could not find another alliance or institution that would guarantee their 
hard security concerns then their only choice was NATO. 
  
This hypotheses proofs to be right. In my analyses I looked at several alliances and institution 





                                                
Although some institutions or alliances were planned to provide help also in hard security 
topics, they all developed into purely soft security alliances. A lot of co-operations were 
founded after the Cold War but they all failed in becoming security alliances. Either the 
member states did not want this development because Russia was part of the co-operation or 
because it was not. In the 90ies the Western states were very uncertain what the outcome of 




5. If Lithuania has NATO membership Lithuania then they believe to assure that the 
Western countries and especially the United States would be their allies in times of 
emergencies. 
  
You can clearly say that the willingness of the Western states to help Lithuania increased with 
Lithuania’s integration to the West. But on the other hand it is not certain if, especially the US 
really would help Lithuania under every circumstance. The priorities of the US have clearly 
shifted and it is not assured if the United States would intervene in times of crises. 
 
6. If the parties of Lithuania would not have agreed completely upon NATO membership 
then the public would have considered alternatives like neutrality more. 
 
This hypotheses can only be partly verified. Fact is that in a survey taken in 1998 on behalf of 
the NATO Office of Information and Press and The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Lithuania 26% think that NATO would be the best choice to guarantee the 
country’s security and stability and 23% said it would be neutrality.228 In the following years 
the approval of NATO membership grew, but why? All the parties in Lithuania agreed on 








9.2 Theoretical Implications 
 
 
A mix of Realist thoughts and Liberalist thoughts are required to fully explain Lithuania’s 
choice of joining NATO.In a way you could say they were both right.  
 
Lithuania as a small state reacted according to the Realists to Morgenthau’s „Balance of 
Power“. They realised that they are not able to secure their state from possible threats on their 
own so they decided to join an alliance. But not only did they join an alliance they also gained 
an important ally within. So Lithuania acted on all the realistic implications, they joined a 
powerful alliance and allied with a major power. 
In the eyes of Lithuania the world hasn’t changed that much since the Cold War ended. They 
still see the Russian federation as their main and only security threat. According to that the 
“Balance of Power” between the US and Russia is an essential factor for them. NATO 
changed in the last two decades but in 2004 Lithuania hoped to join NATO as an alliance seen 
in Realist theory. 
 
Liberalist theory suggest for small states to join alliances with states that have similar goals. 
In the late 90s Lithuania did not see the European Union as an institution that has the same 
goals as they have when it comes to Russia and ensuring their security against it. Therefore 
they saw their only solution in a military alliance and not an economic alliance.  
In NATO they saw their interest represented and Lithuania also has the chance to build 
alliances in NATO, for example “New Europe”. In addition to that Lithuania now has close 
ties to Poland which is also very helpful in NATO. The US on the other hand has now new 






9.3  Outlook 
 
 
Lithuania’s integration to the West is terminated in so many ways, but I think it will be still a 
long way until Lithuania’s fear of Russia, as its main threat, is effaced. 
 
It would be very important for Lithuania to concentrate on becoming less and less dependent 
on Russia. I do not understand why Lithuania does not try harder to get self-sufficient 
regarding energy. Yes, of course, they have to get oil and gas from somewhere, but the issue 
of Lithuania’s power plant, Ignalina, is getting absurd. It was stipulated with the EU that it has 
to close it with the end of 2009, but Lithuania has no planned alternative for Ignalina so far. 
This way its dependence on Russia will increase and Russia will have more opportunity to put 
pressure on Lithuania and continue not treating Lithuania as an equal partner. 
The paradox that Lithuania’s main energy provider is simultaneously their most feared partner 
does not help to solve its security issues. 
 
Under the government of Kubilius an essential turn in Lithuania’s relations with Russia took 
place. With Obama’s famous “Reset”, the government decided to loosen up their rigid view 
concerning it’s foreign policy with Russia and it will be interesting to see where this will lead.  
 
It is questionable if NATO is still “the” NATO Lithuania wanted to join, because NATO is 
developing itself more and more into an organisation with less hard security issues as its main 
sphere of activity. Nevertheless Lithuania is well integrated into NATO operations abroad and 
tries to gain allies through that. 
 
It is crucial for Lithuania how the EU will develop itself in terms of foreign and security 
policy. In my opinion Lithuania would be far more relieved if a joined EU security policy 
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10.2.1  Interview on 15th of September 2009 with Cornelius Hell229: 
 
 
Hofmann: Zu Beginn gleich folgende Frage: Wie sehen die Litauer sich selbst bzw. wie ist 
das Selbstbild der Litauer? Fallen dir dazu ein paar Stichworte ein? 
 
Hell: Mir fallen, wenn ich an die Litauer denke zwei Stichwörter ein. Das eine ist ihre 
Sprache, dass sie ganz stark durch die Sprache bestimmt sind. Litauer ist, wer litauisch 
spricht. Mitunter natürlich auch durch die Kultur und alles, was damit zusammen hängt, denn 
die lange Unterdrückung der Sprache hängt einfach noch nach. Und das zweite ist, dass sie 
stolz sind, dass sie etwas Eigenes haben. Auch wenn sie jetzt nicht mit dem alten Heidentum 
sympathisieren. Aber diese lange Geschichte des Heidentums, oder diese ganz unikale 
Geschichte mit den Bücherträgern. Solche Dinge, die stellen sie schon gerne heraus. Dass sie 
klein sind, aber nicht wie jeder andere, oder wie jede andere Nation. 
 
Hofmann: Da Du das gerade mit dem Heidentum angesprochen hast. Als ich dort war habe 
ich mitbekommen, dass sie doch stolz darauf sind, die letzten Heiden in Europa gewesen zu 
sein, aber auch andererseits, dass die katholische Religion unheimlich wichtig für sie ist. Ist 
das auch heute noch so, oder war das vorwiegend während der Zeit der Sowjetunion?  
 
Hell: Also, das ist, glaube ich, auch heute noch so. Natürlich verändert und nicht mehr so 
stark. Aber zum einen ist die katholische Kirche sicher unbeschädigt und mit einem großen 
moralischen Kredit aus der Sowjetunion herausgegangen, durch diese Chronik der 
katholischen Kirche, die längste ständig erscheinende Untergrundzeitschrift der Sowjetunion. 
Zum anderen durch das Verhalten vieler Priester. Natürlich ist dann auch für manche heutige 
Intellektuelle, die Kirche ein bisschen zu dumm, ein bisschen zu simpel. Natürlich nicht nur 
Landpfarrer, sondern viele Priester sind sehr schlecht ausgebildet, weil sie auch keine 
Möglichkeit dazu hatten. Das ist schon ein Problem. 
Auf der anderen Seite gibt es hervorragende Intellektuelle unter den Priestern. 
Heute am deutlichsten (Lauskris heißt er glaub ich), der am Sonntag immer die Messe in der 
 
229 Cornelius Hell is an author and translator for Lithuanian language. He lived several years in Lithuania and is 




Bernhardiner Kirche hält. Und wenn man sich die ganze Homepage, www.bernhardiner.lt 
anschaut, was es da für Dokumente gibt, welche Leute sie weit über das Christentum hinaus 
zusammen bringen, die dort wichtige Texte deponieren, dann ist das schon ein wichtiger 
Katalysator, der liberal und nicht fanatisch katholisch ist, aber eine Rolle in der Gesellschaft 
spielt.  
 
Hofmann: Hat die Religion, nachdem die Religion auch etwas ist, was sie mit den Polen 
verbindet, auch in ihren Beziehungen zu Polen irgendwelche Auswirkungen? 
 
Hell: Na sicher ist das bei allem, was schwierig war, schon ein Bindeglied. Und wenn man 
sich verbunden fühlt, ist natürlich der Katholizismus ein Absetzen zur Orthodoxie. Das auf 
jeden Fall. 
 
Hofmann: Und das Radikale, dass die katholische Kirche in Polen hat, schwappt das auch ein 
bisschen über nach Litauen, oder hat das eigentlich überhaupt keine Bedeutung? 
 
Hell: Nein, das habe ich eigentlich in Litauen so nie gespürt. Es hatte vielleicht in der 
Sowjetunion etwas, das vergleichbar war; aber das spielt heute auch keine Rolle mehr, dass 
die Priester wahnsinnig angesehen waren und auch relativ reich waren, weil sie so viele 
Spenden bekommen haben. Aber das ist wohl eher eine sowjetische Geschichte, die heute 
vorbei ist. 
Aber eine andere Sache. Ich glaube, dass Religion und Identität im Diskurs eine Rolle spielen. 
Da könnte ich dir noch eine litauische Publikation sagen, über die habe ich referiert bei der 
Übersetzerkonferenz. Ich glaube, es gibt einen Mainstream, der es so sieht, dass der 
Katholizismus den Eingang Litauens nach Europa und den Anschluss an Europa, das 
Mitspielen in Europa bedeutet hat und Litauen es überhaupt ermöglicht, in der Geschichte, 
eine mittelalterliche Großmacht zu werden. Und damit ist es bis heute diese Schleuse nach 
Westeuropa und zur gesamten europäischen Kultur, die durch den Katholizismus aufgegangen 
ist. Es gibt aber eine Minderheit, da gehört sicher der Jonas Basanavičius dazu, welcher ganz 
wichtig für die Stargeschichte [?] war. Dazu tendiert aber auch, der vor einigen Jahren 
verstorbene Mythologe und baltische Religionsforscher Gintaras Beresnevičius, die sagen 
dass es eine Gewaltgeschichte ist und damit die Fremdherrschaft beginnt. Und das ureigene 
litauische und das, was Litauen anders macht und das, was Litauen Europa zu bieten hat liegt 





Hofmann: Und dass die Religion bis zu einem gewissen Grad etwas Aufgezwungenes war? 
 
Hell: Ja. Mit Christentum beginnt die Kolonisationsgeschichte. 
 
Hofmann: Also wird alles eher kritisch betrachtet. 
 
Hell: Beide Seiten haben natürlich gewisse Gefahren. Der Mainstream blendet aus, dass das 
Christentum wirklich eine Gewaltgeschichte ist, vor allem mit der Missionierung.  
Und die anderen übersehen, dass man mit der Meinung, dass das Heidentum das war, was 
Litauen ausgemacht hat, sehr schnell in eine Hypostase eines a-historischen Litauertums 
hinein kommt.  
 
Hofmann: Ich hatte bei den jungen Litauern das Gefühl, dass Religion für sie etwas 
Traditionelles ist und das, was das alte Litauen auszeichnet. Also dass sie das als etwas 
Positives in der Geschichte Litauens sehen. Und nicht als aufgezwungen.  
 
Hell: Kann ich mir auch vorstellen. 
 
Hofmann: Wenn wir schon bei der Geschichte sind. Ich finde die Litauer haben ein etwas 
zwiespältiges Verhältnis zu Geschichte und sie rollen Geschichte zu jedem Thema immer 
wieder auf. Wie siehst Du das? Sind sie mit Ihrer Geschichte versöhnt? Trägt das zu ihrer 
Identität positiv bei? Oder picken sie sich nur bestimmte Dinge heraus und vergessen den 
Rest? 
 
Hell: Sie trägt natürlich positiv bei. Und sie definieren sich viel stärker als wir über die 
Geschichte. Und das Mittelalter von der Ostsee bis zum Schwarzen Meer spielt immer eine 
Rolle. Sie blenden aber aus der Geschichte des Großfürstentums auf jeden Fall aus, dass es für 
sie in gewisser Weise auch eine Misserfolgsgeschichte war, weil einfach diese große 
Polonisierung des Adels stattfand. Dadurch, dass die Residenz nach Krakau übersiedelt ist, ist 
Vilnius zu einer viel unbedeutenderen Stadt herabgesunken. Und diese Polonisierung war ja 
kein Druck, sondern, weil es das Attraktivere, das Größere, das Stärkere war, hat sich der 
Adel quasi von sich selber polonisiert und das Litauisch ist zu so einer Art Bauernsprache 




man aber nicht so deutlich und nicht so gerne und natürlich überbetont man das litauische 
Element im Großfürstentum. Das ist aber kein Wunder. Das machen die Polen auch. Ich habe 
am Wawel in Krakau nicht das Gefühl gehabt, dass bei den Jagiellonen viel Litauisch war. 
Oder gar, dass sie eine litauische Dynastie waren. 
 
Hofmann: Also blenden sie das jeweils Andere aus. 
 
Hell: Aber was sie schon sehr richtig sehen: Es gibt den Terminus, die Litauer hätten den 
Osten gegen den Westen und den Westen gegen den Osten verteidigt. Also gegen die Tataren 
und gegen Russland, gegen Moskau haben sie den Westen verteidigt und den Osten gegen den 
deutschen Norden verteidigt. Und das ist eine große Frage. Sehen sie sich einfach als Teil 
Westeuropas, oder sehen sie sich in einer Zwischenposition zwischen Ost und West. Das, so 
glaube ich, ist auch zwischen den Intellektuellen nicht ganz geklärt.  
 
Hofmann: Dieses Ost und West habe ich in schon sehr vielen Artikeln gelesen. Das sie sich 
wirklich als Bindeglied sehen; auch in der heutigen Zeit. Und dass sie finden, dass sie, auch 
was die NATO und die EU betrifft, anderen Ländern, wie  Weißrussland und Ukraine auf 
ihrem Weg gen Westen helfen können. 
 
Hell: Tun sie auch mit der weißrussischen Opposition und der weißrussischen Universität. Ich 
glaube, das ist schon eine realistische Hoffnung, dass sie in der EU ein bisschen als Experten 
gesehen werden. Von Weißrussland versteht sicher niemand so viel wie sie und von der 
Ukraine verstehen sie auch eine Menge. 
 
Hofmann: Ich hatte aber eigentlich eher den Eindruck, das Weißrussland, obwohl es ein 
Nachbar ist, eher stiefmütterlich behandelt wird und das eigentlich keiner der Litauer schon 
einmal in Weißrussland war. Oder sich zwar vielleicht auskennt, aber keine wirkliche 
Nahbeziehung zu Weißrussland hat. Ganz im Gegensatz zu beispielsweise Polen. 
 
Hell: Logisch, wenn man nicht über die Schengengrenze muss, sondern ein Visum braucht, 
wenn man dort beäugt wird vom Geheimdienst. Es gibt in dem Buch von Martin Pollack 
herausgegeben "Nachrichten aus Sarmatien" [Anm. C. Hofmann „Sarmatische Landschaften – 
Nachrichten aus Litauen, Beloruss, der Ukraine, Polen und Deutschland“] einen interessanten 




Familie und der Landschaft war. Also das gibt es manches Mal schon, ist aber eher selten. 
 
Hofmann: Was ich auch relativ oft gehört habe ist, dass es schon irgendwelche Verwandte 
gibt, die entweder aus Weißrussland kommen, oder in Weißrussland sind, aber es trotzdem 
eigentlich keine Verbindungen mehr gibt. 
Apropos Verwandte in anderen Ländern. Wie siehst Du das mit Exillitauern vor allem in den 
USA bzw. auch welche die nach Irland gingen und dort arbeiten. Inwiefern haben diese einen 
Einfluss? Inwiefern beeinflussen sie nicht bloß die Identität, sondern auch wie Litauer andere 
Länder, die USA und auch Irland sehen? 
 
Hell: Also, es kommt natürlich durch Migration immer sehr viel Weltkenntnis in das Land. 
Das war in der Sowjetunion natürlich mit Amerika. Von einfacher Mode bis verschiedenen 
Orientierungen, sind durch Immigranten ins Land gekommen. Nicht zuletzt natürlich eine 
große Zahl von Lyrikern, die hat heimlich Emigrations-Lyriker von Hand abgeschrieben, weil 
das die waren, die die modernen Verfahrensweisen im Gedicht – die Avantgarde Techniken 
praktiziert haben in der Litauischen Sprache. Und daran hat man sich selber gebildet. Das war 
in der Kunst ein großer Einfluss und war immer auch etwas Prestigeträchtiges. Z.B. hat es in 
Chicago ein Litauisches Opernhaus gegeben, also war die Kultur, die litauische Kultur, in 
manchen Teilen Amerikas sehr stark war. 
Die heutige Emigration – die Arbeitsemigration –  die einer der höchsten der EU ist, ist 
natürlich ganz etwas anderes. Die bringt kaum litauische Kultur in den Arbeitländern hervor, 
weil sie ja eigentlich immer als temporäre konzipiert ist, auch wenn die Leute dann länger 
bleiben als gedacht, aber ursprünglich geplant ist, dass man nicht emigriert, sondern einige 
Jahre arbeitet und dann wieder nach Hause geht. 
 
Hofmann: Hat glaubst du Adamkus, was die USA betrifft, auch eine große Rolle gespielt? 
 
Hell: Also das glaube ich schon. Zum einen zeigt er an, dass natürlich die amerikanische 
Emigration einmal angesehen ist. Und nicht nur er, sondern es hat sie ja auch in der ersten 
Generation von Botschaftern gegeben. Die erste Botschafterin in Wien, die dann zur NATO 
gegangen ist war Kite Dermotis [?], eine litauische Amerikanerin. Ich vergleich es gerne 
damit, man sieht natürlich, dass es möglich ist, dass ein hochgeachteter Präsident mit einem 
stark amerikanischen Akzent spricht. Man stelle sich einen ungarischen oder polnischen 




zeigt schon, dass es ein positives Bild ist. 
 
Hofmann: Und hat Adamkus das Verhältnis zwischen Litauen und den USA verbessert? 
 
Hell: Ja absolut. Der war ja ein hoher Beamter, hat viele Leute gekannt. Er konnte auftreten, 
konnte auch Bush gegenübertreten, er konnte mit einem akzentfreien und einem Jahrzehnte 
lang geübten Englisch wie zu Hause auftreten. Das hat natürlich etwas ausgemacht. 
 
Hofmann: Was somit auch das Selbstbewusstsein der Litauer gestärkt hat, dadurch, dass sie so 
einen Präsidenten hatten - einen auf quasi gleichem Niveau mit Bush...  
 
Hell: Genau so ist es. 
 
Hofmann: Du hast gesagt, es ist eine angesehene Migration. Das heißt aber auch, dass die 
Arbeitsmigration nicht unbedingt angesehen ist? Oder ist das einfach neutral, weil es kein 
wirkliches Exil ist? 
 
Hell: Sie wird irgendwie ein bisschen verschämt behandelt. Oder es wird nicht so viel darüber 
gesprochen. Man bekommt nicht so leicht so viele Zahlen. Die Leute treten natürlich in 
Litauen nicht auf, weil sie ja nicht da sind. Aber auch in London oder wo sie arbeiten, nicht. 
Sie wollen lieber unter sich bleiben und arbeiten und Geld nach Hause schicken. Sie machen 
sich natürlich bemerkbar, im Bruttosozialprodukt mit dem Geld, was sie nach Hause schicken, 
sie machen sich negativ in der Arbeitslosenstatistik bemerkbar. Sie bewerkstelligen da einiges 
im Image von Litauen, aber es kommt, so glaube ich, nicht wirklich zu Wort. Und die 
Auswirkungen sind natürlich auf der einen Seite, wie gesagt, Weltwissen, Kenntnisse. Und 
auf der anderen Seite Desaster; es gibt ja sogar Familien wo zwei Kinder mit den Großeltern 
leben und die Eltern im Ausland arbeiten. Das ist auch sehr schwierig.  
 
Hofmann: Sehen die Litauer das auch als "Brain Drain"? Also, dass die Litauer sich in ihrem 
eigenen Land ausbilden lassen und dann als gute und ausgebildete Arbeiter woanders 
hingehen? 
 





Hofmann: Weil es in Österreich eigentlich immer mal wieder ein Thema ist, dass man sagt, 
dass in der Wissenschaft gerade die Leute bei uns zwar wirklich gut ausgebildet werden, aber 
dann eigentlich keine Möglichkeit sehen sich weiter zu entwickeln und dann deshalb gerade 
in die USA oder nach Groß Britannien gehen. 
Wird das in Litauen nicht in der Form thematisiert? Bzw. noch nicht? 
 
Hell: Da geht es vor allem um Verdienste und dass man in vielen Bereichen eben noch viel zu 
wenig verdient. 
 
Hofmann: Wo sieht sich Litauen selbst kulturell bzw. geographisch positioniert. Sehen sie 
sich als Teil von Europa und hat da auch der Beitritt zur EU dazu etwas beigetragen? Oder 
sehen sie sich immer noch am Rand positioniert? 
 
Hell: Nein. Also sie sehen sich sicher als Teil von Europa. Und es war immer schon so, auch 
in den Anfängen, wo z.B. in der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung der Slogan damals "Zurück nach 
Europa" war. Auch da war das schon unter dem Vorzeichen "Wir sind eigentlich 
Mitteleuropa". Also wir sind nicht Nordeuropa, dass ja auch protestantisch ist. Also ein 
unglaublich schwammiger Begriff mit offenen Enden. Aber doch brauchbar. Nicht 
Nordeuropa, nicht protestantisch, asiatisch, skandinavisch. Und natürlich heißt es, dass sie 
nicht Osten, Russland oder orthodox sind. Und ich glaube mit Berechtigung. Denn wenn man 
nicht zweifelt, dass Polen zu Mitteleuropa gehört, dann gehört auch Litauen zu Mitteleuropa. 
Und dann geht um Litauen schon eine scharfe Grenze, die dann vor allem eine starke Grenze 
gegen Estland ist und eine scharfe Grenze zu Weißrussland.  
 
Hofmann: Weil Du jetzt Estland ansprichst: Das Konglomerat der baltischen Staaten, das vor 
allem aus den Köpfen von EU-Politikern entstanden ist. Man hat jetzt nicht das Gefühl, dass 
die Litauer sich als baltischen Staat sehen. Auch einfach deshalb, weil sie finden, dass Estland 
überhaupt nicht ihre Ambitionen hat, sich geographisch doch völlig anders positioniert. Wie 
siehst du ihr Verhältnis zu Estland bzw. zu Lettland, das irgendwie in der Mitte zu stecken 
scheint? 
 
Hell: Es ist in verschiedenen Bereichen verschieden. In der Musik beispielsweise  und auch 
im Tanz, da sind die Beziehungen eigentlich am stärksten. Doch auch im Theater und in den 




stärksten. Auch zum Beispiel bei den Poesie Festivals ist Estland oder Lettland eigentlich 
immer dabei. Da gibt es schon solche freundschaftliche Beziehungen. 
 
Hofmann: Aber das ist interessant, gerade bei Poesie, wo die Estländer ja eine völlig andere 
Sprache haben. Da werden offensichtlich Barrieren überwunden? 
 
Hell: Da gibt es gegenseitig gute Übersetzer und es wird auch natürlich prozentuell ins 
Estische oder Lettische mehr übersetzt, als in die großen Sprachen. Nur hilft es den 
Schriftstellern nicht sehr viel, weil sie ja nur über die großen Sprachen bekannt werden 
können.  
 
Hofmann: Und ist das Verhältnis zwischen Litauen und Lettland ein anderes, als zwischen 
Litauen und Estland? Man könnte ja glauben, da sie Nachbarn sind und durch die größere 
Verwandtschaft in der Sprache zu Lettland mehr Verbindungen haben. 
 
Hell: Im ganz allgemeinen Gefühl ist Litauen ihnen sicher näher. Gerade in den 
Grenzregionen gibt es auch viel mehr Kontakte. Und bei Estland muss man wirklich weiter 
fahren. 
 
Hofmann: Und das ganz schwierige Thema, was die Nachbarländer betrifft, natürlich 
Russland. Hast Du das Gefühl, dass sich die Beziehungen verbessern? Bzw. dass sie nach 20 
Jahren ihre Geschichte mit etwas mehr Abstand sehen? Oder ist es immer noch der absolute 
Angstgegner? Sie sind ja jetzt seit 2004 in der NATO und seit 2004 in der EU. 
 
Hell: Die Angst ist sicher durch die NATO und auch durch die EU gedämpft. Wird aber 
schnell bei Kaukasus Konflikten, in Georgien und so, wo Litauen genau die Strategien sieht, 
die sie kennen und befürchten, schnell wieder einmal geschürt. Der absolute Gegner bleibt 
Russland auf jeden Fall. Jetzt nicht nur militärisch, sondern es ist auch Thema wo es um 
gemeinsame Erinnerung geht. Ich denke daran, dass, im Gegensatz zur Lettischen Präsidentin 
2005 und 60 Jahre Ende des 2. Weltkrieges, Präsident Adamkus nicht nach Moskau gefahren 
ist um mit Putin das Ende des 2. Weltkrieges zu feiern.  
 





Hell: Ja. Und deshalb verstehe ich die Position von Adamkus völlig. Es wäre ja auch absurd, 
dass er, der unter Lebensgefahr von den Sowjetischen Truppen geflohen ist, dann mit Putin, 
der heute noch sagt, es sei schade, dass die Sowjetunion zerbrochen ist, zusammen das Ende 
des 2. Weltkrieges feiert. 
Es ist ja auch so, dass wir in der EU keine gemeinsame Erinnerungskultur haben. Die 
wichtigen Daten für uns sind nicht auch die wichtigen Daten für Litauen oder die baltischen 
Länder. Dass das Ende des 2. Weltkrieges ganz anders eingeschätzt wird und wie die Litauer 
sagen, gar kein Ende war. Da sind die Identitäten schon noch sehr stark verschieden. Und da 
ist natürlich auch mit Russland, solange man nicht darüber reden kann, solange Russland kein 
Schuldeingeständnis, keine Entschuldigung oder Ähnliches abgibt nicht zu sprechen. Und 
dann ist natürlich auch bei dem, wie ich glaube, vom so genannten Westen her ein zu 
schonender Umgang mit Russland, wo die Litauer in der EU immer die ersten sind, die 
mahnen und die gefordert haben, dass man nicht nur die Nazi Symbole, sondern auch die 
kommunistischen Symbole unter Strafe stellt.  
 
Hofmann: Ja, nachdem die Russen für uns ja auch zu den Alliierten, also zu den Guten gehört 
haben ist es glaube ich schon schwer für das westliche Europa sie als den Feind anzusehen, 
wie es Litauen tut.  




Hofmann: Es ist ja immer noch ein absolutes rotes Tuch, wenn man das in Litauen erwähnt. 
Sieht Russland Litauen wirklich immer noch als "Nahes Ausland"? Und spielt das noch eine 
Rolle? 
 
Hell: Also jetzt nachdem ja klar ist, die baltischen Länder wie Litauen gehören zu der EU und 
vor allem zur NATO, glaube ich nicht, dass der Geheimdienst am Werk ist um sie aus 
zuhebeln um dann einmarschieren zu können. Das stellt sich aber auch in Litauen niemand so 
vor. Viel gefährlicher ist die Unterwanderung in der Wirtschaft, in der Energieversorgung. Da 
bin ich mir nicht so sicher, ob sie Litauen da aufgegeben haben, oder ob sie nicht Positionen 
halten, wo sie einsickern wollen, bestimmte Geschäftsbereiche kontrollieren wollen. Also das 





Hofmann: Im Grunde haben sich die Methoden geändert. Aber dass Russland findet, dass 
Litauen immer noch zu ihrer Einfluss Sphäre dazugehören sollte, hat sich damit nicht wirklich 
geändert?  
 
Hell: In Russland, das sieht man ja auch mit der Ukraine, hat die wirkliche Trennung 
zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft nie stattgefunden. Und das wirkt sich da auch aus. 
 
Hofmann: Noch eine kurze abschließende Frage.  
 
Hell: Ich wundere mich ja eigentlich, dass es so gut geht. Also das Transitproblem, das 
Kaliningradproblem überhaupt zivilisiert lösen konnte. 
 
Hofmann: Aber auch durch den Internationalen Druck. 
 
Hell: Ja absolut.  
 
Hofmann: Sonst hätte Russland sich ja nicht darauf geeinigt. Soweit ich weiß ist es ja so, dass 
die Grenzen zwischen Lettland, Russland und Estland und Russland eigentlich nie wirklich 
fixiert worden sind. Weil Russland sich immer noch geweigert hat diese Verträge zu 
unterschreiben und die NATO und auch die EU gemeint haben, es ist trotzdem kein 
Hindernisgrund, dass es trotzdem zur Stabilität beiträgt, wenn sie der EU beitreten. Und das, 
so glaube ich, nur durch internationalen Druck funktionierte.  
 
Hell: Du, das ist möglich, da weiß ich echt nicht Bescheid. 
Wo Litauen im Vorteil ist und was Russland eigentlich nicht kann und das in Estland und 
Lettland schon tut, ist die Möglichkeit die Russische Minderheit zu instrumentalisieren. 
Dadurch, dass sie in Litauen in der Regel integriert sind und auch Staatsbürger sind gibt es 
diese Geschichten nicht.  
 
Hofmann: Die Russische Minderheit ist glaube ich 6,4%. Sie sind zwar die zweit größte 
Minderheit, aber das war es dann auch schon.  






Hell: Vielleicht wie bei vielen kleinen. Das ist ja auch in Österreich nicht ganz unbekannt, 
dass es so unvermittelt zwischen Überschätzung und Unterschätzung hin und her geht. Also 
wir sind die Besten und wir haben das was niemand hat und dann sind wir die letzten Zwerge 
von hinten. Das geht schon manchmal unvermittelt ineinander. Aber es sind nicht einmal 20 
Jahre, dass der Staat existiert. Ich bewundere eher, wie viel in dieser Zeit gelungen ist. Auch 
was das Identitätsbild angeht. Ich glaube schon, dass man mit dem EU-Beitritt sich als zwar 
kleines, aber als normales Mitglied, das seine Rechte hat, das nicht betteln muss, das nicht 
hoffen muss irgendwo eingelassen zu werden, dass das natürlich die Sache verändert hat.  
 
Hofmann: Und ist es für Litauens Identität ein Problem, dass Litauen doch oft als Baltischer 
Staat wahrgenommen wird? 
 
Hell: Das mit dem Baltischen Staat ist schon ein Problem, weil sie nicht als einer von Dreien 
wahrgenommen werden wollen, oder im Kollektiv wahrgenommen werden wollen. Wenn 
man ihnen so gegenüber tritt spüren sie, dass derjenige eben keine Ahnung hat, oder sie nicht 
wirklich wahrnimmt, oder nicht viel über ihre Geschichte weiß.  
 






                                                
10.2.2  Interview on the 2nd of October 2009 with Dr. Schwarzinger230: 
 
 
Hofmann: War ein Beitritt der Baltischen Staaten zur NATO die logische Konsequenz nach 
der Unabhängigkeit der drei Staaten? 
 
Schwarzinger: Ja, also nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion war ja, aber das haben sie 
sicher auch in der Literatur gelesen, die Überlegung auf der Seite der NATO, dass ein Beitritt 
der baltischen Staaten eigentlich ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit ist, weil man dann im Anlassfall 
diesen Teil der NATO nicht verteidigen könnte.  
 
Hofmann: Außerdem gab es ja auch Angst bezüglich Russlands - was Russland dazu sagt und 
wie sie darauf reagieren würden, oder? 
 
Schwarzinger: Naja, das war sicher auch ein Gesichtspunkt im Wesentlichen. Also es wurde 
eigentlich lange Zeit ausgeschlossen. Es galt als nicht machbar für die NATO.  
 
Hofmann: Ich habe eigentlich vor allem in der Literatur, vor allem der litauische Literatur, 
gelesen, dass es schon die Befürchtung gab, dass sich Russland völlig dagegen stellen würde 
und dass Russland die NATO Mächte davon überzeugen könnte, dass die baltischen Staaten 
nicht aufgenommen werden. Ist das doch etwas subjektiv gefärbt aus litauischer Sicht, oder 
entsprach das der Wahrheit? 
 
Schwarzinger: Vor allem von deutschen Autoren wurde immer wieder vorgebracht, dass der 
Gewinn, den man mit der Aufnahme der baltischen Länder erzielen würde, konterkariert 
werde durch den Verlust an guten Beziehungen zur Russischen Föderation.  
Und das deshalb ein Kosten-Nutzen-Denken geben sollte und da scheidet eigentlich der 
NATO Beitritt der baltischen Staaten aus.  
 
Hofmann: Allerdings habe ich beobachtet, was jetzt natürlich nichts mit der NATO zu tun hat, 
dass vor allem auch die Europäische Union und auch die skandinavischen Länder 
Bestrebungen gehabt haben trotzdem Foren zu schaffen, in denen die baltischen Staaten 
drinnen sind, wie z.B. CBSS. Wo sie aber auch gefunden haben, dass Russland dabei sein 
 




soll. Aber ich hatte den Eindruck, dass nicht wirklich darüber nachgedacht worden ist, was sie 
eigentlich gemacht werden soll. Gerade bei CBSS hatte ich diesen - dass es völlig 
eingeschlafen ist, dass es dort im Grunde keinen Fortschritt mehr gibt.  
 
Schwarzinger: Aber das war ja schon die Länderarchitektur der nordischen Länder vor dem 
Fall der Mauer, vor der Wende. Es gab immer schon die Tradition, dass die nordischen 
Länder untereinander stark zusammenarbeiten. Der Nordische Ministerrat usw. Im Grunde 
genommen war das dann eine Streckung Richtung der baltischen Länder; die Einbeziehung 
der baltischen Länder in die nordischen Strukturen. Das war ja im Grunde von Seitens der 
Finnen und Schweden eine logische Maßnahme, dass man versucht Gespräche zu pflegen und 
vor allem bilateral. Dass die Finnen die Esten betreuen, die Schweden betreuen die Letten und 
die Dänen betreuen die Litauer. 
 
Hofmann: Ich habe auch erstaunlich viele Artikel gefunden, in denen es darum ging. ob die 
baltischen Staaten eigentlich zu den Nordischen, also zu den Skandinavischen, Staaten 
gehören, oder nicht. Weil ja vor allem Estland die Bestrebungen hatte auch in das Nordic 
Council aufgenommen zu werden. Was Litauen betrifft gab es da weniger Intentionen, aber 
angedacht wurde es für Litauen auch, ist dann aber völlig im Sand verlaufen.  
 
Schwarzinger: Das hat aber keinen Effekt, so weit ich weiß. So weit ich weiß, ist der 
Nordische Ministerrat noch in der alten Zusammensetzung.  
 
Hofmann: Nichtsdestotrotz gibt es dazu einiges an Literatur - dass sich die Esten mehr den 
Finnen zugehörig fühlen und Finnland, sowohl wie den skandinavischen Ländern anschließen 
wollten. Und dass Litauen mehr zu CEE tendiert hat. 
 
Schwarzinger: Ja, also die engste bilaterale Verknüpfung ist zwischen Finnland und Estland 
gelungen. Das liegt aber auch daran, dass sprachliche und kulturelle nahe Verhältnisse da 
sind. Worum sich die Litauer in der ersten Zeit ihrer staatlichen Unabhängigkeit stark bemüht 
haben, war die Verbesserung der Beziehungen zu Polen. Aber das ist wieder eine andere 
Geschichte.  
Da wurde sehr viel investiert. Die Litauer haben eine große Botschaft in Warschau. Es gibt 






Hofmann: Ich habe auch einen Artikel gelesen in dem Polen als Litauens stärkster 
Verbündeter genannt wird. Und interessanter Weise steht in dem Artikel, dass Polen in den 
USA der wichtigste Verbündete ist, darüber musste ich fast lächeln. Aber die Stimmung 
dürfte wirklich so sein - sie haben das Gefühl, sie müssen sich gut mit Polen verstehen, damit  
die USA sich mehr um Litauen kümmert.  
 
Schwarzinger: Ja, also aus amerikanischer Sicht ist es ganz klar. Polen ist das wichtigste Land 
in Mittel-Osteuropa. Und da muss man hin, da muss man sein. Deswegen ist auch George 
Bush so früh wie es eben ging nach Polen gefahren. Plus Ungarn, glaub ich auch. Der 
berühmte Besuch von George Bush Senior in Polen und in Ungarn.  
Was dann auch viel Ausgelöst hat. Diese Unterstützungsaktion der G24 usw. Was dann später 
das Fahrerprojekt [?] in der EU wurde - das wurde alles durch diesen doch sehr raschen 
Besuch von George Bush damals ausgelöst.  
 
Hofmann: Dr. Veser von der FAZ, dem ich auch Fragen geschickt habe, hat etwas sehr 
interessantes gesagt, und zwar dass seit dem die Regierung Kubilius an der Macht ist, sich die 
Außenpolitik gen Russland etwas verändert hat und nicht mehr so starr ist. Sie hatten das 
Gefühl sich jetzt neu positionieren zu müssen seitdem Obama Präsident ist.  
Empfinden sie das auch so?  
 
Schwarzinger: Naja, natürlich ist das eine wichtigen Ansage, wenn Präsident Obama diesen 
"Reset" macht. Da muss Litauen natürlich schon darauf reagieren. Das ist ganz klar. Ich 
meine, man geht ja weg von dieser „lehrkonservativen“ Politik der USA hin zu eine 
vorsichtigeren, wobei sich die Außenpolitik von Obama erst entwickeln wird müssen. Aber 
natürlich muss auch ein Staat wie Litauen auf diese neuen Begebenheiten reagieren.  
 
Hofmann: Nun eine allgemeine Frage: Glauben sie, war der Beitritt in die NATO für Litauen 
die beste Möglichkeit, die beste Wahl? 
 
Schwarzinger: Es entspricht auf jeden Fall dem, was die Leute wollten. Also der Rückhalt in 
der Bevölkerung war enorm. Und man hat schon gedacht, dass es sozusagen ein "Window of 
Opportunity" ist, dass man dieses Angebot hat, diese Möglichkeit der NATO beizutreten. Und 




unmöglich. Die Leute haben das schon als eine ungeheure Chance empfunden, dass sie 
tatsächlich die Möglichkeit haben und auch dazu eingeladen wurden der NATO beizutreten - 
als Vollmitglied. 
 
Hofmann: Das war ja auch sehr bald. Man hatte ja eigentlich schon 93/94 das Ziel in die 
NATO zu kommen, oder? 
 
Schwarzinger: Die Litauer haben es nicht als wahnsinnig rasch empfunden. Ich meine, es 
waren ja doch einige Jahre. Wann ist Litauen gegründet worden, als Staat? 90/91? Das sind ja 
doch 12/13 Jahre und die waren ja doch auch zäh. Weil man ja auch nicht wusste, wie die 
strategische Position Litauens wirklich ausschauen würde. Nach der Gründung des Staates 
war ja nicht klar, wie sich das ganze dann weiterentwickeln würde. Z.B. wenn sich der 
Westen nicht wirklich für Litauen interessiert hätte. Und die Erfahrung war ja auch nach dem 
März 90, wo Landsbergis die Unabhängigkeit erklärt hat, war ja zunächst die Message des 
Westens „Stört die Kreise des Gorbatschow nicht“. Es gab ja die berühmten Besuche in 
Berlin, in Washington und in London usw., wo immer wieder gesagt worden ist, dass diese 
Unabhängigkeitserklärung uns gerade quer kommt zu unseren Bemühungen, denn wir wollen 
ja, dass Gorbatschow mit seiner Perestroika weitermacht. Und dass er an der Macht bleibt und 
dass er eine Chance hat. 9:37 
Die Angst war, dass Gorbatschow auf die Unabhängigkeitserklärungen an den Rändern 
reagieren muss, sodass daran der ganze Perestroika Prozess zusammenbricht. Und aus dieser 
Erfahrung war ja nicht abzuleiten, für die Litauer, dass der Westen sie mit offenen Armen 
aufnehmen würde. Und die Litauische Unabhängigkeit als eine Selbstverständlichkeit sehen 
würde, als ein Positivum.  
Und dann war ja auch nicht klar, wie groß und stark Russland sein würde. Die litauische 
Wirtschaft war ja völlig verflochten mit der russischen Wirtschaft. Der Strom kommt zwar 
von Ignalina, aber das ist ja im Grunde genommen ein russisches Kraftwerk. Man ist auch 
sonst leitungsmäßig verbunden mit dem russischen Energienetz, das ganze Gas kommt von 
Russland etc. Wie sollte man hier eine wirtschaftliche Unabhängigkeit darstellen? Es war 
auch nicht klar woher das Einkommen des Landes kommen sollte. Es war also schon eine 
sehr mutige Sache. Man muss sagen, dass es schon sehr kurzsichtig gedacht war; weil man 





Das ist ja auch das, was viele Leute beim Kosovo sagen. Man hat sich keine Gedanken 
darüber gemacht, wo denn eigentlich wirklich der Vorteil davon ist, wenn der Kosovo 
abgespalten ist. Das sind Entwicklungsstränge, die zur Unabhängigkeit führen, die manchmal 
sehr kompliziert sind. Aber wie gesagt, es war nicht klar, ob Litauen nicht nur unter Duldung 
von Moskaus sein würde. Und wie weit man wirklich wegrudern kann vom russischen 
Bruder. Das war in den 90er Jahren nicht ganz klar.  
War die jetzige Entwicklung zu sehen? Nein. Zunehmend gab es Signale aus dem Westen, 
dass sowohl eine NATO Mitgliedschaft, wie auch eine EU Mitgliedschaft tatsächlich möglich 
wird. Das hat sich so Mitte der 90er Jahre dann abgezeichnet. Das war dann schon eine 
ungeheure Erleichterung für die baltischen Länder, als registriert wurde, dass nach der 
anfänglichen Enttäuschung, sich der Westen dann doch für sie erwärmt hat.  
 
Hofmann: Was mich dann doch gewundert hat ist, dass Szenarien wie Neutralität überhaupt 
nicht diskutiert worden sind. Und was mich auch wundert ist, dass diese baltische 
Kooperation, die angedacht worden ist mit BALTBAT und die dann erweitert worden ist mit 
BALTRON usw. nicht weitergeführt wurde. Warum hätte man nicht auch das ausbauen 
können und sagen können, dass es ein Militärbündnis zwischen den drei baltischen Staaten 
gibt? 
 
Schwarzinger: Naja, mir ist nicht ganz ersichtlich, wo der Mehrwert herkommen soll, wenn 3 
arme Länder zusammen arbeiten.  
 
Hofmann: Hilfe hätten sie ja schon bekommen, weil BALTBAT ja auch vor allem durch 
westliche Hilfe aufgebaut worden ist. Aber dann trotzdem aufgelöst 2003 worden ist. Was mir 
nicht ganz logisch erscheint.  
 
Schwarzinger: Ich glaube BALTBAT war nicht sehr preisgünstig - diese Kooperationsformen 
haben ja auch immer Extrakosten.  
 
Hofmann: Man hätte doch auch sagen können, dass man eher eine Großarmee der drei Länder 
hat, als eine Armee für jedes Land extra aufzubauen. Aber offensichtlich wurde das nicht 
weiter gedacht - was mich gewundert hat.  
Ebenfalls Neutralität. Da wir ja in einem neutralen Land leben, schien mir das nicht so 




sind genug überrannt worden und wollen uns jetzt einfach aus allem raus halten und neutral 
sein.  
 
Schwarzinger: Ja eben. Neutralität hätte ja auch eine langfristige Absage an die NATO und an 
die Amerikaner bedeutet. Und das wäre für viele Litauer doch als eine ziemlich große 
Ungeschicklichkeit erschienen. Man darf auch nicht vergessen, dass Litauen auch von vielen, 
aus Amerika zurückgekehrten Exil-Litauern beraten worden ist und auch immer noch beraten 
wird. Und für die war ziemlich klar, dass Litauen doch eine enge Einbeziehung mit den USA 
sucht.  
Es gibt auch sehr viele Litauer, die in den USA leben. Sie sind sehr gut organisiert. Und auch 
der zwischenzeitliche Staatspräsident Adamkus war Amerika-Litauer.  
Und für die wäre es vollkommen unverständlich gewesen, wenn man eine Politik der 
Äquidistanz zwischen Russland und Amerika gesucht hätte.  
 
Hofmann: Also sie finden, dass die Exil-Litauer, die in den USA leben, einen großen Einfluss 
haben?  
 
Schwarzinger: Ja, das würde ich schon sagen. Dass sie auf das Denken, auf die politische 
Beratung schon einen großen Einfluss genommen haben.  
 
Hofmann: Interessant. Ich hatte nämlich mit Cornelius [Hell] darüber gesprochen. Gut, er hat 
das Ganze eher aus kultureller Perspektive gesehen und hat gemeint, dass vor allem Adamkus 
wichtig war. Aber jetzt der Einfluss nicht mehr so groß ist, wie kurz nach der Unabhängigkeit. 
 
Schwarzinger: Kutamaičik und Kaites [?], das ist in Amerika ausgebildeter Offizier; dann die 
Wirtschaftsentwicklungsagentur Grodis [?], es gibt sehr viele Amerika-Litauer, die auch dort 
in Funktionen tätig waren. Und auch viele, die informelle Berater waren. 
 
Hofmann: Und glauben sie, dass wenn sie neutral geworden wären, sie den Eindruck gehabt 
hätten aus der Einflusssphäre Russlands nicht raus zu kommen? 
 
Schwarzinger: Genau. Das Signal wäre gewesen: Wir verzichten auf einen Weg der uns in die 
NATO hineinführt. Bevor wir auch irgendeine Chance haben sagen wir ab, da gehen wir nicht 




empfunden worden. Und nicht unbedingt eine Verbesserung der Wirtschaft. Das ist ja ein 
unglaublich schlechtes Signal an Russland, wenn man das tut.  
 
Hofmann: Und meinen Sie dass das „Near Abroad“ jetzt auch noch eine Rolle spielt? 
 
Schwarzinger: Für Russland ist es auf jeden Fall ein Konzept. Für Russland macht es auf 
jeden Fall einen Sinn eine Einflusssphäre zu definieren und auf die dann einzuwirken.  
 
Hofmann: Und gehört da Litauen noch dazu? 
 
Schwarzinger: Würde ich schon sagen, ja.  
 
Hofmann: Aus beiden vorhergehenden Interviews mit Cornelius Hell und auch mit Dr. Veser 
ging hervor, dass sich wohl eher die Mittel geändert haben, mit denen Russland vorgeht und 
Litauen noch zu verstehen gibt, dass es noch in ihrem Einflussbereich ist. Und auch, dass 
diese nicht mehr so politisch sind, sondern sich eher auf Wirtschaftliches beschränken. Dass 
Russland beispielsweise die Gaspipeline abstellt, weil sie angeblich kaputt ist.  
 
Schwarzinger: Ja, das ist das, was viele an der russischen Politik kritisieren. Dass es immer 
eine Machtbasierte ist, dass die wirtschaftlichen Mittel nicht als „assentive“, sondern eben als 
Druckmittel eingesetzt werden. Dass man versucht die Souveränität der umliegenden Staaten 
zu unterminieren und diese nicht ernst zu nehmen.  
 
Hofmann: Bei Litauen wahrscheinlich noch schwerer, weil es zur Sowjetunion dazugehört 
hat, oder? 
 
Schwarzinger: Auch da hätte Russland andere Möglichkeiten gehabt. Mit einer „Charm-
Offensive“ zum Beispiel. Oder mit dem Angebot einer Zollunion, oder man sagt, wir machen 
eine gestaltete Unabhängigkeit - man sagt, wir regeln das irgendwie oder wir erlauben euch 
das und haben auch Sonderverträge, zum Beispiel. 
Und genau das ist ja für Litauer immernoch ein großes Problem - Verträge mit Russland zu 
machen. Verträge mit Russland sieht man immer als einen Nachteil für Litauen, weil wenn 




während, wenn sich die Russen ein bisschen über den Vertrag hinwegsetzen, ist es für Litauen 
fast unmöglich irgendeine Art von Druck zu machen. Also immer informelle Arrangements.  
Ein Beispiel ist der Transit von Mittelmeergütern zwischen Russland, Weißrussland und 
Kaliningrad. Wo die Russen immer ein Gütertransportankommen haben wollten, was die 
Litauer eben nicht gewährt haben. 
 
Hofmann: Weil sie Kaliningrad gerade ansprechen. Ich habe es interessant gefunden, dass in 
der Literatur der 90er Jahre viele Politologen davon ausgehen, dass Russland Kaliningrad als 
Schnittstelle zum Westen benutzen könnte. Das hat überhaupt nicht stattgefunden…  
 
Schwarzinger: Nein. Die Theorie war, dass die russische Linie bisher immer eine war, den 
Mittelweg zu gehen. Das Land soll nicht ganz schlecht sein, aber es soll auch nicht wirklich 
wirtschaftlich aufblühen. Weil eine wirtschaftliche Blühte in Kaliningrad würde bedeuten, 
dass sie sofort von den Russen die Unabhängigkeit fordern. Und daher fahren immer so einen 
Mittelweg. 
 
Hofmann: Eine völlig andere Frage noch: Wie sehen sie den Nutzen, den die NATO davon 
hat, dass die baltischen Staaten und auch Litauen der NATO beigetreten sind? 
 
Schwarzinger: Wenn man die NATO als Verteidigungsbündnis anschaut, wäre ja eine 
baltische Mitgliedschaft und auch die Mitgliedschaft von Bulgarien und Albanien usw. 
eigentlich eine Erstreckung, die mehr Kosten als Nutzen hat. Wenn man die NATO aber als 
„Toolbox“ ansieht, also als Vereinigung von Staaten, die immer potentielle Kollisionspartner 
sind. Dann wird es auch sehr interessant arme und geographisch schwierige Länder mit 
einzubeziehen. Also wenn man jetzt an das Engagement in Irak oder in Afghanistan denkt, 
macht es politisch erst einmal einen ungeheuren Sinn, eine große Zahl von Staaten zu haben, 
die die Politik in internationaler Form unterstützt. Die einmal in der UNO usw. darauf 
drängen, dass das was die Amerikaner machen das Richtige ist - die ein paar Resolutionen 
unterstützen, die auch in allen möglichen Foren und Gesprächsthemen die amerikanische 
Position voll unterstützen. Also eine möglichst große Koalition zu haben. Und das zweite ist, 
dass man doch mehr Ressourcen hat, die klassifiziert sind; weil es jetzt ist z.B. in Afghanistan 
möglich, dass man die Missionen in Afghanistan auf viele Staaten abwälzt. Da machen die 
Polen mit, die Litauer haben eine ganze Provinz, Goa, wo sie doch mit erheblichen eigenen 




guten Job machen. Also steuern sie da Man-Power bei und politischen Support. Und dann 
macht auch die Mitgliedschaft von so heterogenen Partnerländern absolut einen Sinn. 
 
Hofmann: Ich hatte auch den Eindruck, dass man das Gefühl hatte, wenn die NATO die 
baltischen Staaten aufnimmt, dass dann die Stabilität in der Region größer wird.  
 
Schwarzinger: Gut, da ist ja immer wieder mal das Gegenargument, wenn man die Russen 
zwickt, warum soll es der Stabilität nützen? Das gleiche ist ja mit der Satellitenanlage in 
Polen und Tschechien. Der Nutzen, den man evtl. hat, weil man ein Raketenabfangsystem hat, 
wird wieder abgeschwächt, weil man wieder ein Dauerproblem mit den Russen hat.  
 
Hofmann: Und haben sie das Gefühl, dass eine Umstrukturierung der NATO seit dem 
11.September für die Litauer negativ sein könnte? Das weg von einem reinen 
Verteidigungsbündnis, also nicht nur Hard Security, sondern auch Soft  Security im Fokus 
haben, dass das den Litauern schaden könnte? 
 
Schwarzinger: Ja. Aber ich glaube, die werden nicht wirklich gefragt. Ich glaube sie müssen 
die NATO so akzeptieren, wie sie sich eben entwickelt und wenn das heißt, dass sie im 
Charakter völlig umgemodelt wird, oder wenn sie auch einmal ganz andere 
Mitgliederstrukturen bekommen sollte - dass z.B. die Asiaten mit einbezogen werden sollen. 
Ich glaube nicht, dass die Litauer dann eine große Mitsprache hätten. Und sie würden dann 
auch nicht nach dem Sinn suchen, weil die Litauer aus der NATO viel profitiert haben. Es hat 
ja ein enormes Plus an Sicherheit gegeben. Sicherheit macht es auch Investoren dort leichter 
zu investieren, weil das politische Risiko ziemlich gering ist. Und es hat tatsächlich dazu 
geführt, dass Litauen mit den Russen Teilprobleme lösen konnte. Und dann haben die Litauer 
einen enormen Rückhalt und eine riesengroße Unterstützung in der Auseinandersetzung mit 
Weißrussland. Weißrussland ist ja auch für Litauen ein riesengroßes, bilaterales Problem und 
im Umgang mit den Weißrussen finden sie in der NATO die Unterstützung Amerikas. Weil 
auch die Amerikaner Weißrussland zunehmend als ganz großes Problem sehen. Und das ist 
eine riesige diplomatische Unterstützung, die die Litauer da haben. Auch in finanzieller 
Hinsicht. Es ist für Litauen sehr leicht für Amerika Vorschläge zu machen, wie die 
Amerikaner gegenüber Weißrussland vorgehen sollen. Da haben sie einen enormen Einfluss. 
Und das ist schon toll für so ein "Mini-Land" Litauen mit einer gewissen Teilgeschichte so 




Und aus diesem Grund nehme ich schon an, dass die Litauer auch weiterhin ein willfähriger 
Partner der Amerikaner in der Nato sind und auch nicht irgendwelche Reformen in der NATO 
blockieren werden. Also ein sehr angenehmer Partner für Amerika. 
Und so gesehen haben die Amerikaner wieder mehr Vorteile gezogen. Unter dem Strich lohnt 
sich das für uns, dass die Litauer dabei sind.  
 
Hofmann: Sind für die NATO eigentlich die baltischen Staaten mit Weißrussland und Ukraine 
als Brennpunkt nicht mehr so interessant, wie Rumänien, Bulgarien, die ja näher am 
Kaukasus liegen? 
 
Schwarzinger: Das kann durchaus sein. Aber das ist ja auch wieder ein Vorteil nicht „non- 
stop“ zu sein, sondern auch als eine relativ stabile Region wahrgenommen zu werden. Wenn 
man Weißrussland noch als großen Konflikt sieht, vor allem weil sich dort nichts weiter 
bewegt. 
 
Hofmann: Die Litauer sind ja sehr stolz auf ihre Funktion als Bindeglied zwischen Ost und 
West… 
 
Schwarzinger: Das darf man nicht überschätzen. Im Grunde sind sie kein Bindeglied. Weil die 
Amerikaner Litauen sicher nicht brauchen um mit den Russen auszukommen. Also das wird 
gewaltig überschätzt. Aber zum Beispiel die Kontrolle und Abdeckung des baltischen 
Luftraumes der NATO macht absolut Sinn. Weil das natürlich die russische Luftbewegung 
enorm einschränkt. So würden sie über die ganze Ostsee hin und her fliegen und die Küsten 
Schwedens und Dänemarks davor abschippern, und so drehen sie schon über baltischen 
Boden um. Das ist schon ein großer Unterschied.  
 
Hofmann: Da sie baltische See und Ostsee angesprochen haben. Was ich auch sehr interessant 
gefunden habe ist, dass diese Region, die Baltic Sea Region, aus dem Boden gestampft 
worden ist, vor allem von EU-Politikern und sich die Region nicht wirklich als Region sieht 
Und Litauen sich da auch nicht wirklich zugehörig fühlt.  
 
 
Schwarzinger: Och. Ja das hat immer eine Vorgeschichte. Das war eben 1999 das Konzept 




Nordic Dimension ist, dass man ein Masterkonzept hat und die einzelnen Bemühungen die es 
da gibt, bilateraler Art, wirtschaftlicher Art, im Verkehr, alles Mögliche, dass man das 
irgendwie koordiniert. Vor allem die Hilfslieferungen TACIS damals für Russland. Dass man 
das Einbinden kann in einer gewissen Konditionalität, dass man Verpflichtungen verbindet. 
Dass man sagt, ok, wir bauen hier Schulen und Krankenhäuser. Mit Verpflichtung der Russen 
im Rahmen z.B. der nordischen Organisation beim Umweltschutz. Und das macht viel mehr 
Sinn, als z.B. die Schulen und Krankenhäuser einfach so zu bauen. Also dass man ein 
Konzept hat, dass man diesen Guten Willen und die Zahlungen und Leistungen auch wieder 
dann verwenden kann und wieder Forderungen stellen kann. Das ist das Beste mit dem 
Umgang mit den Russen überhaupt. Wenn man was gibt, dann fordere auch was dafür. Und 
sonst wäre TACIS weitgehend ein "Gebe-Program" mit sehr wenigen Rückflüssen, was wir 
fordern können. Und da hat sich die nordische Dimension unter dem Strich schon gelohnt, 
auch wenn die Erfolge nicht so wahnsinnig Sichtbar sind. Und was jetzt gemacht wird ist 
diese makroregionale Strategie. Warum nicht? Man kann auch das Selbe machen, was die 
nordische Dimension war, noch strenger vernetzt unter einander. Dass es ein flüssigeres 
Konzept wird. Und es gibt nicht wirklich so viele Formen wo wir die Russen in einer 
Kooperation einbinden. Man muss die Russen ja auch sich in eine Kooperation einbinden 
lassen. Die Nordische Dimension hat an sich über die Jahre ganz gut funktioniert und doch 
einige Erfolge gebracht, an Wohlwollen, an Deeskalation, dass weniger „Incidents“ sind, wo 
z.B. die Fischerboote versenkt werden und so weiter. Ein mehr friedliches Umgehen mit 
einander hat es schon gebracht. Das lässt sich nur schwer messen. Weil man ja die nicht 
versenkten Fischerboote nicht zählen kann. Aber unterm Strich hat es sicher zur Beruhigung 
und Deeskalation beigetragen. Und wenn man das System jetzt weiter strickt, warum auch 
nicht? Wir nützen das ja jetzt auch in der Mittelmeer-Strategie der EU mit dieser Mittelmeer 
Union, für die Nordafrika Länder. Destabilisiert sich jedoch zunehmend. Wenn dort z.B. mehr 
an Ausbildung stattfindet, mehr Dialog usw. plus Entwicklungshilfe, dann ist das gar kein so 
schlechtes Konzept. Und dann bauen wir das ja weiter aus für den Donauraum. Das ist zwar 
keine Krisenregion, aber immerhin haben wir da Länder wie Serbien zum Beispiel, die wir 
einbauen können, die wir so zusagen vom Baum herunter holen können, dass wir ein 
Normalverhalten kriegen und dann gibt es von dort weiterhin die Zentral-Asien-Region. Und 
das ist wieder verbunden mit der Nachbarschaftspolitik der Union. Das ist zwar alles Tonnen 
an Papier, wo Strategien geschrieben werden, aber wenn es sie nicht gäbe, wäre es ein 
weniger kohärentes Vorgehen. Man fördert hier, man fördert da und verbindet es dann 




Und vor Allem, wenn keine Strategie da ist, ist auch kein Commitment der Partner da.  
 
Hofmann: Wir reden hier jetzt auch von den baltischen Staaten und eigentlich an sich auch in 
Österreich und in Europa von den baltischen Staaten und werden auch als die baltischen 
Staaten wahrgenommen. Ich hatte in Litauen den Eindruck, dass sie selber damit möglichst 
wenig zu tun haben wollen, als Konglomerat gesehen zu werden. Was meinen Sie dazu? 
 
Schwarzinger: Ja, weil es Bereiche gibt, wo die Litauer nicht hineingezogen werden wollen. 
Das sind zum Beispiel die Auseinandersetzungen mit der russischen Minderheit, die in 
Litauen so ca. bei 6-7% ausmacht, also sehr klein. Im Vergleich was die Letten und die Esten 
haben. Da möchte man sich nicht hineinmischen. Und dann auf Seiten der Esten, die eine viel 
vehementere wirtschaftliche Entwicklung haben, die sich eben nicht zu sehr anbinden wollen 
an die ärmeren Nachbarn. Und dann haben wir kulturell das Interesse mit den Polen 
zusammen zuarbeiten, auf Seiten der Litauer. Das teilen wiederum die Letten und die Esten 
nicht. Die haben andere Interessen und sehen nicht diese enge Notwendigkeit mit den Polen 
sich politisch abzustimmen. Und da ist es besser, wenn jeder seine gewissen Freiräume hat. Es 
gibt auch wieder Dinge in die sich die anderen wieder nicht hineinmengen wollen. 
Beispielsweise der Kaliningrad-Transit. Den haben wieder die Litauer leider am Hals. Oder 
die Militärtransporte. Das ist ein Spezialfall dort wieder. Auf der anderen Seite, wenn es um 
Verkehrsplanung geht, da müssen sie wieder zusammen arbeiten.  
 
Hofmann: Ich habe auch den Eindruck, dass sich die Esten Richtung Norden orientieren, die 
Litauer Richtung Ost- und Mitteleuropa und die Letten sind ja irgendwo in der Mitte. 
 
Schwarzinger: Das sind auch Standart-Wettbewerbe. Die Häfen konkurrieren gegen einander, 
die Tourismusbetriebe konkurrenzieren gegen einander, da ist wenig Synergie möglich. Das 
ist ganz klar. Die alle wollen in den Euro und so weiter. 
Also da muss dann schon jeder sein Heil selber suchen. Aber hin und wieder macht es 
durchaus Sinn wieder gemeinsam aufzutreten. Aber man weiß da wieder um die Grenzen.  
 





Schwarzinger: Es hat schon einen Vertrag gegeben und es ist ja an sich ausgemacht, wo das 
ist. Nur ist das in der DUMA nicht ratifiziert. Und die Demarkation hat noch nicht 
stattgefunden. Aber auf dem Papier weiß man schon, wo die Grenze ist.  
Es gab ja den Vorwurf, dass die Esten noch Territorialforderungen hätten, das wurde dann in 
der Duma wieder „hochgekocht“. Aber das ist etwas, was meiner Meinung nach nicht 
wirklich ein großes Problem darstellt. 
 
Hofmann: Sehr interessant. Vielen Dank, dass sie sich die Zeit genommen haben und danke 






                                                
10.2.3. E-mail correspondence with Dr. Reinhard Veser231 October 2009: 
 
 
1. Hat sich Litauens Außenpolitik seit dem NATO Beitritt gewandelt (auch bezüglich 
Russland)? 
 
In den Grundzügen nicht, in vielen Nuancen schon. Die grundsätzliche außenpolitische 
Orientierung Litauens ist seit Anfang der neunziger Jahre konstant geblieben, und spätestens 
seit 1993/94 gab es auch einen alle wesentlichen Parteien einschließenden Konsens über die 
Westorientierung und das 2004 erreichte Ziel, Vollmitglied in der EU und Nato zu werden.  
 
Bis die Entscheidung über die Aufnahme in diese beiden Organisationen gefallen war, wurde 
in der litauischen Außenpolitik diesem Ziel alles andere untergeordnet, d.h. Litauen hat - wie 
die anderen Beitrittskandidaten - eine Profilierung in strittigen Fragen vermieden, vor allem in 
solchen Fragen, die unter den EU- und Nato-Mitgliedern selbst umstritten waren. Da man die 
Zustimmung aller Mitglieder für die Aufnahme benötigte, wollte man keines verärgern. 
 
Litauen hat - wie eine Reihe anderer osteuropäischer Demokratien - in einer innerwestlichen 
Streitfrage zum ersten Mal Anfang 2003 in der Debatte über den Irak-Krieg offen Position 
bezogen, d.h. nachdem auf dem EU-Gipfel in Kopenhagen und dem Nato-Gipfel in Prag die 
jeweiligen Erweiterungsentscheidungen gefallen waren. Damals stellte es sich (wie in der 
Erklärung der sogenannten Vilnius-Gruppe im Februar 2003 (Datum bitte prüfen)) auf die 
Seite der Vereinigten Staaten. Litauen war - in der Diktion des damaligen amerikanischen 
Verteidigungsministers Rumsfeld - "New Europe". Ein Grund dafür war die Annahme (auf 
der bis vor kurzem auch die polnische Außenpolitik wesentlich gründete), dass angesichts der 
Neigung einiger großer EU-Staaten wie Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien zu einer großen 
Nähe zu Russland die eigene Sicherheit nur dann gewährleistet ist, wenn man auch enge 
Beziehungen zu Washington pflegt.  
 
Von Washington aus wurde diese Haltung, vor allem von Vizepräsident Cheney, aktiv 
unterstützt. Sie wurde aber auch gefördert durch das Verhalten der Westeuropäer, so durch 
das Dreieck Berlin-Paris-Moskau, das Schröder, Chirac und Putin gegen den Irak-Krieg 
 





bildeten. Weitere Entwicklungen, wie z.B. die Art und Weise, wie von der Regierung 
Schröder die Ostsee-Pipeline über die Köpfe der Osteuropäer hinweg vorangetrieben wurde, 
haben diese Haltung noch gestärkt. 
 
Auch Richtung Osten hat Litauen nach Nato- und EU-Beitritt eine aktivere Politik zu 
betreiben begonnen. Das betrifft vor allem die Bestrebungen, die Ukraine, Moldau und 
Georgien näher an die EU heranzuführen, was besonders augenscheinlich wurde durch die 
litauische Vermittlerrolle während der Orangen Revolution in der Ukraine Ende 2004 und 
zuletzt während des russisch-georgischen Kriegs. Diese Ostpolitik koordiniert Litauen relativ 
eng mit Polen - man kann fast von einer litauisch-polnischen Achse in der EU sprechen. 
Beide Länder arbeiten auch in EU und Nato eng zusammen, wenn es darum geht, eine 
Russland-Politik zu formulieren. 
 
Die Haltung gegenüber Russland hat sich seit dem Beitritt zu beiden Organisationen eher 
verhärtet. Ein Grund dafür dürfte sein, dass Litauen außenpolitisch insgesamt seither ein 
deutlicheres Profil zeigt - und das aufgrund der Sicherheit, die es jetzt hat, auch gegenüber 
Russland wagen kann.  
Der Hauptgrund aber liegt in der russischen Politik, als da wären:  
- das Bestreben Moskaus, die ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken als seine Einflusssphäre zu 
arrondieren (und es gibt den durchaus begründeten Verdacht, dass es das mit Präsident Paksas 
auch in Litauen versucht hat)  
- die Politik der ständigen wirtschaftspolitischen Nadelstiche gegenüber den osteuropäischen 
EU- und Nato-Mitgliedern (der Fall Mazeikiu Nafta mit der "lecken" Druschba-Pipeline, der 
russisch-polnische Fleischstreit)  
- die russische Geschichtspolitik, in der die sowjetische Okkupation des Baltikums als 
freiwilliger Anschluss dargestellt wird  
- was zu solchen akuten Krisen führen kann wie dem Streit über das sowjetische 
Kriegerdenkmal in Tallinn. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund habe ich den Eindruck, dass sich der "antirussische" Konsens in der 
litauischen politischen Elite in den Jahren seit dem Machtantritt Putins in Moskau deutlich 
verfestigt hat.  
 
In der litauischen Russland-Politik ist allerdings seit Herbst vergangenen Jahres (d.h. 




Pragmatismus zu beobachten, für die es offenbar zwei Gründe gibt. Zum einen hat man in 
Vilnius erkannt, dass eine derart harte Haltung wie Litauen sie mit seinem langen Veto gegen 
die Aufnahme von EU-Russland-Verhandlungen über ein Partnerschaftsabkommen bis 
Frühjahr 2008 gezeigt hat, nicht auszahlt, weil man sich dadurch in der EU (bzw. Nato) 
isoliert und so letztlich sowohl innerhalb der Gemeinschaft als auch gegenüber Russland in 
eine schwächere Position gerät. Zum anderen sind in Washington die Inspiratoren der harten 
Haltung abgetreten. Obamas "Reset" in den Beziehungen zu Russland zwingt die 
Osteuropäer, sich neu zu positionieren.  
 
Bei diesen Veränderungen aber gilt, dass sich an den grundsätzlichen Annahmen und der 
grundsätzlichen Ausrichtung der litauischen Außenpolitik, über die ein breiter Konsens in der 
politischen Elite besteht, nichts geändert hat: Man sieht in Russland eine potentielle Gefahr 
für die eigene Sicherheit, gegen die man sich nur durch eine feste Integration in allen 
westlichen Organisationen schützen kann. 
 
 
2. War der Beitritt zur NATO die beste Wahl für Litauen? Bzw. warum kam Neutralität 
oder ein Ausbau der Baltischen Kooperation (BALTBAT, BALTRON, etc.) nicht in 
Frage? 
 
Die Antwort auf den ersten Teil der Frage lautet uneingeschränkt: ja. Der Antwort auf ihren 
zweiten Teil wird sich aus der folgenden Begründung ergeben. 
 
Noch eine Vorbemerkung: Bei der Beantwortung derartiger Fragen sind Nato und EU immer 
zusammen zu sehen - das Streben nach Mitgliedschaft in diesen beiden Organisationen diente 
dem gleichen Ziel, der festen Verankerung Litauens im Westen, zum Schutz vor Russland, bei 
dem bis heute unklar ist, ob es die Souveränität der ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken wirklich 
akzeptiert.  
 
Dass Litauen eine solche Verankerung anstrebte, hat auch mit der schlechten historischen 
Erfahrung zu tun, die man in der Zwischenkriegszeit mit der Neutralität gemacht hat. Sie bot 
keinen Schutz, sondern machte Litauen im Gegenteil anfälliger dafür, zum Spielball anderer 
Mächte zu werden. In einem Bündnis wie der Nato, in dem alle Mitglieder über wesentliche 




(Demokratie, Rechtsstaat, Marktwirtschaft) es teilt. Ein Vorteil dabei ist, dass bei 
Interessenkonflikten mit größeren Staaten im eigenen Bündnis für diese die Bündnisregeln 
gelten. Litauen hat durch die Vollmitgliedschaft in Nato und EU also auch gegenüber 
befreundeten Staaten eine stärkere Position.    
 
Die Entscheidung für die Westbindung fiel Anfang der neunziger Jahre in einer Lage, in der 
die politische Landkarte Europas in einem Maße in Bewegung war, wie seit dem 2. Weltkrieg 
nicht mehr. Es war nicht klar, in welche Richtung sich die gerade von der kommunistischen 
Diktatur befreiten Staaten entwickeln würden -  angesichts der Erfolgsgeschichten in 
Ostmitteleuropa gerät das heute leicht in Vergessenheit. Das galt für Litauen ebenso wie für 
alle seine Nachbarn, d.h. auch Polen und Russland, gegenüber denen beiden man aufgrund 
historischer Erfahrungen ein Sicherheitsbedürfnis hatte. 
 
Auch in Bezug auf Polen herrschte damals in Vilnius große Unsicherheit - man wusste ja 
nicht, wie stark auf Dauer jene Kräfte werden würden, die dem verlorenen Wilno lautstark 
nachtrauerten. Dass man Partner für einen Schutz gegen Polen finden würde, war aber 
ausgeschlossen, schließlich war es das Land, das damals die größte Aufmerksamkeit und die 
größte Unterstützung aus dem Westen genoss. Also musste es darum gehen, unter das gleiche 
Dach wie Polen zu schlüpfen, d.h. in ein Bündnis einzutreten, in dem klare Regeln gelten, 
z.B. was die Unverletzlichkeit von Grenzen angeht.  
 
Das klingt aus heutiger Sicht sehr hypothetisch und hatte damals in der litauischen Debatte 
mitunter hysterische Züge, aber man muss bedenken, dass in jener Zeit Jugoslawien gerade in 
einem blutigen Bürgerkrieg zerfiel, dass es in Moldau einen Sezessionskrieg der slawischen 
Minderheit am Ostufer des Dnjestr gab, dass im Kaukasus die Krieg um Abchasien, 
Südossetien und Nagornyj Karabach tobten. Es war nicht ausgeschlossen, dass es auch 
anderswo zu gewaltsamen Eskalationen kommen könnte - auf der Ebene von Straßengewalt 
gab es sie z.B. in Bulgarien mit der türkischen Minderheit, in Rumänien mit der ungarischen 
Minderheit. In Litauen spielte eine große Rolle, dass die Führer der polnischen Minderheit im 
Umland von Vilnius sich in den Jahren von 1989 bis 1991 von Moskau hatten 
instrumentalisieren lassen und nach dem Ende der Sowjetunion versuchten, nun Warschau für 
ihre Forderungen nach Autonomie zu gewinnen. 
 




vor allem im Westen laut geäußerte - Hoffnung, es könne sich zu einer Demokratie 
entwickeln, aber auch die Furcht, aus dem Zerfall könne eine nationlistisch-revanchistische 
Kraft hervorgehen; selbst in Russland wurden in politischen Debatte damals oft Parallelen 
zwischen der Weimarer Republik und Russland gezogen. Eine andere, durchaus reale 
Möglichkeit schien eine weitere Desintegration Russlands - zentrifugale Tendenzen gab es 
nicht nur in Tschetschenien, sondern auch in Tatarstan, Baschkortostan und einigen anderen 
Teilgebieten mit nichtrussischer Titularethnie sowie sogar einigen ethnisch russischen 
Provinzen. Wie real die Gefahr eines Staatszerfalls in Russland war, zeigte sich auch in der 
gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzugn zwischen Präsident Jelzin und dem Obersten Sowjet im 
Oktober 1993.  
 
Bei einer negativen Entwicklung Russlands (und zwar egal bei welchem Szenario), wäre 
Litauen, das sich im Staatsaufbau befand und daher in seinem Inneren selbst noch schwach 
und instabil war, nicht in der Lage gewesen, sich allein gegen die Folgen zu schützen: Weder 
hätte es sich gegen eine Aggression (auch nur eines Teils Russlands oder sich selbständig 
machender Teile der russischen Streitkräfte) verteidigen können, noch wäre es in der Lage 
gewesen, die von einem zerfallenden Russland ausgehenden Wellen der Instabilität 
aufzufangen.  
 
Dieses Gesamtbild muss man sich vor Augen halten, wenn man die damals getroffene 
grundsätzliche Entscheidung für eine Westintegration nachvollziehen will.  
 
Die frühe Festlegung aller ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten auf eine Westintegration und die 
Bereitschaft von EU und - anfangs mit Einschränkungen - Nato, diese Länder aufzunehmen, 
waren meines Erachtens ein Faktor, wenn nicht sogar der entscheidende Grund dafür, dass die 
Entwicklung dort stabil und demokratisch verlaufen ist. Vereinfacht gesagt, waren die beiden 
Organisationen informelle Garantiemächte für die Einhaltung von Regeln, sowohl in der 
Innen- wie in der Außenpolitik. Beide Organisationen machten die Erfüllung demokratischer 
Standards im Inneren zur Voraussetzung für die Aufnahme. Das hatte zwei Folgen: Zum 
einen gab es für die jeweiligen Regierungen einen starken Anreiz, sich auch wirklich an 
Regeln zu halten - ein grober Verstoß hätte zwar möglicherweise kurzfristig taktische Vorteile 
im innenpolitischen Machtkampf gebracht, wäre aber insgesamt schädlich für die eigene 
Position gewesen. Umgekehrt musste derjenige, der gerade nicht an der Macht war, nicht 




Wahlniederlage zuzugeben und die Macht in andere Hände zu geben. Entsprechende Anreize 
funktionierten auch für das Verhalten in Beziehungen zu den Nachbarstaaten.  
 
All das führte dazu, dass es in den politischen Eliten einen festen Konsens in allen 
wesentlichen Grundsatzfragen gab, was in Umbruchzeiten, in denen oft das politische 
Faustrecht regiert, alles andere als selbstverständlich ist. Damit war auch die Gefahr einer 
Manipulation innenpolitischer Ereignisse durch Moskau (die Regierung oder auch nur 
mächtige Interessengruppen in bestimmten Ministerien, Sicherheitskräften oder Wirtschaft) 
gering, wie sie in Weißrussland, der Ukraine und Moldau sowie im Kaukasus zu beobachten 
waren.  
 
Konkret auf Litauen bezogen heißt das (natürlich grob vereinfacht): Es gab nach 1991 im 
rechten Flügel von Sajudis starke Kräfte, die sich das unabhängige Litauen als nationalistisch-
autoritären Staat (ähnlich wie Kroatien unter Tudjman) vorstellten, während auf der anderen 
Seite aus der KP kommende Geschäftsleute und Interessengruppen an politischen Zuständen 
interessiert waren, wie sie sich in Russland entwickelten, d.h. einer engen Verquickung von 
wirtschaftlicher und politischer Macht. Auf beiden Seiten gab es "Geschäftsleute" aus der 
Untergrundwirtschaft der Sowjetzeit, die auf verschiedenen Wegen nach einer wenigstens 
teilweisen Legalisierung ihrer Geschäfte strebten und dazu ebenfalls politischen Einfluss 
suchten. Aber auch für alle diese Gruppen, die eine ernste Gefahr für eine demokratische 
Entwicklung waren (und z.T. noch sind), waren aus unterschiedlichen (wirtschaftlichen, 
ideologischen) Gründen die Mitgliedschaft in EU und Nato interessant. Man kann also sagen, 
dass sich Litauen mit seinem Streben nach Westbindung gewissermaßen vor sich selbst 
geschützt hat.    
 
Baltische Kooperation war also keine Alternative - zumal Estland und Lettland wegen des 
hohen Anteils russischsprachiger Bevölkerung in einer noch weitaus größeren Gefahr der 
inneren Destabilisierung als Litauen waren und also keine verlässlichen Partner werden 
konnten; davon abgesehen wären auch die drei baltischen Staaten gemeinsam zu klein 
gewesen, sich etwaigen Wiedereinverleibungsversuchen aus Osten wirksam zu widersetzen. 
Sie ist aber im Rahmen der Nato sinnvoll - so wie es ja auch deutsch-französische oder 






11.1 Timeline to Lithuanian-NATO-Membership 
 
The chronology of key events to Lithuanian NATO membership: 
 
On 20 December 1991, Lithuania together with Latvia and Estonia joined the North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council (NACC). 
 
On 13-16 March 1992, the first visit by a NATO secretary General, Manfred Wörner, to the 
Baltic States took place at the invitation of the Governments of these three states. 
 
On 5 October 1993, political parties of the Republic of Lithuania addressed the President 
regarding the integration of the Republic of Lithuania into NATO. 
 
On 4 January 1994, President of the Republic of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas sent a letter 
to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner requesting Lithuanian membership in NATO.  
 
On 27 January 1994, Lithuania joined the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programe. 
 
On 19 December 1996, Law on the Basics of National Security was adopted, which defined 
integration into European and transatlantic structures as the priority goal of the Lithuanian 
foreign policy and the measure for safeguarding national security. 
 
On 1 August 1997, the Lithuanian Mission to NATO was established. 
 
On 9 October 1997, the former Minister of National Defence Linas Linkevièius was 
appointed as Ambassador of Lithuania to NATO. 
 
On 23-25 April 1999, at the NATO Summit in Washington NATO leaders launched the 
Membership Action Plan, designed to assist countries, like Lithuania, aspiring to join the 
alliance in preparation for NATO membership. 
  




                                                
was held in Vilnius, during which the Vilnius Statement was made a joint declaration of 
NATO Enlargement. As a result of this meeting, the Vilnius Ten group was established after 
the joining of Croatia. 
 
On 17 November 2000, Ambassador Giedrius Èekuolis was appointed chief coordinator of 
Lithuanian integration to NATO. 
 
On 25 January 2001, by decree of the President, Gintë Damusis was appointed as 
Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the Western European Union (WEU). 
 
On 27-31 May 2001, NATO Parliamentary Assembly held its spring session in Vilnius.  
 
On 21 November 2002, in Prague, seven NATO candidate countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to start accession 
negotiations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
 
On 26 March 2003, Protocols of accession were signed, paving the way for the invited 
candidate countries to join the Alliance. 
 
On 10 March 2004, the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania ratified 
the Washington Treaty. 
 
On 29 March 2004, Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas and his 
Bulgarian, Estonian, Latvian, Romanian, Slovakian and Slovenian counterparts presented to 
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell the ratification instruments of the Washington Treaty. 
On this day Lithuania became a full-fledged member of NATO. 
 
On 2 April 2004, the Lithuanian flag was raised at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Antanas Valionis and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia attended the official ceremony.232 
 
 
Source: Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188864 
(03/25/09);  







Lithuania joined in 2004, together with the two other Baltic countries Estonia and Latvia, not 
only EU but also NATO. The paper deals with the reasons why Lithuania joined the military 
alliance respectively what other possibilities Lithuania had to satisfy their needs in terms of 
security especially towards Russia. First it is to be analyzed which options a small state has 
according to the liberal or the realist school of thought concerning its security. Subsequently 
the specific conditions of Lithuania  like its history, identity and its military are taken under 
consideration. A crucial factor in the context of Lithuania joining NATO is Russia. It was not 
only seen as the main threat by Lithuania, it was also the biggest opponent of NATO 
accession of the Baltic states. 
 
Abstract Deutsch: 
Litauen trat 2004, gemeinsam mit den anderen beiden Baltischen Staaten Estland und 
Lettland, nicht nur der EU sondern auch der NATO bei. Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich nun mit 
den Gründen warum Litauen der NATO beigetreten ist bzw. welche anderen Möglichkeiten es 
für Litauen gegeben hätte, sein Sicherheitsbedürfnis vor allem gegenüber Russland zu stillen. 
Zunächst wird beleuchtet welche Optionen ein Kleinstaat im Falle Litauens dem Liberalismus 
und dem Realismus folgend hat. Danach wird auf die besonderen Gegebenheiten Litauens, 
wie seine Geschichte, Identität und sein Militär eingegangen. Ein wichtiger Faktor ist 
Russland im Zusammenhang mit Litauens NATO-Beitritt, da die Russische Föderation nicht 
nur als größte Bedrohung in Litauen wahrgenommen wurde, sondern auch der größte Gegner 











2006 – 2007   Erasmus-Aufenthalt in Litauen an der Vilnius University 
 
2002 Wintersemester 
bis heute Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Wien 
 
2002 1 Semester Medizin an der Universität Wien 
 




2001     Matura am Bundesgymnasium Tulln 
 
1997    Wechsel in das Bundesgymnasium Tulln 
 
1993 – 1996 Höhere Internatsschule des Bundes Boeharvegasse 1030 Wien  
 
1989-1993 Volksschule Strohgasse Wien 
 
 
Praktika und weitere Tätigkeiten 
 
2008 September  
bis Dezember   Praktikum bei IDM (Institut für Donauraum und Mitteleuropa) 
Aufgabenfeld: mehre Publikationen, Unterstützung bei der 
Organisation von Veranstaltungen, Mitwirkung an der Studie 
„Der Donauraum“, Englische Übersetzungen 
 
  
2007 April 2 Vorträge zum Thema „Die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten der EU und 
Arbeitsmigration“ im  Auftrag der TU Wien im Rahmen des 
Projektes „Optimierte Marktbearbeitung STRABAG 2020“ mit 
der STRABAG SE 
Publikationen  
 
 „Europäische Zukunft für die Ukraine?“, in IDM Info Europa 4/2008 
 „Partei Perspektiven“ in Kooperation mit C. Hell, in „Litauen“ IDM Sonderheft als 
Beilage der Wiener Zeitung 
 „Alte Uni, neue Bildung“, in „Litauen“ IDM Sonderheft als Beilage der Wiener 
Zeitung 
 „Seen, Sand und alte Städte“, in „Litauen“ IDM Sonderheft als Beilage der 
Wiener Zeitung 
